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Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?
Derek Jinks† & David Sloss††
Abstract
The United States is party to several treaties that regulate the conduct of war, including the 1949 Geneva
Conventions on the Protection of War Victims. These treaties require belligerent states, as a matter of
international law, to accord fair and humane treatment to enemy nationals subject to their authority in time of
war. Moreover, these treaties are, as a matter of domestic law, part of the Supreme Law of the Land. The
scope and content of the Conventions have assumed central importance in debates about U.S. policy toward
al Qaeda and Taliban detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Indeed, several aspects of U.S. policy toward
the detainees arguably violate the Conventions. In response, the Bush Administration maintains in effect that
the Conventions, even if they are applicable and even if U.S. policy is inconsistent with them, are not binding
on the President as a matter of domestic law because the President has the constitutional authority to choose
to violate the Conventions in the interest of protecting national security. This Article evaluates the Bush
Administration’s claim. The Administration’s position has certain non-trivial virtues. Even if the United
States has no legal right to violate the treaties as a matter of international law, there are good reasons to
recognize an implied power to violate (or supersede) treaties as a matter of domestic law. The central
question is who should have this authority: the President or Congress. We consider in detail three variations
of the Administration’s position - read in its best light. The President’s power to violate treaties might stem
from (1) the President’s law-making authority; (2) the President’s law-breaking authority; or (3) the
President’s unfettered discretion to interpret U.S. treaty obligations. Following detailed consideration of each
variation, we conclude that the President has no authority to violate a treaty obligation if Congress has the
authority under Article I to enact legislation superseding that treaty obligation. Because the rules embodied in
the Geneva Conventions address matters within the scope of Congress’ Article I powers, the President lacks
the constitutional power (absent congressional authorization) to violate these treaties. Building on this claim,
we also argue that the President never has the unilateral authority to violate treaties because the existence of
international rules empowers Congress to regulate matters governed by the treaty, even if those matters
would otherwise be subject to the President’s exclusive power. Finally, we suggest that there is some
meaningful role for courts to play in enforcing treaty obligations—irrespective of whether the President’s
interpretation of any given treaty is entitled to substantial deference. In short, we conclude that the President
is bound by the Geneva Conventions—as a formal legal matter and as a practical matter.
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We have seen the war powers, which are essential to the preservation of the nation in
time of war, exercised broadly . . . in conditions for which they were never intended, and
we may well wonder in view of the precedents now established whether constitutional
government as heretofore maintained in this republic could survive another great war
even victoriously waged.1

INTRODUCTION
During wartime, the executive branch tends to accrue greater powers at the
expense of the legislative and judicial branches. For most of U.S. constitutional
history, the powers accrued by the executive branch in wartime reverted to the
other branches in peacetime.2 However, according to one distinguished scholar,
this did not happen at the end of World War II. As a result, he concluded, “the
situation we are faced with today is that for the first time in our history there is,
following a great war, no peace-time Constitution to which we may expect to
return in any wholesale way.”3 Another respected scholar, writing at the end of
the Vietnam War, added: “[U]nless the American democracy figures out how to
control the Presidency in war and peace . . . then our system of government will
face grave troubles.”4
Recently, in the context of the so-called “war on terror,” President Bush
has attempted to build on precedents established in past wars to support
extraordinarily broad claims of executive power. For example, a top legal adviser
in the Justice Department told the White House: “[T]he President enjoys complete
discretion in the exercise of his Commander-in-Chief authority.”5 Moreover, he
added, Congress lacks authority “to set the terms and conditions under which the
President may exercise his authority as Commander in Chief.”6 In short, when
the President invokes his Commander-in-Chief power, he is free to take any
action that, in his view, promotes national security, and Congress is powerless to
interfere with the exercise of Presidential prerogative.7
1

Charles Evans Hughes, Address at Harvard Law School, June 21, 1920, reprinted in ZECHARIAH
CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATEs 102 (1954).
2
See EDWARD S. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 168-72 (1947).
3
Id., at 172.
4
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, at x (1973).
5
See Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, Memorandum from
Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, August 1, 2002
[hereinafter, “Bybee Memo”], at 33.
6
Id., at 34.
7
Several recently declassified memoranda from high-level legal advisors argue that the Congress
lacks the authority to condition, in any meaningful way, the exercise of the Commander-in-Chief power. See,
e.g., id. at 34 (arguing that the Torture Act does not apply to interrogations undertaken pursuant to his
Commander-in-Chief authority); Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees,
Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel

2

Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?
Draft – July 17, 2004

The Bush Administration’s sweeping claims of executive power have not
gone unchallenged. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that a U.S.
citizen alleged to be an “enemy combatant” and held captive in a military prison
has a right to challenge the factual basis for his detention.8 In Rasul v. Bush, the
Court held that aliens designated as “unlawful combatants” who are being
imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have a right of access to U.S. courts.9
Hamdi and Rasul impose significant limitations on executive power in wartime,
but the Court’s decisions also leave unanswered a number of crucial questions.
One such question is whether the President has the constitutional authority
to violate treaties that regulate the conduct of warfare. The Geneva Conventions
are four treaties concluded in the aftermath of World War II whose central
purpose is to provide comprehensive and effective protection for the victims of
warfare.10 The Bush Administration is currently holding approximately six
hundred prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, most of whom were captured in the course
of armed conflict in Afghanistan.11 Assuming that the detainees do not qualify as
prisoners of war under the POW Convention, as the Bush Administration
maintains,12 they are still entitled to protection under the Civilian Convention,
to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, January 9, 2002, at 10-11 (“[hereinafter,
“Yoo/Delahunty Memo”] (disclaiming the applicability of the War Crimes Act to conduct authorized by the
President by reference to the President’s “plenary authority” as Commander in Chief); Dep’t of Defense,
Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogation in the Global War on Terrorism, March 6, 2003, at 24,
available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/print/20040622-14.html [hereinafter, Working
Group Report on Detainee Interrogation] (“In wartime, it is for the President to alone to decide what
methods to use to best prevail over the enemy.”); id. (asserting that President has “complete discretion in
exercising the Commander-in-Chief power” and that “[a]ny effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation
of unlawful combatants would violate the Constitution’s sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in
the President.”).
8
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. ___ (2004).
9
See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. ___ (2004).
10
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I];
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III, or POW Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention IV, or Civilian Convention].
11
As of September 2003, there were more than 650 detainees at Guantanamo. See Letter from the
President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Sept.
19, 2003, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09 (visited Feb. 15, 2004). As of this
writing, about ninety of the original detainees have been “transferred for release” or “returned to their home
country.” See Secretary Rumsfeld Remarks to Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce, Feb. 13, 2004,
available at www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004 (visited Feb. 15, 2004). It is unclear how many of those
may have been transferred or released before September 2003.
12
See Statement by the Press Secretary on the Geneva Convention, May 7, 2003, available at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05 (visited Feb. 15, 2004) [hereinafter “Press Statement”]. For
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which applies to all “those who, at a given moment and in any manner
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a
Party to the conflict . . . of which they are not nationals.”13 The Bush
Administration claims to be treating the Guantanamo detainees “in a manner
consistent with the principles of” the Conventions. However, it reserves the right
to deviate from specific requirements of the Conventions “to the extent
appropriate and consistent with military necessity.”14
Is the President bound, in any meaningful sense, by the Geneva
Conventions? Do the treaties, applicable only in time of war, condition the
exercise of the President’s Commander-in-Chief power? On the Administration’s
view, the answer to both questions is no.15 As a matter of international law, it is
untenable to claim that the United States has a legal right to disregard its
analysis of issues related to the classification of detainees as POWs, see infra notes 41-47 and accompanying
text.
13
Civilian Convention, supra note 10, art. 4. The Bush Administration has suggested that the
Civilian Convention does not apply to the al Qaeda detainees because they are unlawful combatants, and the
Civilian Convention applies only to “civilian non-combatants.” See Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at
Guantanamo, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02 (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter “Fact
Sheet”]. The policy described in the Fact Sheet was formalized in a directive issued by the President on
February 7, 2002. See Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, Memorandum for the Vice
President,
et
al
from
the
President,
February
7,
2002
available
at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/62204index.html [hereinafter, “Bush Directive on Treatment of
Detainees”]. The Administration’s position is difficult to reconcile with the language of the Convention
quoted above. See infra notes 479-494 and accompanying text (discussing status of detainees under Civilian
Convention).
14
Fact Sheet, supra note 13. The Fact Sheet states explicitly that “the detainees will not receive some
of the specific privileges afforded to POWs” under the POW Convention.
15
See supra text accompany notes 5-7. Indeed, the Administration has made clear that its decision to
treat detainees in a manner consistent with the Geneva Conventions is not dictated by law. See Bush
Directive on Treatment of Detainees, supra note 13; Fact Sheet, supra note 13. And, as part of the claim that
the President enjoys complete discretion as Commander in Chief, Administration lawyers argued that the
President has the constitutional authority to suspend application of the Geneva Conventions—even if doing
so is inconsistent with the Conventions themselves and international law generally. See Yoo/Delahunty
Memo, supra note 7, at 28-34. The President expressly endorsed this view in his directive concerning the
treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees. See Bush Directive on Treatment of Detainees, supra note 13.
Moreover, the scope of legal memoranda strongly suggests that the Administration thinks the President is not
bound by the Conventions. The legal memoranda are structured around the analysis of criminal statutes; and
they discuss international law only insofar as it is relevant to the interpretation of the statutes in question (or
simply as a matter of policy). The Office of Legal Counsel’s (OLC) views regarding the application of the
treaties to the Guantanamo detainees is structured around an analysis of the War Crimes Act. See
Yoo/Delahunty Memo, supra note 7, at 1-2. As a consequence, the memo is riddled with inexplicable gaps in
its analysis. For example, the memo analyzes whether contemplated policies would constitute “grave
breaches” of the Conventions—provisions of the treaties covered by the War Crimes Act—but fails to
analyze whether specific policy options would violate provisions of the Conventions that do not violate
domestic statutes. Id. at 2-11. Likewise, the OLC’s analysis of the legality of “counter-resistance”
interrogation techniques is structured around an analysis of the Torture Act. See Bybee Memo, supra note 5.
The clear implication is that international law, on the Administration’s view, arguably binds the President
only if incorporated directly into statutes (and of course, in the final analysis, not even the statutes bind the
President in the Administration’s view).
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obligations under the Conventions. But the constitutional argument advanced by
Bush Administration lawyers is a claim about domestic law, not international
law.16 The “Bush position” boils down to this: even assuming that the Geneva
Conventions are binding on the United States as a matter of international law, the
Conventions are not binding on the President as a matter of domestic law because
the President has the constitutional authority to choose to violate specific
provisions of the Conventions in the interest of protecting national security.17
This article evaluates the domestic constitutional arguments for and against the
Bush position.
This is the first law review article to offer sustained analysis of the
President’s constitutional authority to violate a treaty that is the supreme Law of
the Land. There are several scholars who have analyzed the President’s authority
to terminate treaties in accordance with international law.18 However, treaty
termination and treaty violation raise distinct constitutional issues. A Presidential
decision to terminate a treaty in compliance with international law is generally
consistent with his constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”19 In contrast, a Presidential decision to breach a treaty, in
contravention of international law, may constitute a violation of the President’s
constitutional duty under the Take Care Clause.
Scholars have also published numerous articles concerning the President’s
authority to violate customary international law (CIL).20 However, treaties raise
different constitutional issues because the Supremacy Clause states expressly that
treaties, like statutes, are the “supreme Law of the Land.”21 Granted, the majority
16

The Bush Administration has also adopted the position, as a matter of international law, that the
Guantanamo detainees do not qualify as prisoners of war under the POW Convention. See, e.g., Bush
Directive on Treatment of Detainees, supra note 13. We discuss that issue below. See infra notes 63-70 and
accompanying text. However, this article focuses primarily on the domestic constitutional argument, asserted
in Justice Department memos, that the President has the constitutional authority to violate treaties governing
the treatment of wartime detainees.
17
The Bybee Memo, supra note 5, emphatically endorses the view that we characterize here as the
“Bush position.” It is unclear whether the Bush White House has endorsed this position.
18
See, e.g., DAVID GRAY ADLER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TERMINATION OF TREATIES (1986);
Raoul Berger, The President’s Unilateral Termination of the Taiwan Treaty, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 577 (1980);
Louis Henkin, Litigating the President’s Power to Terminate Treaties, 73 AM. J. INT’L L. 647 (1979); David
J. Scheffer, Comment, The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to the United States De-Recognition of the
Republic of China, 19 HARV. INT’ L L. J. 931 (1978).
19
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
20
See, e.g., Agora: May the President Violate Customary International Law?, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 913
(1986) (collection of short essays approaching the question from different perspectives); Agora: May the
Presdient Violate Customary International Law? (Cont’d), 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 371 (1987) (same); Michael J.
Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law by the Executive
Unconstitutional?, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 321 (1985); Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and
International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1988).
21
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
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view is that CIL is also “supreme over the law of the several States.”22 But that
does not mean that CIL and treaties have co-equal status within the hierarchy of
federal law. Federal regulations are supreme over state law, but they rank lower
than statutes in the federal hierarchy because Congress enacts statutes. Similarly,
one could plausibly argue that CIL should rank lower than treaties in the federal
hierarchy because the Senate approves treaties.23 Here, it is not our purpose to
defend any particular position regarding the domestic status of CIL. Our claim is
simply that questions involving the President’s power to violate treaties raise
distinct constitutional issues. Therefore, even assuming that the President has the
constitutional authority to violate CIL, it does not necessarily follow that the
President has the constitutional authority to violate a treaty that is supreme Law of
the Land.
Apart from general issues concerning the President’s authority to violate
treaties, the question whether the President is bound by the Geneva Conventions
implicates certain unique issues involving the President’s Commander-in-Chief
power.24 The Conventions belong to a fairly small class of treaties that regulate
the conduct of warfare. Scholars have written extensively about the relationship
between the Commander-in-Chief power and Congress’ power to “declare
War.”25 In addition to the Declare War Clause, though, the Constitution also
grants Congress a number of other powers related to the conduct of warfare.26
There is surprisingly little scholarly commentary on the relationship between

22

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(1) (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. The prevailing view is that CIL is the law of the United States because
it qualifies as “federal common law.” Criticizing this position, Professors Bradley and Goldsmith have
challenged the view that CIL preempts state law. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815
(1997). For a defense of the view that CIL preempts state law, see Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law
Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998). The Supreme Court has now settled at least some aspects
of this debate. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. ___ (2004) (Slip op. at 38) (holding that some subset
of CIL is federal common law).
23
Professor Ramsey has advanced a similar argument. See Michael D. Ramsey, International Law as
Non-Preemptive Federal Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 555 (2002).
24
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (designating the President as the “Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States”).
25
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 11. For recent commentary on this issue, see, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey,
Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543 (2002); Michael D. Ramsey, Text and History in the
War Powers Debate: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1685 (2002); John C. Yoo, War and
Constitutional Texts, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639 (2002).
26
See, e.g., U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (the power “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations”); U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (the
power to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water);
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (the power “[t]o raise and support Armies”); U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 13 (the
power “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy”); U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (the power “[t]o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”).
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these congressional powers and the President’s Commander-in-Chief power.27
That relationship is important for purposes of this article because law-of-war
treaties address some matters that are arguably subject to the President’s exclusive
constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief.28 Matters subject to the
President’s exclusive authority are, by definition, beyond the scope of Congress’
article I powers. It is firmly established that Congress has the power to violate
U.S. treaty obligations within the scope of Article I by enacting legislation that
supersedes a particular treaty provision as a matter of domestic law. However, if
the Geneva Conventions regulate matters beyond the scope of Congress’ article I
powers, then either the President has the constitutional authority to violate the
treaties, or the federal government as a whole lacks the power.
In this Article, we argue that the President never has the unilateral
authority to violate a treaty; thus, he must always obtain Congress’ approval if he
wishes to do so. We also argue that the courts have a meaningful role to play in
enforcing treaties. The argument is organized as follows. Part I provides general
background information about the Geneva Conventions. It also shows that the
Bush Administration has adopted a range of policies and procedures that may be
inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the Conventions. Parts II through V each
address a different version of the claim that the President is not bound by the
Geneva Conventions. One variant of the argument is that the President is not
bound by the Conventions because they lack the status of supreme federal law.
Part II rebuts that argument. It demonstrates that, prior to September 11, 2001,
the Geneva Conventions were the supreme Law of the Land under the Supremacy
Clause. Moreover, legislation enacted since 9/11 has not altered the domestic
status of the Conventions in any material respect.
Part III analyzes the relationship between treaties and the President’s
independent lawmaking authority to assess whether the President has the
lawmaking authority to supersede the Conventions as matter of domestic law. On
November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an executive order related to the
27

But see Lt. Col. Bennet N. Hollander, The President and Congress: Operational Control of the
Armed Forces, 27 MIL. L. REV. 49 (1965). Hollander argues that Congress may not enact legislation
regulating the operational control of the armed forces because these matters are the exclusive province of the
President as Commander-in-Chief. See, e.g., id. at 72. He does not address whether the President may violate
treaties (or CIL) regulating the conduct of war. In fact, he seems to suggest at times that the “law of nations”
and the “law of war” limit the scope of the Commander-in-Chief power. See, e.g., id. at 58 (quoting Brown v.
United States, 12 U.S., (8 Cranch) 110, 147 (1814) (Story, J. dissenting)). Nor does he suggest that the
regulation of military operations is beyond the scope of the treaty power. In short, Hollander does not analyze
the problem under review here. In Part IV, we offer a sustained analysis of the issues identified by Hollander
in so far as they implicate the distribution of constitutional authority to violate treaties. See infra Section
IV.C.
28
See infra notes 341-359 and accompanying text.
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detention, treatment, and trial of certain enemy aliens.29 That Military Order
authorized the Secretary of Defense to prescribe rules governing conditions of
detention (which have never been published), and to issue regulations for trials
before military commissions, which have been published.30 Insofar as regulations
adopted pursuant to the Military Order may conflict with certain provisions of the
Geneva Conventions, the question arises whether the Military Order supersedes
the relevant treaty provisions as a matter of domestic law. Part III contends that,
although the President has a limited power to create federal law by issuing
unilateral executive orders, any conflict between the Military Order and the
Geneva Conventions must be resolved in favor of the treaties.
Part IV confronts directly the central question raised in this article:
whether the President has the constitutional authority to violate the Geneva
Conventions. The analysis proceeds in three parts. First, we rebut the claim that
the President as Commander-in-Chief has the constitutional authority to violate
federal statutory and constitutional law in emergency situations for the sake of
protecting national security. Second, we demonstrate that the President’s duty to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”31 includes a duty to execute
treaties. Therefore, the President must obtain congressional authorization for any
policy that contravenes a treaty provision that is Law of the Land. Third, we
consider the claim that treaties regulating the conduct of warfare constitute a
special case, and that the President must have the constitutional authority to
violate such treaties insofar as they regulate conduct beyond the scope of
Congress’ Article I powers. Part IV rejects this claim for two reasons. First, even
if this claim were valid, it would not apply to the Geneva Conventions, for the
most part, because most of the Conventions’ provisions address matters within the
scope of Congress’ legislative powers. Second, when the United States ratifies
treaties regulating the conduct of warfare, the act of ratification alters the
allocation of power between the President and Congress, thus empowering
Congress to regulate matters that would otherwise be subject to the exclusive
control of the President as Commander in Chief.
Part V addresses the constitutional separation of powers between the
President and the courts with respect to treaty interpretation. The Bush
Administration has suggested that the President is not bound by the Geneva
Conventions -- at least not in any practical sense -- because the President has
29
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57833 (2001) [hereinafter Military Order].
30
Dep’t of Defense, Military Comm’n Order No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002) [hereinafter DOD Order], http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf
31
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
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unfettered discretion to interpret the treaties as he sees fit.32 Although the Geneva
Conventions do present some treaty interpretation issues that raise nonjusticiable
political questions, Part V demonstrates that the Conventions also present some
treaty interpretation questions that are well within the scope of judicial
competence. Therefore, the President’s power to interpret the Conventions is
subject to judicial control.
I.
BACKGROUND
Part One is divided into two sections. The first section provides a general
introduction to the Geneva Conventions. The second section presents an
overview of Bush Administration policies that may be inconsistent with U.S.
obligations under the Conventions.
A.

The Geneva Conventions

The United States is party to several multilateral treaties governing the
conduct of war. These treaties constitute the so-called “law of war.” Because our
argument directly addresses the legal status of only one (important) aspect of this
law, it is important to provide some background on the law of war generally and
the Geneva Conventions specifically. The “law of war” encompasses two distinct
bodies of rules: the jus ad bellum—rules governing when uses of force are lawful;
and the jus in bello—rules governing the conduct of war. The jus in bello itself
has two principal subdivisions: “Geneva law” and “Hague law.” Geneva law,
embodied principally in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two 1977
Additional Protocols, prescribes an extensive body of detailed rules governing the
treatment of the victims of armed conflict.33 Hague law, embodied principally in
the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, govern the means and methods of
warfare—i.e., the tactics and general conduct of hostilities.34 This is not to say
that Geneva law includes no rules governing means and methods of warfare; or
that Hague law includes no rules governing the treatment of war victims—indeed,
each treaty series includes elements of the other. This terminology, although
conceptually imprecise, emphasizes the distinction between the two kinds of
32

See infra note 463 and accompanying text.
See Geneva Conventions, supra note 10; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for
signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened
for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II].
34
See, e.g., Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 (Hague Regulations are annexed to the Convention) [hereinafter Hague
Regulations or Hague Convention].
33
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regimes—one governing the treatment of persons subject to the enemy’s authority
(Geneva law), the other governing the treatment of persons subject to the enemy’s
lethality (Hague law). In contemporary parlance, “international humanitarian law”
embraces the whole jus in bello, in both its “Geneva” and “Hague” dimensions.35
The four Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims form the
core of so called “Geneva law.” These treaties were drafted in 1949—in the wake
of World War II. The war had revealed several important deficiencies in the law
of war: the conditions under which the rules applied were poorly defined; the
rules inadequately protected various categories of vulnerable persons subject to
the authority of the enemy; the rules did not provide any protection in noninternational armed conflict; and the rules were not adequately enforced.36 The
Conventions were designed to address each of these concerns.
First, the Conventions apply in all cases of armed conflict between two or
more states—irrespective of whether either of the states has issued a formal
declaration of war.37 That is, the treaties apply whenever there exists a de facto
state of armed conflict between states. Moreover, these treaties obligate states
party to them irrespective of whether the state (or states) against which they fight
is party to them.38
Second, each of the four Conventions prescribes detailed rules defining
the proper treatment of one category of “protected persons”—the sick and
wounded on land, the sick, wounded, and shipwrecked at sea, prisoners of war,
and civilians. The central idea of these treaties, as alluded to earlier, is to establish
minimum rules for the treatment of persons subject to the authority of the enemy
(e.g., persons captured and detained by the enemy). For example, under Geneva
law, POWs have the following rights: (1) the right to humane treatment while in
confinement (including important limitations on coercive interrogation tactics);39
(2) due process rights if subject to disciplinary or punitive sanctions;40 (3) the
right to release and repatriation upon the cessation of active hostilities;41 and (4)
35

See generally INGRID DETTER, THE LAW

OF

WAR x-xviii (2000) (surveying these terminological

issues).
36

See generally GEOFFREY BEST, LAW AND WAR SINCE 1945 (1998) (summarizing the views of
governments and the International Committee of the Red Cross).
37
Geneva Conventions, supra note 10, Common Art. 2. The Conventions also apply in all cases of
military occupation. Id.
38
Id. See also Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239
(2000) (outlining the significance of this development).
39
Geneva Convention III, supra note 10, art. 13 (humane treatment). See also id., arts. 17-19 (rules
concerning interrogation); id., arts. 21-48 (rules governing conditions of confinement).
40
Id., arts. 99-108.
41
Id., art. 117-118.
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the right to communication with (and the institutionalized supervision of)
protective agencies.42 The GPW also prohibits reprisals against POWs;43 and
precludes the use of POWs as slave laborers.44 In addition, the treaties define,
with some precision, the categories of persons protected by them.45
Third, the Geneva Conventions also specify fundamental humanitarian
protections applicable to all persons subject to the authority of a party to a
conflict—even if the conflict is not international in character (i.e., a civil war).
These protections, first codified in Common Article 3 of the Conventions, govern
the treatment of persons no longer taking active part in the hostilities.46 All such
persons are entitled to humane treatment and, in the case of criminal charges, fair
trial by “a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which
are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”47
Finally, the Conventions established an enforcement and implementation
scheme with three important features: (1) states are required to enforce the treaty
through the imposition of criminal sanctions; (2) warring parties must designate a
neutral state or organization as a “Protecting Power” empowered by the
Conventions to monitor compliance with the treaties during armed conflicts; and
(3) the Conventions include substantial due process protections designed to ensure
some measure of judicial and/or administrative oversight of the treatment
accorded war detainees.
In summary, the Geneva Conventions govern the treatment of detainees
(and others subjected, in some formal way, to the authority of the enemy) in time
of armed conflict. These treaties outline modest, but important humanitarian
guarantees with an emphasis on humane treatment, communication rights, due
process, fair trial rights, and repatriation. Compliance with the Convention is to be
monitored by administrative and/or judicial tribunals in the detaining state as well
as a neutral “Protecting Power;” violations of the Convention give rise to
individual criminal liability. These features of the Conventions, taken together,
provide a viable legal framework that strikes the proper balance between military
necessity and humanitarian ideals.

42

Id., arts. 8-11.
Id., art. 13.
44
Id., arts. 49-57.
45
See infra notes 62-65, 479-494 and accompanying text (describing the “protected persons”
definitions in the POW and Civilians Conventions).
46
See Geneva Conventions, supra note 10, Common art. 3.
47
Id.
43
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The Conventions entered into force on October 21, 1950;48 the United
States ratified all four Conventions in 1955. In 1956, the U.S. Army Field
Manual on the Laws of War was revised to reflect the numerous important
developments codified in the Geneva Conventions.49 As of January 2004, over
190 states have ratified the Conventions.50
In 1977, two Additional Protocols to the Conventions were opened for
signature. These Protocols sought to elaborate, clarify and extend the protective
schemes of the Geneva Conventions.51 The First Additional Protocol, governing
international armed conflicts, also sought to resolve several important ambiguities
in so-called “Hague law” (governing the means and methods of warfare).52 The
Second Additional Protocol sought to elaborate the rules applicable to noninternational armed conflicts.53 Although these treaties also enjoy broad
international participation,54 the United State has not ratified either Protocol.55
B.
Possible Treaty Violations Since 9/11
In this Section, we argue that the Bush Administration, since September
11, 2001, has adopted a range of policies and practices that are arguably
inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the Geneva Conventions. Our purpose
here is not to offer a comprehensive defense of this position. We intend only to
demonstrate that several policies and practices pursued in the “war on terrorism”
raise non-trivial concerns under the Geneva Conventions.
Notwithstanding the detainee abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib prison in
Iraq,56 we emphasize U.S. policy with respect to the treatment of detainees at
48

See 75 U.N.T.S. 31; 75 U.N.T.S. 85; 75 U.N.T.S. 135; 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL: THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE (1956).
50
See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977: Ratifications, Accessions and Successions, at http://www.icrc.org/eng/party_gc
(documenting 191 ratifications).
51
MICHAEL BOTHE, ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE
TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, 261-63 (1982).
52
See, e.g., AP I, supra note 33, arts. 50-57.
53
See AP II, supra note 33.
54
See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977: Ratifications, Accessions and Successions, at http://www.icrc.org/eng/party_ap
(documenting 161 ratifications).
55
The United States has, however, signed Additional Protocol II. President Reagan transmitted the
treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent, but the Senate has not consented to the treaty. See Letter of
Transmittal of Protocol II to the Senate by President Reagan, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 2, 100th Cong. at III
(1987), reprinted in 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 910 (1987).
56
See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE,
Prepared by Major Gen. Antonio M. Taguba (The “Taguba Report), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT ]; Seymour M. Hersh,
Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, April 30, 2004.
49
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Guantanamo Bay. We do so for two reasons. First, the precise contours of formal
U.S. policy in Iraq are unclear. It is important to note that the Administration
concedes that the conduct at Abu Ghraib violated the Geneva Conventions;57 and
it maintains that this conduct was contrary to U.S. policy.58 Moreover, the military
has initiated criminal proceedings against several soldiers deemed directly
responsible for the abuse.59 And although some evidence strongly suggests that
U.S. policy concerning interrogation methods and conditions of detention was
inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions,60 there is insufficient information at
the time of this writing to draw definitive conclusions. In addition, there is good
reason to think that any improprieties at the policy level resulted from an illconceived strategy to transplant Guantanamo detainee policies into Iraq.61 In other
words, sustained reflection on the legality of U.S. practices in Guantanamo is, in
an important sense, also an analysis of U.S. policy in Iraq. Second, the details of
U.S. policy in Guantanamo are publicly available; and several aspects of this
policy are, we submit, flatly inconsistent with U.S. treaty obligations.62
Consider four examples. First, the procedures utilized by the
administration to classify war detainees under Geneva law are arguably deficient
under that law. Second, the merits of these classification decisions are themselves
also questionable under the terms of the treaties. Third, the treatment accorded the
detainees in Guantanamo Bay, including the so-called “interrogation rules of
engagement,” is arguably inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions—irrespective
of whether the detainees are entitled to POW status. And, fourth, the
contemplated trials by special military commission are arguably inconsistent with
the fair trial and due process guarantees recognized in the Conventions (again,
57

See, e.g., AP Newswire, Pentagon Officials: Interrogation Techniques Lawful, May 13, 2004
(quoting Marine General Peter Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Deputy Defense
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz—both acknowledging that the abuse constituted violations of the Geneva
Conventions).
58
See, e.g., Dep’t of Defense, Defense Department Background Briefing, May 14, 2004, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040514-0752.html (transcript of Senior Military official
insisting that U.S. policy was to apply the Geneva Conventions in Iraq); Richard W. Stevenson, White House
Says Prisoner Policy Set Humane Tone, NEW YORK TIMES, June 23, 2004 at A1.
59
See, e.g., US Marines Plead Guilty to Prisoner Abuse, GUARDIAN, June 3, 2004; see also Thom
Shanker, At Iraqi Prison, Rumsfeld Vows to Punish Abuse, NEW YORK TIMES, May 14, 2004, at A1.
60
See, e.g., John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004; Seymour M. Hersh,
The Gray Zone, NEW YORKER, May 24, 2004; Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command, NEW YORKER, May 9,
2004.
61
See, e.g., Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, Afghan Policies on Questioning Prisoners Landed in Iraq,
NEW YORK TIMES, May 21, 2004, at A1.
62
See, e.g., Fact Sheet, supra note 13 (outlining Administration policy with respect to detainees on
Guantanamo); White House, Press Briefing by White House Counsel Judge Alberto Gonzalez, et al., June 22,
2004, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/print/20040622-14.html (describing in great
detail the evolution of U.S. policy regarding treatment of Guantanamo detainees and announcing the release
of many Administration orders and memoranda defining and debating the contours of this policy). These
orders and memoranda are available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/62204index.html.
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irrespective of the “status” of the detainee). These four examples divide into two
types of potential violations. The first two examples illustrate possible treaty
violations issuing from the U.S. decision to deny the Guantanamo detainees POW
status. The second two examples illustrate possible violations issuing from the
treatment accorded these detainees—however classified under Geneva law. In the
balance of this Section, we consider each type of example in more detail.
The U.S. government has arguably denied the Guantanamo detainees
POW status improperly. The official U.S. government position is that neither
Taliban nor al Qaeda fighters qualify as POWs because they failed to satisfy
international standards defining “lawful combatants.”63 This position is arguably
deficient under Geneva law in at least two respects: (1) the U.S. determination
that the detainees are not POWs is flawed because it relies on a misreading of the
POW Convention; and (2) the U.S. must, irrespective of the merits of their
classification, treat the detainees as POWs until a “competent tribunal” has
determined that they do not qualify for POW status. The first criticism questions
the U.S. interpretation of Article 4 of the POW Convention—identifying persons
entitled to POW status (the “Article 4 issue”).64 The second, on the other hand,
questions the U.S. interpretation of Article 5 of the treaty—establishing
presumptive POW status in all cases of “doubt” and prescribing the procedure for
determining the legal status of captured fighters (the “Article 5 issue”).65 On both
63

See Press Conference, Department of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, Feb. 8,
2002, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002; Fact Sheet, supra note 13. For a summary of
the government’s position, see Sean Murphy, Decision Not to Regard Persons Detained in Afghanistan as
POWs, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 475 (2002); Mike Allen and John Mintz, Bush Makes Decision on Detainees,
WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at A1.
64
See, e.g., Jordan Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 1, 2-6 (2001) [hereinafter Paust, Courting Illegality]. Article 4 of the POW Convention identifies several
categories of persons protected by the Convention. See POW Convention, supra note 10, art. 4. With respect
to Article 4, one important question is whether the four criteria expressly applied to “militia and other
volunteer corps” in paragraph (A)(2) also limit the scope of paragraph (A)(1) concerning members of the
armed forces. That is, there is some question whether members of the regular armed forces must have a
command structure, wear uniforms, carry arms openly, and generally comply with laws of war to qualify for
POW status. On the other hand, the text of (A)(1) does not make reference to “regular” armed forces. Indeed,
it extends coverage to “members of militia and other volunteer corps forming part of” the armed forces—and,
inexplicably, this reference to “militia and other volunteer corps,” unlike the reference in (A)(2), is not
qualified by the four criteria. This textual anomaly strongly suggests that the four criteria apply only to
“militia and other volunteer corps” not part of the “armed forces” of the state; and that captured fighters
covered by (A)(1) are POWs irrespective of whether they satisfy the four criteria. See, e.g., George H.
Aldrich, New Life for the Laws of War, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 764, 768-69 (1981) (arguing that Article 4(A)(2)
criteria apply only to certain “irregular” armed forces and that “[m]embers of regular, uniformed armed
forces do not lose their PW [prisoner of war] entitlements no matter what violations of the law their units
may commit, but the guerrilla unit is held to a tougher standard ....”).
65
See, e.g., Yasmin Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner-of-War Status, 84 INT ’L REV. RED CROSS 571 (2002);
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Request for Precautionary Measures, Detainees in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (IACHR March 12, 2002) (on file with authors) (granting, in part, petitioners’
request for precautionary measures; and urging the U.S. “to take urgent measures necessary to have the legal
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fronts, U.S. policy is arguably inconsistent with the minimum requirements of the
Convention.
The United States has maintained that these detainees do not qualify for
POW status; and that the assignment of POW status in this case would be bad
policy. Specifically, the U.S. argues that neither the Taliban nor the al Qaeda
detainees satisfy the express requirements of the POW Convention, and that POW
protections would impede the investigation and prosecution of suspected
terrorists.66 Of particular concern on the policy front are (1) restrictions on the
interrogation of POWs;67 (2) the criminal procedure rights of POWs (which might
preclude trial by special “military commission”);68 and (3) the right of POWs to

status of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay determined by a competent tribunal” in accordance with Article 5
of the POW Convention). It is difficult, in many cases, to discern easily whether a captured combatant
satisfies the requirements of Article 4—a point well understood by the drafters of the Convention. To address
this problem directly, the Convention establishes that captured combatants, when their status is unclear, are
presumptively entitled to POW status. Article 5 of the Convention provides that, “Should any doubt arise as
to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong
to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.” POW Convention,
supra note 1, art. 4. In response, the United States maintains that the status of Taliban and al Qaeda detainees
was not in “doubt.” See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Detainees Are Not P.O.W.’s, Cheney and Rumsfeld
Declare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at A6 (quoting Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld that “[t]here is no
ambiguity in this case”). However, long-standing U.S. policy provides for Article 5 tribunals whenever the
detainee asserts POW status or asserts facts that would entitle him or her to POW status. See U.S Army,
Army Reg. 190-8. In addition, substantial evidence suggests that, as an objective matter, there was some
doubt as to the status of these detainees. Recall that several dozens of the detainees have been released over
the course of the last two years, and reports indicate that many more may be released in the wake of the
Supreme Court rulings in Rasul and Hamdi. In fact, the Defense Department has now established “Combatant
Status Review Tribunals” to determine the legal status of the detainees. See Neil A. Lewis, U.S. is Readying
Review Panels for Cuba Base, NEW YORK TIMES, July 17, 2004, at A1.
66
See, e.g., Yoo/Delahunty Memo, supra note 7.
67
Under the POW Convention, the detaining authority may not subject POWs to coercive
questioning, and POWs are required only to provide name, rank, and serial number to interrogators. See
Geneva Convention III, supra note 10, arts. 17-18; Jeremy Rabkin, After Guantanamo: The War over the
Geneva Conventions, NAT’L INTEREST 15 (Summer 2002) (defending denial of POW status to Taliban and Al
Qaeda detainees, in part, on this ground); Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions,
96 AM. J. INT’L L. 328 (2002) (same); Ruth Wedgwood, The Rules of War Can’t Protect Al Qaeda, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2001 (same).
68
See MILITARY ORDER, supra note 20. It is a fair reading of the POW Convention that POWs facing
criminal charges are entitled to trial by court-martial or regular civil court. See POW Convention, supra note
1, arts. 99, 102; Neal Kumar Katyal & Laurence Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1263-66 (2002) (concluding, in view of rights recognized in the POW
Convention, that the Military Order must cover only unlawful belligerents); Laura Dickinson, Using Legal
Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1423-24 (2002); Daryl A. Mundis, The Use of Military Commissions to Prosecute
Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 320, 324-26 (2002); Diane F. Orenlichter & Robert
Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 25 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 659-63 (2002); Paust, Courting Illegality, supra note 64. Under this view, denying
POW status would appear to leave open the possibility of trying detainees before military commissions for
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release and repatriation following the cessation of hostilities.69 In short, the
United States has denied the detainees POW status in part because POW rights
were deemed inconsistent with U.S. policy objectives.70 The important point here
is that, irrespective of the merits of these concerns, U.S. policy is manifestly
inconsistent with Geneva law if the procedures utilized to classify these detainees
were insufficient; or if the classification determinations were inaccurate in fact or
erroneous in law.
In addition, the treatment of these detainees is arguably deficient under the
Geneva Conventions—even if they were lawfully denied POW status. Assuming
that the detainees are not POWs, they are still “protected persons” under Common
Article 3 and many of them are protected under the Civilians Convention. The
Civilians Convention and Common Article 3 grant rights to “unlawful
combatants” that are nearly identical to the rights granted POWs under the POW
Convention.71 Thus, by denying the Guantanamo detainees the protections of the
POW Convention, the United States is violating many of the rights to which they
are legally entitled under Common Article 372 and the Civilians Convention.73
violations of the law of war. For evaluation of this claim, in view of the arguments developed herein, see
infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.
69
See Geneva Convention III, supra note 10, arts. 117-118 (recognizing the right to repatriation);
Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 AM. J.
INT’L L. 345, 353 (2002) (suggesting that this right is one procedural consequence of denying POW status);
Rabkin, supra note 45 (defending denial of POW status to Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees, in part, on this
ground); Wedgwood, supra note 45 (same).
70
The internal memoranda traffic on the issue indicates that there was some support for assigning the
detainees POW status. See, e.g., Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva Conventions, Memorandum to
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, Department of State,
February 2, 2002 [hereinafter, “Taft Memo”] (arguing that U.S. classify detainees as POWs irrespective of
whether they satisfy the formal requirements of the POW Convention).
71
See Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming
2004); see also infra text accompanying notes 479-494 (assessing the Administration’s claim that “unlawful
combatants” are not protected by the Civilian Convention).
72
For example, Common Article 3 prohibits “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” Geneva Conventions, supra note 1.
Thus, many of the arguments against trial of POWs by military commission apply with equal force to persons
protected under Common Article 3. See infra notes 87-99 and accompanying text. It must be noted that the
President expressly determined that Common Article 3 does not apply to the war on terrorism because the
conflict is “international in scope.” See Bush Directive on Treatment of Detainees, supra note 13; see also
Yoo/Delahunty Memo, supra note 7. Although an extended analysis of this claim is beyond the scope of this
Article, suffice it to say that it is plainly incorrect as a matter of law. By its terms, Common Article 3 applies
to “armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties.” On the Administration’s view, this language makes clear that the provision governs only armed
conflicts confined to the territory of one state. The text, structure, and history of the provision, however,
demonstrate that it applies to all armed conflicts not involving two or more opposing states. See generally
Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2003). Common Article 3 was
revolutionary (and controversial in some quarters) because it regulates wholly internal matters as a matter of
international humanitarian law. If the provision governs wholly internal conflicts, as the “one state”
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The claim that the detainees are not protected by Geneva law has provided
the foundation for U.S. detention policy at Guantanamo. The clearest—and
perhaps most controversial—aspect of this policy are the “interrogation rules of
engagement.” Unencumbered by international legal obligation, the Administration
crafted an interrogation policy motivated solely by U.S. policy preferences—
narrowly conceived. In Part V, we analyze in some detail the legality of the
interrogation techniques authorized for use in Guantanamo.74 It is sufficient here
to point out only that these “counter resistance” techniques clearly violate the
Geneva Conventions—if the Conventions do indeed protect the detainees—in that
they involve various forms of coercion and intimidation including implied threats
of violence and other forms of gross mistreatment.75 The POW Convention
obligates the detaining power to protect POWs “against [all] acts of violence or
intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.”76 It also provides that
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may
be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of
any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not
be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or
disadvantageous treatment of any kind.77

interpretation recognizes, then the provision applies a fortiori to armed conflicts with international or
transnational dimensions. The language of the provision limiting its application to the “territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties” simply makes clear that application of the provision requires a nexus to the
jurisdiction of a state party to the treaty. Id. at 41. In addition, the Administration’s interpretation produces
several inexplicable regulatory asymmetries. On the Administration’s view, the Conventions would cover
international armed conflicts proper (in virtue of Common Article 2) and wholly internal armed conflicts (in
virtue of Common Article 3), but would not cover armed conflicts between a state and an armed group with a
transnational presence. The Conventions also would not cover internal armed conflicts that spill over an
international border into the territory of another state. The only reasonable reading of the provision is that it
applies to all “armed conflicts” not covered by Common Article 2—the provision defining international
armed conflict within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions. Id. at 38-41.
73
See, e.g., Civilian Convention, supra note 10, art. 31 (restricting interrogation of protected persons);
id., arts. 65-76 (specifying criminal procedure rights of protected persons); id., arts. 132-35 (providing for
release and repatriation of protected persons). The Civilian Convention guarantees the detainees a right of
access to a canteen to purchase “foodstuffs and articles of everyday use, including soap and tobacco.”
Civilian Convention, supra note 10, art. 87. However, the Administration has stated explicitly that the
detainees will not receive “access to a canteen to purchase food, soap, and tobacco.” Fact Sheet, supra note
13.
74
See infra Part V (analyzing interrogation policy as an illustration of the kind of Convention-based
claims that might succeed in court).
75
See infra text accompanying notes 495-501 (describing and analyzing interrogation specific
techniques).
76
POW Convention, supra note 10, art. 13.
77
Id. art. 17.
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Likewise, the Civilians Convention provides that protected persons “shall at all
times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of
violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.”78 This
Convention also provides that: “No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised
against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from
third parties.”79 Simply put, the techniques authorized by the Defense Department
are plainly inconsistent with these obligations.80 Indeed, the Secretary of Defense
acknowledged, in his April 2003 Order authorizing these tactics, that several of
the techniques are inconsistent with provisions of the POW Convention.81
Finally, the contemplated criminal trials by ad hoc military commission
arguably violate the fair trial rights recognized in the Geneva Conventions.82 As
discussed above, the military commission procedures clearly fail to satisfy the
requirements of the POW Convention.83 On this point, there is little room for
meaningful disagreement because the POW Convention flatly requires the
detaining state to “assimilate” POWs into the legal regime governing their own
armed forces.84 The relevant aspect of this regime for present purposes is the rule
requiring that POWs be tried before the same courts, and according to the same
procedures, as members of the armed forces of the detaining state.85 Therefore,
POWs detained and tried by the United States must be tried by regular courts-

78

Civilian Convention, supra note 10, art. 27. This provision makes clear that the protection against
violence and threats of violence is part of the right to “humane treatment.” This is important for two reasons:
(1) Article 5 of the Civilian Convention requires that all civilians, even “unlawful combatants” be treated
humanely, id. art. 5; and (2) Common Article 3 requires that all enemy combatants be treated humanely in all
circumstances. Id. art. 3.
79
Civilian Convention, supra note 10, art. 31. See also POW Convention, supra note 10, art. 17 (“No
physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure
from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened,
insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.”)
80
See infra text accompanying notes 495-501 (assessing these interrogation techniques under Article
31 of the Civilian Convention).
81
See Dep’t of Defense, Counter-Resistence Techniques in the War on Terrorism, Memorandum for
the Commander, US Southern Command from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, April 16, 2003,
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/62204index.html [hereinafter Rumsfeld April 2003
Memo].
82
Fifteen detainees have been designated for trial by military commission. See Dep’t of Defense,
Press Release, Presidential Military Order Applied to Nine More Combatants, July 7, 2004, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040707-0987.html. And charges have been referred in several
cases. See, e.g., Dep’t of Defense, Armed Forces Information Service, Yemeni Detainee to Face Military
Commission, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/n07142004_2004071406.html; Dep’t of
Defense, Armed Forces Information Service, Guantanamo Detainees Charged with Conspiracy to Commit
War
Crimes,
Feb.
24,
2004,
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/n02242004_200402246.html.
83
See supra note 68 (summarizing this point and collecting citations).
84
See POW Convention, supra note 10, arts. 82-106.
85
Id., art. 102.
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martial.86 In other words, the POW Convention prohibits trial by the contemplated
ad hoc military commissions irrespective of whether the procedures utilized
therein satisfy basic due process requirements—simply put, the right to
assimilation precludes the use of special procedures.
In addition, the procedures prescribed by the Department of Defense for
trials by military commission arguably fall short of the minimum guarantees
recognized in the Geneva Conventions.87 Note first that all detainees are entitled
to substantial fair trial guarantees under the Conventions. The Civilians
Convention provides due process rights that, in most respects, mirror those
provided by the POW Convention.88 Moreover, the Conventions establish
minimum procedural rights for any person charged with serious violations of its
substantive rules irrespective of the person’s status under the Conventions. 89 Any
person prosecuted for violations of the Geneva Conventions, irrespective of their
status as “protected persons,” must be provided with “safeguards of proper trial
and defence, which shall not be less favorable than” those outlined in Articles 105
and following of the Third Geneva Convention (concerning POWs).90 Article 105
specifically provides for basic fair trial rights including: the right to counsel of the
defendant’s choice, the right to confer privately with counsel, the right to call
witnesses, and the right to an interpreter.91 These provisions also require, for
example, that accused persons be granted the same right of appeal as that open to
members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power.92 In addition, Common
Article 3, applicable to all war detainees, prohibits “the passing of sentences and
the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”93 This rule, even though
somewhat abstract, clearly prohibits punishment without a “previous judgment”
suggesting that a formal adjudication is required. The body pronouncing this
judgment must be “regularly constituted” suggesting that it must be established in
86

See, e.g., Paust, Courting Illegality, supra note 64, at 17 n.39.
See DOD Order, supra note 30 (outlining the trial procedure).
88
The Civilian Convention does not include so-called “assimilation” rights but the specific fair trial
rights recognized in the Convention are identical to those found in the POW Convention. See Civilian
Convention, supra note 10, arts. 64-76, 126, 146-47; see also Jinks, supra note 71.
89
See, e.g., Civilian Convention, supra note 10, art. 146. This is an important source of fair trial
rights in this context because the Administration asserts the authority to try by military commission only
persons accused of violations of the laws of war. See, e.g., Alberto Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full and Fair,
NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27 (maintaining that persons subject to trial by military commission
“must be chargeable with offenses against the international law of war.”).
90
Geneva Convention I, supra note 10, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 10, art. 50; POW
Convention, supra note 10, art. 129; Civilian Convention, supra note 10, art. 146.
91
POW Convention, supra note 10, art. 105.
92
Id., art. 106.
93
Id.
87
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law; and that it must not be convened especially for the punishment of the
adversary. And this body must be a “regularly constituted court” suggesting that
there must be adequate safeguards in place to ensure the impartiality,
independence, and fairness of the institution issuing the judgment. Moreover, the
text of Common Article 3specifically the reference to the opinions of “judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples”also
establishes an evolving standard that, by design, tracks customary international
law in this area.94
The military commission procedures arguably fail to satisfy these
requirements in several respects. For example, the commissions themselves
arguably do not constitute impartial, independent tribunals.95 The commissions
arguably do not qualify as “tribunals established by law,” and they clearly are not
“regularly constituted courts.”96 In addition, the Department of Defense
procedures arguably deprive defendants of any meaningful right to counsel.97
They also limit the defendant’s ability to mount an effective defense by sharply
qualifying the right to confront witnesses and compel process.98 Finally, the
procedures do not recognize a right to appeal to a higher tribunal.99
94

See, e.g., LINSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 86-88 (2002). Therefore,
Common Article 3 arguably requires that all war detainees be accorded the basic fair trial rights recognized in
major human rights treaties. Id. See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
arts. 9, 14, & 15, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; The African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, June 27, 1981, arts. 3, 6, & 7, 21 I.L.M. 59; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
arts. 7, 8, & 9, 9 I.L.M. 673; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 5, 6, & 7, 312 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S.
45, Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55, and Protocol No. 8, E.T.S. 118; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts.
9-11, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 72, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
95
See, e.g., LAWYER’S COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, TRIALS UNDER MILITARY ORDER: A GUIDE TO
THE FINAL RULES FOR THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS 5 (2003) [hereinafter LCHR, TRIALS UNDER MILITARY
ORDER] (arguing that the military commission scheme is “particularly susceptible to abuse because the entire
process is limited to one branch of government (the executive) with no meaningful independent oversight or
review by either the judiciary or the legislature, and none of the participants has both standing and an interest
to challenge possible abuses.”).
96
See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of
Procedure, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 677, 687-90 (2002) [hereinafter Paust, Ad Hoc DoD Rules].
97
One problematic aspect of the rules is that civilian counsel (the counsel chosen by the accused) can
be excluded from “closed Commission proceedings” and denied “access to any information protected under
[the procedure’s security exclusion].” DoD Order, supra note 30, §§ 4(C)(3), 6(B)(3), 6(D)(5); see also
Paust, Ad Hoc DoD Rules, supra note 96, at 690.
98
The procedures drastically curtail the right of confrontation. Cross-examination of witnesses
against the accused is authorized only with respect to witnesses “who appear before the Commission.” DoD
Order, supra note 21, § 5(I). Witnesses can also provide testimony “by telephone, audiovisual means, or
other means,” by “introduction of prepared declassified summaries of evidence,” “testimony from prior trials
and proceedings,” “sworn [and even] unsworn written statements,” and “reports.” Id. § 6(D). See also Paust,
Ad Hoc DoD Rules, supra note 96, at 685-87.
99
Verdicts issued by the military commissions may be appealed to specially established “Review
Panels.” See DoD Order, supra note 30, § 6(H)(4); see also LCHR, TRIALS UNDER MILITARY ORDER, supra
note 95, at 5-6 (criticizing the absence of a right to appeal guilty verdicts to a civilian court).
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II.
The Domestic Status of the Geneva Conventions
One could argue that the President is not bound by the Geneva
Conventions, as a matter of domestic law, because the Conventions lack the status
of law within the domestic legal system. Part Two addresses this argument. The
analysis is divided into two sections. The first section demonstrates that the
Geneva Conventions were the Law of the Land under the Supremacy Clause
before September 11, 2001. The second section shows that Congress has not
enacted legislation since September 11, 2001 to supersede the Conventions as a
matter of domestic law.
A.

The Domestic Status of the Conventions Before 9/11

President Truman transmitted the Geneva Conventions to the Senate on
April 25, 1951.100 The Senate gave its consent to ratification on July 6, 1955.101
The United States ratified the treaties on July 14, 1955. This section demonstrates
that the Conventions had the status of supreme federal law within the domestic
legal system prior to 9/11. The first sub-section addresses those portions of the
Conventions for which implementing legislation is constitutionally required. The
second sub-section addresses the provisions for which implementing legislation is
not constitutionally required.
1. Provisions for Which Implementing Legislation Is Constitutionally
Required: There are some provisions of the Conventions for which implementing
legislation is constitutionally required. For example, it is generally agreed that a
treaty provision “requiring states parties to punish certain actions . . . could not
itself become part of the criminal law of the United States, but would require
Congress to enact an appropriate statute before an individual could be tried or
punished for the offense.”102 Certain provisions of the Geneva Conventions
obligate the United States to impose criminal sanctions for specified conduct that
constitutes a “grave breach” of the Conventions.103 Implementing legislation is
100

Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, S.
Exec. Rep. No. 84-9 (1955), reprinted at 84 Cong. Rec. 9962, 9963 (1955) [hereinafter, Senate Report].
101
84 Cong. Rec. 9958, 9972-73 (1955).
102
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 111, cmt. i. A minority view holds that implementing
legislation is not constitutionally required to give domestic legal effect to treaty provisions requiring criminal
sanctions. See JORDAN PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 59-62 (1996).
103
See Geneva Convention I, supra note 10, art. 49 (obligating States Parties “to enact any legislation
necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of
the grave breaches of” Convention I, which are defined in article 50); Geneva Convention II, supra note 10,
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probably constitutionally required to give domestic legal effect to the “grave
breaches” provisions.
When the United States ratified the Geneva Conventions, the Executive
Branch expressed the view that it was unnecessary to enact new implementing
legislation for the grave breaches provisions because “it would be difficult to find
any of these [grave breaches] which, if committed in the United States, are not
already violations of the domestic [criminal] law of the United States.”104 The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee agreed with that assessment.105 Thus, at the
time of ratification, the political branches agreed that the constitutional
requirement for implementing legislation was satisfied by pre-existing criminal
legislation. Forty years later, though, the political branches decided that existing
legislation was inadequate. Congress enacted the War Crimes Act of 1996 to
impose federal criminal sanctions for grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions.106 Since 1996, the U.S. treaty obligation to impose criminal
sanctions for specified violations of the Conventions has been fully incorporated
into domestic law by virtue of a combination of federal statutes that implement
various aspects of the U.S. treaty obligations.107
Aside from the grave breaches provisions, there is one other aspect of the
Geneva Conventions for which implementing legislation may be constitutionally
required. Article 74 of the POW Convention and article 110 of the Civilian
Convention provide that relief shipments for prisoners of war and civilian
internees shall be exempt from import duties.108 The Constitution provides that
art. 50 (imposing a similar obligation with respect to grave breaches of Convention II, which are defined in
article 51); POW Convention, supra note 10, art. 129 (imposing a similar obligation with respect to grave
breaches of Convention III, which are defined in article 130); Civilians Convention, supra note 10, art. 146
(imposing a similar obligation with respect to grave breaches of Convention IV, which are defined in article
147).
104
Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims: Hearing on Executives D, E, F and G
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1955) [hereinafter, Senate Hearing]
(statement of Richard R. Baxter, Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense).
105
See Senate Report, supra note 100, at 9970 (“The committee is satisfied that the obligations
imposed upon the United States by the “grave breaches” provisions are such as can be met by existing
legislation enacted by the Federal Government within its constitutional powers. A review of that legislation
reveals that no further measures are needed to provide effective penal sanctions . . . .”).
106
Pub. L. No. 104-192, 110 Stat. 2104 (1996) (“Whoever, whether inside or outside the United
States, commits a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, in any of the circumstances described in
subsection (b), shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both, and if death
results to the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death.”) One year later, Congress amended the
statute to expand criminal liability to include other war crimes, in addition to grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions. See Pub. L. No. 105-118, title V, § 583, 111 Stat. 2436 (1997). The statute is now codified at
18 U.S.C. § 2441.
107
See generally War Crimes Act of 1996, H. Rep. No. 104-698, pgs. 3-7 (1996).
108
See POW Convention, supra note 10, art. 74; Civilian Convention, supra note 10, art. 110.
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“[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.”109
There is some authority to suggest that this provision may preclude the treaty
makers from utilizing the treaty power to amend pre-existing laws that impose
duties on imports.110 Thus, implementing legislation may be constitutionally
required to give domestic effect to the Geneva Convention articles that exempt
relief shipments from import duties. Regardless, legislation enacted prior to U.S.
ratification of the Conventions gave the President the requisite statutory authority
to implement these provisions.111 In sum, there are a few articles of the Geneva
Conventions for which implementing legislation may be constitutionally required.
Those articles have the status of supreme federal law within the domestic legal
system because Congress has enacted appropriate legislation to incorporate the
relevant provisions into domestic law.
2.
Provisions for Which Implementing Legislation Is Not Required:
Under the Supremacy Clause: “[A]ll Treaties made . . . under the Authority of the
United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”112 This means that all
treaties ratified by the United States have the status of supreme federal law, unless
a particular treaty provision exceeds the scope of the treaty makers’ domestic
lawmaking powers, or it is superseded by a subsequent inconsistent treaty or
statute.113 Most provisions of the Conventions are well within the scope of the
treaty makers’ domestic lawmaking powers.114
For such provisions,
109

U.S. Const. art. I § 7, cl. 1.
See SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 183-99 (2d ed. 1916)
(documenting the fact that, by the middle of the 19th century, the political branches had developed a tacit
understanding that treaties involving concessions in tariff duties would not have domestic effect in the
absence of implementing legislation).
111
See Senate Hearing, supra note 104, at 59 (Letter from Assistant Attorney General to Chairman of
Senate Foreign Relations Committee) (noting that 19 U.S.C. § 1318 “provides that during a war or national
emergency the President may authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to permit the duty-free importation of
food, clothing, and other supplies for use in emergency relief work”). The letter adds that “it may be
appropriate to revive” a World War II statute that specifically authorized duty-free importation of “articles
addressed to prisoners of war and civilian internees in the United States.” Id. However, Congress apparently
decided that it was not necessary to revive that statute, because Congress never enacted any such legislation.
112
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2
113
For a detailed exposition of this interpretation of the Supremacy Clause, see David Sloss, Non-SelfExecuting Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 46-55 (2002). A competing
interpretation of the Supremacy Clause holds that a treaty provision has the status of supreme federal law
unless the treaty makers intended to prevent a particular provision from having domestic legal effect. See,
e.g., Carlos M. Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 700-710
(1995). Even under that interpretation of the Clause, most provisions of the Geneva Conventions are
supreme federal law because there is no evidence that the treaty makers intended to prevent them from
having domestic effect. See infra notes 118-128 and accompanying text for further discussion of this point.
114
This statement is based on two assumptions: 1) most provisions of the Conventions address matters
that are within the scope of Congress’ Article I powers; and 2) the treaty makers generally have the power to
create domestic law within the scope of Article I, because most of Congress’ Article I powers are concurrent
powers, not exclusive powers. We provide a detailed defense of the first assumption below. See infra [crossref]. Most scholars agree with the second assumption, but Professor Yoo has argued that the treaty makers
110
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implementing legislation is not constitutionally required. For most such
provisions, Congress has not enacted implementing legislation.115 Even so, the
various articles of the Geneva Conventions for which there is no implementing
legislation have the status of supreme federal law because the Supremacy Clause
grants them that status.
One might object that a treaty has the status of supreme federal law only if
the treaty makers intended it to have that status.116 As a matter of constitutional
law, we contend that this objection is misguided because a treaty’s status as
supreme federal law is governed by the Constitution, and the treaty makers lack
the power to alter the relevant constitutional rules by manifesting their intent to
deprive a treaty of its status as Law of the Land under the Supremacy Clause.117
For present purposes, though, we will assume that the treaty makers’ intentions do
have some relevance to the question whether the Geneva Conventions are the Law
of the Land. Given this assumption, analysis of the domestic legal status of treaty
provisions for which there is no implementing legislation requires discussion of
whether the Conventions were intended to be self-executing.
The Senate record associated with ratification of the Geneva Conventions
does not contain any general statement by either the Senate or the executive
branch suggesting that the Conventions, as a whole, are either self-executing or
non-self-executing. There are a few statements indicating that particular
provisions of the Conventions are non-self-executing.118 One might infer from

cannot utilize the Article II treaty process to create domestic law within the scope of Congress’ Article I
powers. See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original
Understanding, 99 COLUM L. REV. 1955 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism]; John C. Yoo, Rejoinder,
Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM L. REV.
2218 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Rejoinder]. For detailed criticism of Yoo’s thesis, see Martin S. Flaherty,
History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the
Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999); Carlos M. Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154
(1999).
115
When the Senate consented to ratification of the Conventions, the Senate Report stated explicitly
“that very little in the way of new legislative enactments will be required to give effect o the provisions
contained in the four conventions.” Senate Report, supra note 100, at 9971. The report then recommended a
few minor changes in federal statutes. Id. at 9971. Apart from these few items, and the war crimes
legislation noted above, see supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text, there has not been any legislation to
implement the Conventions.
116
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 111(4)(a) (stating that a treaty is non-selfexecuting, and will not be given effect as law in the absence of implementing legislation, “if the agreement
manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as domestic law without the enactment of
implementing legislation”).
117
For a detailed defense of this position, see Sloss, supra note 113.
118
See, e.g., Senate Report, supra note 100, at 9970 (“It should be emphasized, in any event, that the
grave breaches provisions cannot be regarded as self-executing”); id. at 9969-70 (discussing articles 53 and
54 of Geneva Convention I, which concern the use of the “Red Cross” symbol by private parties, and noting
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these statements that the treaty makers thought that the vast majority of
Convention provisions – those not specifically said to be non-self-executing –
would be self-executing. This inference is reinforced by the fact that the Senate
and the executive branch both stated that most of the Conventions’ provisions
could be implemented without enacting new legislation.119 Even so, aside from
the few provisions explicitly said to be non-self-executing, the Senate record as a
whole provides at best weak evidence of the treaty makers’ intentions regarding
the self-executing or non-self-executing character of the Conventions.
In contrast, the subsequent practice of the U.S. military provides fairly
strong evidence that the executive branch has understood the Conventions to have
the status of supreme federal law. On October 1, 1997, the government published
Army Regulation 190-8, which establishes policies and procedures “for the
administration, treatment, employment, and compensation of enemy prisoners of
war (EPW), retained personnel (RP), civilian internees (CI) and other detainees
(OD) in the custody of the U.S. Armed Forces.”120 The regulation states
explicitly that it is “a multi-service regulation,” which “applies to the Army,
Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps and to their Reserve components.”121 The
regulation does not cite any federal statute as a basis of authority for its adoption.
Rather, it cites the Geneva Conventions as the basis for the military’s legal
authority to promulgate the regulations.122 Moreover, the regulation states: “In
the event of conflicts or discrepancies between this regulation and the Geneva
Conventions, the provisions of the Geneva Conventions take precedence.”123 In
short, the U.S. military has taken the position that the Geneva Conventions are
directly binding on all U.S. military forces as a matter of domestic law, even
where the Conventions conflict with the military’s own regulations.
Some courts have argued that language in the Conventions calling for
implementing legislation demonstrates that the treaty drafters intended the
Conventions to be non-self-executing.124 This argument is mistaken for two
that “[i]t is the position of the executive branch that the prohibition of articles 53 and 54 is not intended to be
self-executing.”).
119
See, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 104, at 59 (letter from Assistant Attorney General to Senator
George stating that, upon ratification of the Conventions, “the United States will be required to enact only
relatively minor legislation” to implement the Conventions); Senate Report, supra note 100, at 9971 (“From
information furnished to the committee it appears that very little in the way of new legislative enactments
will be required to give effect to the provisions contained in the four conventions.”).
120
Army Regulation 190-8, § 1.1(a).
121
Id., cover page.
122
Id., § 1.1(b).
123
Id., § 1.1(b).
124
See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (stating that the POW Convention and the Civilians Convention “expressly call for implementing
legislation,” and that “[a] treaty that provides that party states will take measures through their own laws to
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reasons. First, the treaty language at issue merely calls for legislation “to provide
effective penal sanctions for persons committing” grave breaches.125 Thus, at
most this language suggests that the treaty drafters intended the grave breaches
provisions to be non-self-executing;126 it does not manifest an intention that the
Conventions as a whole would be non-self-executing. Moreover, the Conventions
obligate parties “to enact any legislation necessary.”127 The phrase “any
legislation necessary” is designed to accommodate the differences between
domestic legal systems that always require implementing legislation for treaties
(dualist systems), and domestic legal systems that never require implementing
legislation for treaties (monist systems).128 Thus, the language does not actually
manifest an intention for the grave breaches provisions to be non-self-executing.
Rather, it manifests the treaty makers’ recognition that broad-based multilateral
treaties must be formulated in a manner that takes account of the variety of
domestic legal systems in the countries where the treaty is to be implemented.
Judicial opinion is divided on the question of whether the Geneva
Conventions are self-executing. Two district courts have held explicitly that at
least some provisions of the Geneva Conventions are self-executing.129 The
majority of courts that have explicitly addressed the question have held that the

enforce its proscriptions evidences its intent not to be self-executing.”); Linder v. Portocarrero, 747 F.Supp.
1452, 1463 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (“The Geneva Conventions expressly call for implementing legislation, and
therefore . . . are not self-executing.”).
125
See Geneva Convention I, supra note 10, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 10, art. 50;
POW Convention, supra note 10, art. 129; Civilian Convention, supra note 10, art. 146. There are a few
other articles of the Conventions that call for legislation dealing with specific aspects of the Conventions.
See, e.g., Geneva Convention I, supra note 10, art. 54 (“The High Contracting Parties shall, if their legislation
is not already adequate, take measures necessary for the prevention and repression, at all times, of the abuses
referred to under Article 53.”). But there is no general provision that calls for implementing legislation for
the Conventions as a whole.
126
As noted above, under U.S. constitutional law the grave breaches provisions would be non-selfexecuting in any event, because implementing legislation is constitutionally required for a treaty provision
obligating the United States to impose criminal sanctions for designated conduct. See supra notes 87-92 and
accompanying text.
127
See Geneva Convention I, supra note 10, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 10, art. 50;
POW Convention, supra note 10, art. 129; Civilian Convention, supra note 10, art. 146.
128
The Netherlands, for example, has a monist legal system; treaties never require implementing
legislation. See Pieter van Dijk & Bahiyyih G. Tahzib, Parliamentary Participation in the Treaty-Making
Process of the Netherlands, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 413, 418 (1991). In contrast, the United Kingdom has a
dualist system, where treaties always require implementing legislation. See Lord Templeman, Treaty-Making
and the British Parliament, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 459, 467-69 (1991).
129
See United States v. Lindh, 212 F.Supp.2d 541, 553 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding that the Prisoner of
War Convention, “insofar as it is pertinent here, is a self-executing treaty”); United States v. Noriega, 808
F.Supp. 791, 797 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (“[G]iven the opportunity to address this issue in the context of a live
controversy, the Court would almost certainly hold that the majority of provisions of Geneva III are, in fact,
self-executing.”).
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Conventions are not self-executing.130 However, a simplistic division into
majority and minority views obscures more than it clarifies.
The cases supporting non-self-execution generally say that the
Conventions are non-self-executing because they do not create a private right of
action.131 The conclusion that the Conventions do not create a private right of
action is entirely consistent with the proposition that the Conventions have the
status of supreme federal law. In American Insurance Assoc. v. Garamendi,132 the
Supreme Court enjoined enforcement of a California statute that required
insurance companies to disclose information about “insurance policies issued to
persons in Europe, which were in effect between 1920 and 1945.”133 The Court
held that the California law was preempted by certain bilateral agreements
between the United States and European governments.134 Despite the fact that
130
See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., concurring)
(stating that the “Geneva Convention of 1949” is not self-executing, without specifying which Convention he
is addressing); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003) (POW Convention is not selfexecuting); United States v. Fort, 921 F.Supp. 523, 526 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (POW Convention is not selfexecuting); Linder v. Portocarrero, 747 F.Supp. 1452, 1462-63 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (rejecting claim based on
Common Article 3, and stating that “the Geneva Conventions are not self-executing”); Handel v. Artukovic,
601 F.Supp. 1421, 1424-26 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (rejecting claim based on the 1929 Geneva Convention, in part
because the 1949 POW Convention is not self-executing); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,
808-09 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (neither the POW Convention nor the Civilian Convention is
self-executing); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978) (rejecting child custody claim
based on Articles 24 and 49 of the Civilian Convention because “there is no evidence that any of the general
language relied upon by plaintiffs was intended to be self-executing”).
131
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003) (POW Convention is not selfexecuting because “the document, as a whole, [does not] evidence an intent to provide a private right of
action”) (quoting Goldstar (Panama) v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992)); Handel v.
Artukovic, 601 F.Supp. 1421, 1425 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (“In the absence of authorizing legislation, an individual
may enforce a treaty’s provisions only when it is self-executing, i.e., when it expressly or impliedly provides
a private right of action”); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (concluding that neither the POW Convention nor the Civilians Convention is self-executing
because neither treaty “provides a private right of action”); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th
Cir. 1978) (stating that there is no evidence that the Civilians Convention “was intended to be self-executing
or to create private rights of action in the domestic courts of the signatory countries”).
132
123 S. Ct. 2374 (2003).
133
Id. at 2383.
134
Id. at 2390-93. The Court’s preemption analysis relies primarily on three bilateral executive
agreements: Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future,” United
States-Germany, July 17, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1298; Agreement Between the Austrian Federal Government and
the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Austrian Fund “Reconciliation, Peace and
Cooperation,” October 24, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 523; Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of France Concerning Payments for Certain Losses Suffered During World
War II, January 18, 2001, 2001 WL 416465. All three agreements acknowledge the creation of certain
“funds” or “foundations” by European governments that are designed to compensate victims for harms they
suffered during World War II. All three agreements provide that the designated funds or foundations are
intended to provide the exclusive remedy for such victims. See, e.g., U.S.-Germany Agreement, supra, art. 1,
para. 1 (“The parties agree that . . . it would be in their interests for the Foundation to be the exclusive remedy
and forum for the resolution of all claims that have been or may be asserted against German companies
arising from the National Socialist era and World War II.”).
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none of the bilateral agreements created a private right of action,135 the Court
granted relief to private plaintiffs on the grounds that the agreements preempted
California law under the Supremacy Clause.136 Thus, Garamendi supports the
proposition that international agreements of the United States have the status of
supreme federal law under the Supremacy Clause, regardless of whether they
create a private right of action.137
Only three published judicial opinions have explicitly addressed the
question whether the Geneva Conventions have the status of supreme federal law
under the Supremacy Clause; all three agree that the Conventions are the Law of
the Land.138 In contrast, none of the cases holding that the Conventions are nonself-executing explicitly address the status of the Conventions under the
Supremacy Clause. Thus, unanimous judicial precedent supports the proposition
that the Geneva Conventions – at least in substantial part – have the status of
supreme federal law.
In sum, with respect to the vast majority of Convention provisions for
which implementing legislation is not constitutionally required, judicial precedent
supports two conclusions. First, the Conventions are non-self-executing in the

135
The bilateral agreements manifest the drafters’ expectations that the agreements may be invoked
defensively in U.S. courts. See id., art. 2, para. 1 (“The United States shall, in all cases in which the United
States is notified that a claim described in article 1(1) has been asserted in a court in the United States, inform
its courts . . . that it would be in the foreign policy interests of the United States for the Foundation to be the
exclusive remedy and forum for resolving such claims asserted against German companies . . . and that
dismissal of such cases would be in its foreign policy interest.”). In Garamendi, though, the insurance
companies did not invoke the bilateral agreements defensively. Rather, they sued the Insurance
Commissioner of the State of California to enjoin enforcement of the California law. See Garamendi, 123 S.
Ct. at 2385. There is nothing in the language of any of the agreements to suggest that the drafters anticipated,
or intended to authorize, this type of private lawsuit. Thus, the plaintiffs in Garamendi implicitly relied on
the Supremacy Clause as a basis for a private right of action to enforce international agreements that
themselves did not create a private right of action. See David Sloss, Ex parte Young and Federal Remedies
for Human Rights Treaty Violations, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1193-97 (2000) (contending that the
Supremacy Clause creates an implied private right of action for some treaty-based preemption claims against
state officers).
136
Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. 2374.
137
One could make a persuasive argument that Garamendi was wrongly decided insofar as it equated
sole executive agreements with treaties. See, e.g., David Sloss, International Agreements and the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1963 (2003). Regardless, the central point here is that a treaty
that does not create private rights of action, like a statute that does not create private rights of action, might
still have the status of supreme federal law under the Supremacy Clause.
138
Padilla v. Bush, 233 F.Supp.2d 564, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that the POW Convention “under
the Supremacy Clause has the force of domestic law”); United States v. Lindh, 212 F.Supp.2d 541, 553-54
(E.D. Va. 2002) (stating that provisions of the POW Convention “in issue here are a part of American law
and thus binding in federal courts under the Supremacy Clause”); United States v. Noriega, 808 F.Supp. 791,
794 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (stating that the POW Convention “is undoubtedly a valid international agreement and
‘the law of the land’ in the United States”).
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sense that they do not create a private right of action.139 Second, and most
importantly for the purposes of this paper, the Conventions are self-executing in
the sense that they have the status of supreme federal law under the Supremacy
Clause.
B.

Legislation Since 9/11

Some may argue that Congress, in the wake of September 11, 2001, has
authorized violations of the Geneva Conventions. This section refutes that
argument. At the outset, it is important to emphasize that Congress has not
expressly authorized the President to violate the Geneva Conventions.
Nevertheless, it might be argued that two congressional acts impliedly authorize
violations of the Conventions: the congressional resolution authorizing the use of
force against those responsible for the September 11 attacks; and the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001. This Section demonstrates that: (1) the authorization to
use force does not implicate U.S. obligations under the Geneva Conventions; and
(2) the PATRIOT Act, at the most, enacts a few modest qualifications of U.S.
obligations under the Civilians Convention.
1. Congressional Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force: The Joint
Congressional Resolution authorizing the use of force does not authorize the
President to violate the Geneva Conventions. By its terms, the resolution
authorizes the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”140
The Joint Resolution also characterizes the attacks as “armed attacks” against the
United States in order to justify the use of force in self-defense. Indeed, the
Resolution arguably characterizes the attacks as inherently unlawful acts of war,
or “war crimes.”141 The language of the Resolution, therefore, clearly
contemplates executive action aimed at attacking and killing those responsible for
the September 11 attacks, or in the alternative, capturing, detaining, and punishing
any such persons. In this sense, it is clear that Congress contemplated the direct,
severe application of U.S. power against a foe formally characterized as the

139

We express no view as to whether this conclusion is correct. We simply note that judicial
precedent supports this conclusion.
140
Joint Resolution: To Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Those Responsible
for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18,
2001).
141
Id.
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“enemy.” The question is whether the Resolution directly or impliedly authorizes
the President to engage in conduct contrary to the Geneva Conventions.
Although the Joint Resolution does not on its face mention the Geneva
Conventions, it may nevertheless impliedly authorize violations of these treaties.
There are two versions of this argument—one plausible and the other not. It is
therefore important to distinguish these two competing conceptions of this
implied authorization: (1) the resolution authorizes the use of any tactics deemed
essential in that it authorizes the President to use “all necessary and appropriate
force” to prevent further attacks; and (2) the resolution triggers the application of
a network of lawsstatutes, treaties, common law, and regulationsgoverning
the use of force that in turn authorize the President to violate the Geneva
Conventions.
The first view does not withstand even casual scrutiny. The Resolution, as
important as it may be, is not a blanket authorization for the President to wage the
War on Terrorism in any way he sees fit. Although the Resolution authorizes the
President to use “all necessary and appropriate force,” this phrase is best
understood as an authorization to deploy U.S. forces in a range of operational
settings—up to and including operations that would constitute an “armed conflict”
or “war” against another sovereign state. In other words, the Resolution
authorizes the President to take action short of war, or, if necessary, to commit
U.S. troops to war. Indeed, the language used in the Resolution mirrors that of
previous (and subsequent) resolutions authorizing the use of force.
To read the Resolution more broadly is inconsistent with several important
interpretive considerations. First, U.S. law criminalizes many violations of the
Geneva Conventions.142 It is difficult to sustain the claim that Congress impliedly
repealed various provisions of the U.S. penal code and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice.143 Second, all evidence suggests that Congress would have
presumed that military operations would be conducted in accordance with the
laws of war. No evidence suggests that the executive sought, or suggested the
necessity of, the discretion to conduct military operations in any way inconsistent
with U.S. treaty obligations. Indeed, substantial evidence suggests that the U.S.
military thought (or thinks) that it is in the strategic interest of the United States to
comply with the laws of war.144 It is important to note in this regard that the
President did not seek a formal declaration of war in part because he considered
142

See 18 U.S.C. § 2441.
10 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.
144
See, e.g., DEP’T OF ARMY, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 10 (2003);
Department of Defense Law of War Program, DoD Directive 5100.77 (Dec 9, 1998) (establishing that, as a
matter of U.S. policy, U.S. forces are to observe the law of war).
143
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the extraordinary powers triggered by such a declaration unnecessary. Third,
long-standing U.S. military regulations require all operations to be conducted in
accordance with the Geneva Conventions.145 This dense network of regulations
(tightly coupled to the statutory provisions of the UCMJ) constituted an important
part of the backdrop against which Congress issued the Resolution.
The second variant of this claim, though more plausible, is nevertheless
flawed. Recall that, on this view, the resolution in conjunction with some other
source or sources of authority empowers the President to take action inconsistent
with U.S. treaty obligations. This variant acknowledges that the Joint Resolution
could not of its own force authorize the President to suspend statutes and treaties
that might otherwise condition the exercise of the war-making power. The
resolution might, nevertheless, constitute sufficient congressional authorization to
activate other presidential powers arising out of other specific statutes or the
Constitution itself—powers that might allow the President to derogate from
specific treaty obligations. The most salient example is the claim that Congress
has, in time of war, authorized the use of military commissions—and insofar as
the use of these special tribunals violates the Geneva Conventions, Congress has
authorized these violations.146
On this application of the view, the resolution arguably empowers the
President to invoke the “Articles of War,” including the provisions authorizing the

145

See, e.g., DEP’T OF ARMY, FM 27-10: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL: THE LAW OF
LAND WARFARE (1956); Army Regulation 190-8, § 1.1(b) (“In the event of conflicts or discrepancies between
this regulation and the Geneva Conventions, the provisions of the Geneva Conventions take precedence.”).
146
To be clear, the argument is not that further congressional authorization is unnecessary. Rather, the
argument identified here is that the Joint Resolution constitutes wholly sufficient authorization for the use of
military commissions. There are two variants of this claim. The argument is that Congress, by authorizing the
use of force, implicitly sanctioned the establishment of military commissionseven absent any other
constitutional or statutory source of authoritybecause: (1) the resolution necessarily authorizes any action
short of armed force in dealing with the September 11 attackers in that the greater power includes the lesser;
or (2) the use of military commissions itself constitutes the “use of force” within the meaning of the
resolution. These are obviously strained readings of the resolution. After all, the resolution triggers a
narrower range of emergency powers than would a formal declaration of war. In addition, the Constitution as
well as some treaties and statutes govern the exercise of the President’s war-making power; and might
prohibit or authorize the use of specific institutions such as military commissions. It is also important to note
that the Supreme Court in Quirin did not sanction the use of commissions based solely on the fact that the
Congress had declared war on Germany. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26-29 (1942) (identifying two
potential sources of authority to establish commissions: statute and the Commander-in-Chief power). Of
course, some commentators argue that the Court’s reasoning in Quirin suggests that a formal declaration of
war is a condition precedent for the invocation of either basis. See, e.g., Katyal & Tribe, supra note 68. The
rather clumsy arguments outlined above must, therefore, be distinguished from the more plausible claim that
the resolution read in conjunction with another power (the commander-in-chief power, for example)
establishes the president’s authority to convene military commissions. See infra notes 147-156 and
accompanying text.

31

Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?
Draft – July 17, 2004

use of military commissions.147 The central question driving the vigorous, ongoing debates concerning the President’s power to issue the Military Order is
whether the Joint Resolution is sufficient to trigger these other powers or whether
a formal declaration of war is necessary.148 For the purposes of this analysis, the
important point is that the Joint Resolution arguably authorizes the use of military
commissions only insofar as it activates other sources of authority cited in the
Military Order—namely, 10 U.S.C. §§ 821 and 836.149
Section 821 provides:
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courtsmartial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or
other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to
offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be
tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military
tribunals.150
By its terms, this provision does not appear to authorize the establishment of
military commissions.151 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Quirin held that
“Congress [in what is now § 821] has explicitly provided, so far as it may
constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try
offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases,” and held that
“Congress [in what is now § 821] has authorized trial of offenses against the law
of war before such commissions.”152 Many commentators argue that the Court’s
147

10 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq.
Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military
Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249 (2002); with Katyal & Tribe, supra note 46.
149
See MILITARY ORDER, supra note 20, prmbl.
150
10 U.S.C. § 821 (1994) (emphasis added).
151
See, e.g., Katyal & Tribe, supra note 68, at 1285-87; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 148, at * 7
(suggesting that the terms of the statute appear to “recognize[ ] a pre-existing non-statutory authority in the
President”); David J. Bederman, Article II Courts, 44 MERCER L. REV. 825, 834 (1993) (“Although federal
statute recognizes military commissions, it is clear that Congress considers them established . . . under the
laws of war.” ).
152
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1942). See also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER
& DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 408-15 (5th ed.
2003); DEP’T OF ARMY, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK 206 (2000) (stating that
UCMJ “authorizes the use of military commissions, tribunals, or provost courts to try individuals for
violations of the law of war”) (emphasis added); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 148, at * 7-8; id. at * 7
(“Although by its terms this provision recognizes a pre-existing non-statutory authority in the President, the
Supreme Court in Quirin held that this provision also constitutes congressional authorization for the
President to create military commissions.”). In fact, many critics of the result in Quirin acknowledge that the
Court interpreted Article 15 of the Articles of War as congressional authorization for military commissions.
See, e.g., Michael R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of the Nazi
Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REV. 59, 82 (1980); David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs’ Case, 1 J. S. CT. HIST. 61
(1996). It is important to note that in Quirin the government also charged the German saboteurs under Article
148
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reasoning in Quirin is closely tethered to the facts of the case and should not
apply outside these unique circumstances.153 Some also maintain that the Court’s
interpretation of the predecessor of § 821 is implausible,154 implying that perhaps
the Supreme Court should revisit the issue.155 Irrespective of the merits of these
contentions, the applicability of § 821 to the present circumstances will turn, in
substantial part, on whether individuals subject to the Military Order may, under
the laws of war, be tried by special military tribunal. That is, the statute
authorizes the use of military commissions, even under the Quirin court’s
reasoning, only insofar as the laws of war permit it. Therefore, insofar as such
tribunals violate the Geneva Conventions, which are an integral part of the laws of
war, this statutory provision does not authorize their use.156

82 of the Articles of War—a provision that clearly authorized military commissions to try the offense of
spying. The Court, however, examined only the “laws of war” charges, and had “no occasion to pass on” the
other charges. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 46. In Yamashita, the Supreme Court, relying in part on Quirin, again
read the predecessor of § 821 as explicit congressional authorization for military commissions to try offenses
against the laws of war. In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 46 (1946). See also Bederman, supra note 151, at
835-36 n.55.
153
These circumstances include: the case was decided in the context of a formally declared, “total”
war; the charges were levied against only eight identified defendants; the charges were supported by
irrefutable evidence; the list of charges included alleged violations of statutes clearly assigning jurisdiction to
military commission. See, e.g., Katyal & Tribe, supra note 68; Oversight of the Dep’t of Justice: Preserving
our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Scott L. Silliman).
154
See, e.g., Katyal & Tribe, supra note 68, at 1281-1284; Belknap, supra note 152; Danelski, supra
note 152.
155
See, e.g., Katyal & Tribe, supra note 68 (advocating an overruling of Quirin). One difficulty with
this view is that courts, for obvious reasons, do not lightly abandon stare decisis in the context of statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) (stating that “[c]onsiderations of
stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation” (citation omitted)); Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation
of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it reenacts a statute without change.”); Burnet v. Coronado
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-06 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (outlining why heightened rules of
stare decisis apply in statutory settings); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CCONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 1-16,
3-3, at 84 & n.42, 251-54 (3d ed. 2000). Specifically, it appears that Congress ratified the holding in Quirin
when reenacting § 821. See SEN. RPT. 486, Establishing a Uniform Code of Military Justice, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess., at 13 (June 10, 1949) (“The language of [Article of War] 15 has been preserved because it has been
construed by the Supreme Court. (Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)).”); H. REPT. 491, Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., at 17 (April 28, 1949) (same). See also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 148, at * 8.
156
The statute does suggest, however, that other statutes might authorize trial by military
commission—irrespective of whether the laws of war would authorize them in any such circumstances. This
is an important point because the Uniform Code of Military Justice does authorize the use of military
commissions in some specific circumstances. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2002) (stating that military
commissions may impose the death penalty for the crime of “aiding the enemy”); 10 U.S.C. § 906 (2002)
(stating that military commissions may try the crime of spying during wartime); Military Tribunal
Authorization Bill of 2002, S. 1941, 107th Cong. § 3(b) (introduced Feb. 13, 2002) (establishing military
tribunal jurisdiction over “crimes against humanity targeting against United States persons”).
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2. USA Patriot Act of 2001: In general, the USA Patriot Act does not
authorize the President to violate the Geneva Conventions.157 Clearly, the Act
does not expressly authorize the President to do so. Some of its provisions may
nevertheless have this effect in that they are inconsistent with some U.S.
obligations under these treaties—at least when these provisions target certain
persons at certain times. Even so, the Act implicates only a very narrow swath of
Geneva law. This Section contends that the Act, at most, derogates from a few
rules established in the Civilians Convention concerning the treatment of enemy
aliens on U.S. territory in time of armed conflict.
For the most part, the Patriot Act does not concern matters governed by
the Geneva Conventions. This is not to say that the Act has little impact on the
civil rights of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Indeed,
without question, it does. Our point is only that the law enforcement powers
augmented by the Act, by and large, do not concern matters regulated by the law
of war. For example, the Act substantially expands the information-gathering and
surveillance capacity of federal law enforcement. The Act also broadens the
definition of terrorism (and terrorism-related offenses) with the effect of
increasing the available penalties for many federal crimes. In addition, it
formalizes several modes of cooperation between law enforcement agencies.
Although there may be other grounds for objecting to these provisions, they do
not violate U.S. treaty obligations under the laws of war.
One cluster of reforms in the Act, however, is potentially problematic. The
“enhanced immigration” provisions dramatically expand the power of federal law
enforcement to detain non-citizens. Section 412 of the Act grants the Attorney
General the authority to detain any alien he has “reasonable grounds to believe” to
have engaged in activity that endangers the national security of the United
States.158 The provision requires that the Attorney General either begin removal
proceedings against such aliens or bring criminal charges within seven days (or
release them from custody).159 Nevertheless, any alien found to be removable, but
whose removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future, may be detained
indefinitely if the Attorney General “certifies” that release of the alien will
“adversely affect national security or the safety of the community or any
person.”160 The provision also sharply limits the scope of judicial review accorded
any alien detained under the provision.161
157

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
158
Id., § 412.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. §§ 412-413.
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When applied to nationals of a state with which the United States is at
war, this provision arguably violates the Geneva Conventions. The detention of
any such individuals is arguably an unlawful deprivation of liberty under the
Civilians Convention. The Civilians Convention authorizes states to detain enemy
aliens present on their territory only if (1) the alien has directly participated in the
hostilities; or (2) detention is otherwise necessary to preserve the national security
of the detaining state.162 In addition, enemy aliens present on the territory of a
party to a conflict are to be given the right to depart the enemy territory
voluntarily.163 The details of these claims are, for the moment, less important than
the more general point: even if some provisions of the Patriot Act are inconsistent
with the Geneva Conventions, the Act does not, in general, constitute
congressional authorization to violate these treaties.

162
163

Civilian Convention, supra note 10, art. 42.
Id., art. 35.
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III
The President as Law Maker
As noted above, certain Defense Department regulations and policies
adopted to implement President Bush’s Military Order may conflict with some
provisions of the Geneva Conventions.164 In light of these apparent conflicts, the
question arises whether the Military Order supersedes conflicting provisions of
the Geneva Conventions as a matter of domestic law. Although the Military
Order relies in part on statutory authorization, the statutes invoked by the Order
do not grant the President the authority to supersede the Geneva Conventions.165
Even so, one could argue that the Military Order supersedes the Geneva
Conventions because the President has the independent constitutional authority to
adopt a unilateral executive order166 that supersedes a prior inconsistent treaty that
is the supreme Law of the Land. Part Three evaluates the merits of this argument.
It bears emphasis that this is not a question about the power of the federal
government to supersede a previously ratified treaty. It is well established that
Congress has the power to enact legislation that supersedes a previously ratified
treaty as a matter of domestic law.167 Thus, the precise issue under consideration
is a question of the distribution of power between the legislative and executive
branches. Given that Congress has an undisputed power to enact legislation to
supersede a previously ratified treaty, does the President also have an independent
power – acting without congressional authorization – to adopt a unilateral
executive order that supersedes a previously ratified treaty as a matter of domestic
law? The first section presents the argument in favor of a Presidential power to
promulgate orders that supersede prior inconsistent treaties. The next section
explains why that argument is ultimately unpersuasive.
A.

The Case for A Presidential Power to Supersede Treaties

In his famous concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure case, Justice Jackson
identified three categories of Presidential action.168 Category One includes

164

See supra Section I.B.
See supra Section II.B.
166
The term “unilateral” executive order refers to an executive order issued by the President on the
basis of his independent constitutional authority. It does not include executive orders that rely on an express
or implied statutory authorization by Congress. Since Congress has not authorized the President to violate
the Geneva Conventions, the Military Order is unilateral insofar as it appears to authorize policies
inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the Conventions.
167
See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600-602 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 193-95 (1888); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 597-99 (1884).
168
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
165
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Presidential “acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress.”169
Category Two includes Presidential actions undertaken without “either a
congressional grant or denial of authority.”170
Category Three includes
Presidential actions that are “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress.”171
Even before the rise of administrative agencies associated with the New
Deal, it had become routine for the President and his subordinates to create law
pursuant to express congressional authorization.172 Nowadays, the Code of
Federal Regulations contains thousands of pages of regulations promulgated by
the executive branch on the basis of congressional authorization. Such
regulations have the status of supreme federal law,173 at least insofar as the
regulators are acting within the scope of legislative authorization. In short,
Category One Presidential lawmaking has become so firmly entrenched in our
legal system that its constitutionality cannot seriously be challenged.
Whereas the products of Category One lawmaking are often called
“regulations,” Category Two Presidential lawmaking yields “unilateral executive
orders.”174 Such executive orders are properly termed “unilateral” because they
are adopted by the President without legislative authorization. Category Two
lawmaking, like Category One, has deep historical roots,175 but its constitutional
validity is less firmly established.176 Justice Jackson concluded that the
constitutionality of Category Two lawmaking “is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
theories of law.”177
169

Id. at 635.
Id. at 637.
171
Id.
172
See KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.4 (3rd ed.
1994) (describing the historical development of administrative law prior to World War II).
173
See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) (holding that FCC regulations
preempt Oklahoma law prohibiting advertising of alcoholic beverages on cable television).
174
An executive order that relies on congressional authorization would be considered Category One.
In contrast, an executive order promulgated by the President on the basis of his independent constitutional
authority (i.e., a unilateral executive order) is Category Two.
175
For a detailed account of Category Two lawmaking by President Roosevelt before and during
World War II, see EDWARD S. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION (1947), at 47-50 (discussing
seizure of private companies to ensure continued production of war material in the face of actual or
threatened labor strikes); and at 50-55 (discussing Presidential orders establishing administrative agencies
that lacked legislative authorization); and at 55-62 (describing the Roosevelt Administration’s use of
“administrative sanctions,” which according to Professor Corwin “were in fact nothing short of blackmail.”).
In light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Youngstown, some of Roosevelt’s unilateral
Presidential orders were probably unconstitutional.
176
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing Category
Two as a “zone of twilight”).
177
Id.
170

37

Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?
Draft – July 17, 2004

There is a longstanding practice of Category Two Presidential lawmaking
by means of sole executive agreements. A “sole executive agreement” is an
international agreement concluded by the President on the basis of his
independent constitutional authority, without any legislative authorization.178
Between 1789 and 1989, the United States concluded more than 12,000 nontreaty
international agreements, including 1,182 such agreements concluded before
1939.179 The Supreme Court has consistently held that sole executive agreements
have the status of domestic law, and that they supersede inconsistent state law.180
Thus, notwithstanding the original constitutional design,181 it is now firmly
established that the President has some independent authority to create domestic
law by means of sole executive agreements.
Advocates of broad Presidential powers might cite Supreme Court
precedents involving sole executive agreements in support of a unilateral
Presidential power to supersede treaties domestically. In United States v. Belmont
the Supreme Court suggested that “all international compacts and agreements,”
including sole executive agreements, have the status of supreme federal law.182
Five years later, in United States v. Pink, the Court reiterated that “[a] treaty is a
Law of the Land under the supremacy clause . . . Such international compacts and
agreements as the Litvinov Assignment [a sole executive agreement] have a
similar dignity.”183 Since sole executive agreements “have a similar dignity” as
178
Terminology related to executive agreements is not entirely uniform. Commentators generally
distinguish between “congressional-executive agreements,” which are international agreements authorized by
Congress in some fashion, and “sole executive agreements,” which are international agreements concluded
by the President on the basis of his independent constitutional authority. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 215-224 (2d ed. 1996). Some commentators distinguish a third
category of executive agreements that derive their authority from an earlier treaty. See PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE,
UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 113-15 (2002).
179
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE 14 (1993) [hereinafter CRS Study]. Due in part to definitional problems in
distinguishing between sole executive agreements and congressional executive agreements, it is unclear how
many of these were sole executive agreements. However, it is fair to assume that a substantial number were
sole executive agreements.
180
See American Insurance Assoc. v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374 (2003) (holding that sole executive
agreements with Germany, France and Austria preempt California statute); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981) (holding that sole executive agreement with Iran preempts state law breach of contract
claims); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (holding that sole executive agreement with Russia
preempts New York common law rules governing relative priority of competing creditors); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (same).
181
Professor Ramsey has made a persuasive argument that the Framers did not intend to grant the
President independent authority to create domestic law by means of sole executive agreements. See Michael
D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133 (1998).
182
301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
183
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, §
115 n.5 (“A sole executive agreement made by the President on his own constitutional authority is the law of
the land and supreme to State law.”).
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treaties, a later sole executive agreement arguably supersedes an earlier treaty
under the later-in-time rule. Moreover, one could argue, there is no reason to
distinguish between unilateral executive orders and sole executive agreements in
this respect because both are unilateral Presidential acts.
Even in a purely domestic context, the Court has periodically upheld the
validity of Category Two Presidential lawmaking. For example, in United States
v. Midwest Oil Co.,184 Congress had enacted a statute declaring that public lands
containing petroleum would be “free and open to occupation, exploration, and
purchase by citizens of the United States.”185 The President subsequently issued
an executive order that made certain public lands temporarily unavailable for
exploration and purchase in order to ensure “the conservation of a proper supply
of petroleum for the government’s own use.”186 The Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the executive order, despite the fact that it was issued without statutory
authorization. The Court relied heavily on the practice of the political branches as
a guide to constitutional interpretation. The majority opinion stated: “[I]n
determining the . . . existence of a [constitutional] power, weight shall be given to
the usage itself, even when the validity of the practice is the subject of
investigation.”187 The Court noted that, prior to 1910, various Presidents had
issued “at least 252 executive orders making reservations [of public lands] for
useful, though nonstatutory, purposes.”188 The Court concluded that Congress
had acquiesced in this practice, and that its acquiescence “operated as an implied
grant of power.”189 Thus, Midwest Oil stands for the proposition that the
President has a limited power to create law in Category Two: i.e., without express
congressional authorization.190
In sum, Supreme Court precedents involving both sole executive
agreements and unilateral executive orders support the claim that the President
has independent constitutional authority to create supreme federal law by means
of unilateral executive action. In The Federalist, John Jay stated: “All
constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the judicial
department, have as much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded from
184

236 U.S. 459 (1915).
Id. at 466 (citing Act of February 11, 1897).
186
Id. at 467.
187
Id. at 473.
188
Id. at 471.
189
Id. at 475.
190
Some may object that Midwest Oil does not support a Presidential lawmaking power because the
Presidential order in that case was “executive,” not “legislative.” Granted, the executive order was
“executive” in a formal sense because it emanated from the President. However, it was “legislative” in a
functional sense because it had precisely the same effect as a statute limiting occupation and exploration of
public lands. Therefore, Midwest Oil supports Presidential lawmaking in a functional sense.
185
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the legislature.”191 If, as Jay suggests, a unilateral executive order has as much
legal validity as a statute, then one could argue that a unilateral executive order
should supersede a prior inconsistent treaty, just as a federal statute supersedes a
prior inconsistent treaty under the later-in-time rule. The following section
explains why this argument is flawed.
B.

The Limits on Presidential Lawmaking Powers

A careful reading of the constitutional text suggests that the Framers did
not intend to grant the President the authority to create law by means of unilateral
executive action: that is, without the participation of the legislative branch. The
text grants the President “[t]he executive power.”192 Additionally, the President is
the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,”193 he has the “Power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States,”194 and the power
to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”195 However, these textual
provisions, construed in accordance with their ordinary meaning, do not appear to
grant the President any lawmaking authority. Of course, the President does have
the power to make treaties, which have the status of supreme federal law, but a
treaty does not obtain that status unless it is approved by a two-thirds Senate
majority.196 Thus, the Treaty Power grants the President the authority to create
law, but not by means of unilateral executive action.
Article I states explicitly that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States.”197 The Framers decision to use the
word “all” to modify the phrase “legislative Powers” reinforces the conclusion
that they did not intend to grant the President an independent lawmaking power.
Contemporary scholars of U.S. foreign relations law hold sharply differing views
about the scope of the President’s constitutional foreign affairs powers, but they
generally agree that the Framers did not intend to grant the President an
independent lawmaking power in the realm of foreign affairs.198
191

THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 378 (John Jay) (Isaac Kramnick ed. 1987).
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
193
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
194
Id.
195
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
196
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
197
U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
198
See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1011 (1993) (claiming that the President has “a general authority to protect and defend the personnel, property,
and instrumentalities of the United States from harm,” but “the President not only cannot act contra legem, he
or she must point to affirmative legislative authorization when so acting.”); Saikrishna B. Prakash and
Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L. J. 231, 234-35 (2001)
(contending that the constitutional grant of “executive power” gives the President a “residual foreign affairs
power,” but “the President is not a lawmaker, even in foreign affairs.”). But see H. Jefferson Powell, The
192
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Even so, all but the most rigid formalists must acknowledge that there is a
thin line, at best, that separates execution of existing law from creation of new
law. Indeed, the difficulty of drawing bright lines to separate legislative and
executive functions provides a partial explanation for the Supreme Court
decisions approving Presidential lawmaking by means of unilateral executive
action. Despite the Court’s approval of Presidential lawmaking, though, the
analysis in this section shows that Supreme Court precedent is generally
consistent with the following proposition: although valid federal law created by
means of unilateral executive action is supreme over state law, unilateral
executive action that conflicts with a federal statute or treaty is invalid, unless the
President is acting within the scope of his exclusive constitutional authority.199
This proposition is consistent with the overall structure of the
Constitution, which purposefully divides power among the three branches of the
federal government in order to limit the power of any one branch.200 The
President has a constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”201 That duty applies not only to statutes enacted by Congress, but also
to ratified treaties.202 If the President had the power to adopt a unilateral
executive order that could supersede federal statutes or treaties, his duty to “take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” would be illusory.203 Whenever the
President did not want to execute a particular statute or treaty, he could simply
adopt a unilateral executive order to supersede the particular statute or treaty that
he did not want to implement. The balance between the legislative and executive
branches that the Framers wove into the constitutional structure would be
destroyed.
President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527,
543-44 (1999) (distinguishing between “autonomous presidential powers,” which Congress cannot lawfully
regulate, and “independent presidential powers,” which are subject to legislative regulation).
199
If the President is acting pursuant to his exclusive constitutional authority, then any conflicting
federal statute would be invalid because Congress lacks the power under Article I to legislate in areas that are
constitutionally committed to the President’s exclusive control. In contrast, there is no authority to suggest
that the treaty makers, acting pursuant to Article II, lack the power to create domestic law in areas within the
scope of the President’s exclusive constitutional authority. Below, we consider whether the President has the
constitutional authority to violate treaty provisions addressing matters within the scope of his exclusive
authority as Commander in Chief. See infra text accompanying notes 341-383.
200
See See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L. J. 1725,1763-64
(discussing excessive concentration of power in state legislatures during pre-Constitutional period), and at
1766-67 (concluding that Framers “understood that governmental power needed to be separated sufficiently
to ensure that no one branch would ever again become as powerful as the state legislatures had”).
201
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
202
See infra notes 286-302 and accompanying text.
203
See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (“In the framework
of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he
is to be a lawmaker.”).
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1. Limits on Sole Executive Agreements: The Supreme Court has never
held that sole executive agreements have the same rank as statutes and treaties
within the domestic constitutional order. Supreme Court decisions involving sole
executive agreements have all involved conflicts with state law, not federal
law.204 Both Belmont and Pink involved conflicts between the Litvinov
Agreement, a sole executive agreement with Russia, and New York common law
rules governing the relative priority of competing creditors.205 Dames & Moore
involved a sole executive agreement with Iran that effectively terminated the
petitioner’s state law breach of contract action against the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran, and transferred venue to a specially constituted arbitration
tribunal.206 Garamendi involved a conflict between a California statute and sole
executive agreements with Germany, France and Austria.207 In none of these
cases did the Supreme Court decide the relationship between sole executive
agreements, on the one hand, and federal statutes or treaties, on the other.208
Granted, both Belmont and Pink contain dicta suggesting that sole
executive agreements have the same status as statutes and treaties.209 Equal status
implies that a subsequent executive agreement would supersede an earlier statute
or treaty under the later-in-time rule. However, such dicta are noticeably absent
from both Dames & Moore and Garamendi. 210 Moreover, most lower courts that

204
Franklin Roosevelt concluded an executive agreement with Great Britain in 1940 -- involving the
delivery of fifty overage destroyers to Britain in exchange for the lease of sites for naval bases -- that “was
directly violative of at least two [federal] statutes.” See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT : OFFICE AND
POWERS, 1787-1984 (5th ed. 1984) at 273. Attorney General Jackson (later Justice Jackson) defended the
agreement on the basis of the President’s Commander-in-Chief power. Id. However, the constitutionality of
the agreement was never tested in court.
205
See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
206
See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
207
See American Insurance Assoc. v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374 (2003).
208
Professor Trimble contends that, in Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court authorized the use of a
sole executive agreement to supersede the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), a federal statute.
TRIMBLE, supra note 178, at 138-39. However, this is an excessively broad reading of Dames & Moore. The
Dames & Moore Court never stated explicitly that the executive agreement at issue superseded the FSIA.
Moreover, Trimble’s interpretation is inconsistent with the Court’s stated intention “to rest decision on the
narrowest possible ground capable of deciding the case.” Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 660.
209
See, e.g., Pink, 315 U.S. at 230 (stating that a treaty is “a Law of the Land under the supremacy
clause,” and that sole executive agreements “have a similar dignity”); Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331 (stating that
the Supremacy Clause establishes the supremacy of treaties over state law, and “the same rule would result in
the case of all international compacts and agreements from the very fact that complete power over
international affairs is in the national government”).
210
See American Insurance Assoc. v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374 (2003); Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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have explicitly addressed the issue have concluded that sole executive agreements
do not supersede a prior inconsistent statute.211
There are numerous cases in which the Supreme Court has held that an
administrative regulation that conflicts with a previously enacted statute is
invalid.212 These cases are instructive because the Court has also held that valid
federal regulations, like valid executive agreements, preempt conflicting state
law.213 In effect, the Court treats administrative regulations as equivalent to
federal statutes for the purpose of resolving conflicts between federal and state
law, but it views such regulations as being subordinate to statutes for the purpose
of resolving conflicts between federal statutes and regulations. Statutes have a
higher status than regulations within the system of federal law because statutes
require the joint action of the legislative and executive branches, whereas a
regulation that conflicts with a statute is the product of unilateral executive
action.214
Treaties, like statutes, require the joint action of the legislative and
executive branches.215 In contrast, sole executive agreements, like regulations,
involve unilateral executive action. Therefore, even though sole executive
agreements preempt conflicting state law, such agreements should be
subordinated to treaties for the purpose of resolving conflicts between two
international agreements.216 Moreover, if a sole executive agreement does not
211
See United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1953) (holding that an
“executive agreement was void because it was not authorized by Congress and contravened provisions of a
statute”); Swearingen v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (D. Colo. 1983) (stating that “executive
agreements do not supersede prior inconsistent acts of Congress because, unlike treaties, they are not the
‘supreme Law of the Land’”); Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601, 606-07 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (rejecting
Government’s contention that an executive agreement is equivalent to a treaty under the Supremacy Clause).
But see Etlimar S.A. of Casablanca v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 191 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (suggesting that an
executive agreement might supersede an earlier act of Congress).
212
See, e.g., Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000) (invalidating FDA regulations that conflicted with Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act); MCI
Telecommunications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994) (invalidating FCC rule that conflicted
with Federal Communications Act); City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994)
(invalidating EPA rule that conflicted with Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
213
See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) (holding that FCC regulations
preempt Oklahoma law prohibiting advertising of alcoholic beverages on cable television).
214
A valid regulation typically involves the participation of both legislative and executive branches:
Congress enacts a statute to authorize Presidential rulemaking. But the existence of a conflict between a
statute and regulation necessarily implies that the regulation was not authorized by Congress, which means
that the President was acting unilaterally with respect to the invalid portion of the regulation.
215
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
216
From the standpoint of international law, there is no difference between a treaty and a sole
executive agreement: both are considered “treaties.” Thus, a sole executive agreement could supersede a
prior inconsistent treaty for purposes of international law. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 30, para. 3 (“When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also
to the later treaty . . . the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those
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supersede a prior inconsistent treaty, it follows that a unilateral executive order
cannot supersede a prior inconsistent treaty.
2. Limits on Unilateral Executive Orders: Even if one assumes that sole
executive agreements have the same status as statutes and treaties, it does not
necessarily follow that unilateral executive orders have equivalent status. Sole
executive agreements arguably deserve a higher status than unilateral executive
orders because sole executive agreements implicate the international legal
obligations of the United States.217 In contrast, unilateral executive orders are
entirely creatures of domestic law.218
Despite the fact that a valid executive order is supreme over state law,219 a
unilateral executive order can never supersede a prior inconsistent statute because
a unilateral executive order that conflicts with a valid federal statute is per se
invalid.220 Little v. Barreme221 illustrates this point. In 1799, in the context of
ongoing hostilities with France, Congress enacted a statute to suspend commercial
intercourse between the United States and France. The statute authorized the
President to seize “any ship or vessel of the United States on the high sea . . .
bound or sailing to any place within the territory of the French republic or her
dependencies.”222 Although the statute covered only vessels sailing to France, the
President subsequently issued an executive order authorizing seizures of vessels
“bound to or from French ports.”223 Acting pursuant to the executive order,
Captain Little seized a ship sailing from a French port. Chief Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court, held that the seizure was unlawful, even though it was

of the later treaty.”). However, in terms of domestic law, the better view is that a sole executive agreement
cannot supersede a prior inconsistent treaty, for the reasons explained above.
217
Professor Henkin makes a similar argument. See HENKIN, supra note 178, at 504 n.198.
218
At times, Presidents have adopted a unilateral executive order for the purpose of implementing a
sole executive agreement. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660 (1981) (the “dispute
involves various Executive Orders and regulations by which the President nullified attachments and liens on
Iranian assets in the United States . . . to comply with an Executive Agreement between the United States and
Iran”).
219
See CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 204, at 440, n.10 (stating that “executive laws” are
“endowed as against state authority with the supremacy of national law.”).
220
Id. at 439, n.10 (“Such regulations may not, of course, transgress the constitutional acts of
Congress.”).
221
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
222
Id. at 177.
223
Id. at 178.
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consistent with the executive order,224 because the executive order could not
authorize action contrary to the statute.225
The Court’s conclusion is especially noteworthy because Marshall
suggested that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, might well have had the
constitutional power to authorize the seizure if Congress had not enacted
legislation.226 Hence, by enacting legislation to authorize seizure of vessels
sailing to France (which the President as Commander-in-Chief had the power to
seize without legislative authorization), Congress effectively precluded the
President from exercising his Commander-in-Chief power to seize vessels sailing
from France. In short, an executive order that would have been constitutional
under Category Two (if undertaken without “either a congressional grant or denial
of authority”227) was invalid under Category Three because it was “incompatible
with the . . . implied will of Congress.”228
The conclusion that a unilateral executive order can never supersede a
prior inconsistent statute implies that conflicts between an earlier-in-time treaty
and a later-in-time executive order must also be resolved in favor of the treaty, at
least insofar as the treaty is the Law of the Land. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that treaties and statutes have equal rank within our
constitutional system; in the event of a conflict between a statute and a treaty, the
later in time prevails.229 Since treaties are equivalent to statutes, and statutes rank
higher than unilateral executive orders, it follows that treaties also rank higher
than unilateral executive orders. Therefore, a unilateral executive order can never
supersede a prior inconsistent treaty that is the Law of the Land.
Core principles of democratic theory reinforce the soundness of this
conclusion. In our democratic system, political power ultimately belongs to the
people. Lawmaking by statute or treaty requires the participation of both the
legislative and executive branches. The participation of both branches helps
224

The Court assumed, for the purpose of its analysis, that the seizure was consistent with the
executive order. See id. at 178.
225
See id. at 177-79. As a matter of statutory interpretation, one could have made a plausible
argument that the executive order was supplementary to the statute, not contrary to the statute. However, that
was not how the Court construed the statute.
226
See id. at 177 (“It is by no means clear that the president . . . who is commander in chief of the
armies and navies of the United States, might not, without any special authority for that purpose, in the then
existing state of things, have empowered the officers commanding the armed vessels of the United States, to
seize and send into port for adjudication, American vessels which were forfeited by being engaged in this
illicit commerce.”)
227
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)
228
Id.
229
See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600-602 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190, 193-95 (1888); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 597-99 (1884).
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ensure that treaties and statutes do not become law without a certain degree of
popular support. In contrast, when the President creates law by means of
unilateral executive orders, the safeguard of a legislative check on Presidential
authority is absent. Accordingly, there is a greater danger of creating law at odds
with the will of the people. Inasmuch as unilateral executive orders have less
democratic legitimacy than federal statutes or treaties, it is entirely appropriate
that such executive orders have a lower rank within the hierarchy of federal law.
IV.
The President as Law Breaker
Part Three showed that, although the President has a limited power to
create new law, any law created by unilateral executive action necessarily has a
lower status within the hierarchy of federal law than treaties or statutes, both of
which involve legislative participation. Even so, Presidents and their subordinates
have often claimed that the President is free to disregard (i.e., violate) statutes and
treaties, and even the Constitution itself, in certain emergency situations.230 Most
recently, executive branch lawyers have claimed that President Bush has
unlimited discretion to determine the appropriate means for interrogation of
enemy combatants detained in the war on terrorism.231 Indeed, a Justice
Department memorandum contends that treaties and statutes prohibiting torture -if applied to interrogation of enemy combatants -- would be an unconstitutional
infringement of the President’s Commander-in-Chief power.232
Part Four addresses the claim that the President has the constitutional
authority to violate the law for the sake of protecting national security. The first
section rebuts the argument that the President has the legal authority to violate
constitutional and/or statutory law in emergency situations. The second section
contends that the President’s constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed”233 includes a duty to execute treaties that have the status of
supreme federal law. Therefore, the President lacks the unilateral authority to
violate treaties, and he must obtain congressional authorization to violate a treaty
that is Law of the Land.
230

See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24-32
(1993) (discussing claims advanced by various Presidents in support of a Presidential power to violate the
law in an emergency).
231
See Bybee Memo, supra note 5, at 39 (“Any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of
battlefield combatants would violate the Constitution’s sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in
the President.”).
232
Id. at 31-39. It bears emphasis that the Geneva Conventions expressly prohibit torture of both
POWs and civilians. See POW Convention, supra note 10, art. 130; Civilian Convention, supra note 10, art.
147. Common Article 3 also prohibits torture. Id. art. 3
233
U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 3.
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The final section of Part Four considers whether the President’s general
duty to execute treaties applies to law-of-war treaties that impinge upon the
President’s Commander-in-Chief power. Although there are plausible arguments
for exempting such law-of-war treaties from the President’s general duty under
the Take Care Clause, we conclude that the President’s duty to execute the law
applies with equal force to law-of-war treaties that have the status of supreme
federal law. Therefore, as a matter of constitutional law, the President must
obtain congressional authorization if he wishes to violate such treaties. However,
as a matter of constitutional fact, the President and his subordinates are unlikely to
face sanctions for violating treaties if Congress and the public agree that the
violation was necessary to protect national security.
A.

Presidential Emergency Power

1. Historical Support for an Emergency Power: Before any person can
become President, he is required to take an oath to “preserve, protect and defend
the Constitution of the United States.”234 Relying in part on this oath, several
Presidents have claimed a power to violate the law in situations where national
survival is at stake. For example, Thomas Jefferson once wrote:
The question you propose, whether circumstances do not sometimes
occur, which make it a duty in officers of high trust, to assume authorities
beyond the law, is easy of solution in principle, but sometimes
embarrassing in practice. A strict observance of the written laws is
doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest.
The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in
danger, are of higher obligation.235
Jefferson added: “To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law,
would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, and property and all those who
are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the ends to the means.”236
Thus, even Thomas Jefferson, who was more wary than most Presidents of the
dangers of unchecked executive power, seemingly recognized a Presidential
power to violate the law in order to protect and defend the nation.

234

U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 1, cl. 8.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), reprinted in IX THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 279-82 (Paul Ford, ed. 1898).
236
Id., at 279.
235
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Fifty years later, Abraham Lincoln sounded a similar theme. During a tenweek period in 1861, when Congress was not in session:
[President Lincoln] added 23,000 men to the Regular Army and 18,000 to
the Navy, paid out two millions from unappropriated funds in the Treasury
to persons unauthorized to receive it . . . suspended the writ of habeas
corpus in various places, caused the arrest and military detention of
persons who were represented to him as being engaged in or
contemplating treasonable practices -- and all this for the most part
without the least statutory authorization.237
Lincoln defended his actions in a speech to a special session of Congress on July
4, 1861.238 During that speech, Lincoln posed the famous rhetorical question:
“[A]re all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to
pieces, lest that one be violated?”239 As Professor Corwin has noted, this question
“logically implies that the President may, in an emergency thought by him to
require it, partially suspend the Constitution.”240 Lincoln himself made a similar
point: “I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by
becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution, through the
preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow
it.”241 Thus, faced with a choice between his duty to execute the law and his duty
to maintain national integrity, President Lincoln asserted that his duty to preserve
national unity was paramount.
Similarly, in the period before and during World War II, President
Roosevelt advanced broad claims of Presidential power. In September 1942,
Roosevelt urged Congress to repeal an offending provision of the Emergency
Price Control Act (EPCA).242 In addition to urging, though, he also threatened to
violate EPCA: “In the event that the Congress should fail to act, and act
adequately, I shall accept the responsibility, and I will act.”243 Professor Corwin
analyzed Roosevelt’s message to Congress as follows:

237

CORWIN, TOTAL WAR, supra note 2, at 16-17.
See Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861, reprinted in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS (Roy P. Basler, ed.) (1946) at 594-609.
239
Id. at 601.
240
CORWIN, TOTAL WAR, supra note 2, at 17.
241
Alexander J. Groth, Lincoln and the Standards of Presidential Conduct, XXII PRESIDENTIAL STUD.
Q. 765, 766 (1992) (quoting President Lincoln).
242
See CORWIN, TOTAL WAR, supra note 2, at 62-65.
243
88 Cong. Rec. 7044 (1942). Roosevelt did not make the threat idly; the Dean of the Oregon Law
School had previously told him that “if you decide that a certain course of action is essential as a war
measure, it supersedes congressional action.” Monaghan, supra note 230, at 29.
238
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The Message of September 7 can only be interpreted as a claim of power
on the part of the President to suspend the Constitution in a situation
deemed by him to make such a step necessary. The claim was not a totally
unprecedented one . . . [referring to Lincoln]. But Mr. Roosevelt was
proposing to set aside, not a particular clause of the Constitution, but its
most fundamental characteristic, its division of power between Congress
and President, and thereby gathering into his own hands the combined
power of both. He was suggesting, if not threatening, a virtually complete
suspension of the Constitution.244
In the end, there was no opportunity to test the validity of Roosevelt’s asserted
Presidential power to violate EPCA, because Congress enacted legislation to
supersede the relevant portions of the statute.
Building on these precedents, President Nixon went even further than any
of his predecessors in advancing the claim that the President is above the law.
Consider the following interview with David Frost:
FROST: So what, in a sense, you’re saying is that there are certain
situations, . . . where the President can decide that it’s in the best interests
of the nation or something, and do something illegal.
NIXON: Well, when the President does it, that means that it is not illegal.
FROST: By definition.
NIXON: Exactly. Exactly. If the President, for example, approves
something because of the national security, or in this case because of a
threat to internal peace and order of significant magnitude, then the
President’s decision in that instance is one that enables those who carry it
out, to carry it out without violating a law. Otherwise, they’re in an
impossible position.245
In short, Nixon claimed that if the President determines that a specified action is
necessary to protect national security, then the action is lawful, even if it is
prohibited by a federal statute.
In sum, lawyers within the Bush Administration can cite substantial
executive branch precedent in support of their claim that the President has the
constitutional authority to violate federal statutes and treaties prohibiting torture
of detainees held in the war on terrorism. On the other hand, if the Constitution
244

CORWIN, TOTAL WAR, supra note 2, at 64-65.
Interview with Nixon About Domestic Effects of Indochina War, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1977, at A16
(quoted in Monaghan, supra note 230, at 7).
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really does grant the President the authority to approve torture of detainees, it
becomes difficult to identify the line that separates constitutional democracy from
despotism. Thus, the next section subjects the claim of a broad Presidential
emergency power to critical scrutiny.
2. Critical Evaluation of an Asserted Emergency Power: The central
claim of those who advocate a Presidential power to violate the law in emergency
situations is that the President’s duty to protect and defend the nation sometimes
takes precedence over his duty to execute the laws. It is helpful to distinguish
between a weaker and stronger version of this thesis. The strong version asserts
that the President has the sole constitutional authority to decide what specific
actions are necessary to defend the nation, and that any action the President deems
necessary is ipso facto lawful, regardless of any constitutional or statutory
provision to the contrary.246 Under the strong version, neither the legislative nor
the judicial branch has the constitutional authority to second-guess the President’s
judgment that a particular course of action is required for national security, and
impeachment is the only remedy for abuse of Presidential power.
Whereas the strong version provides a constitutional defense of broad
Presidential emergency powers, the weak version offers a legal realist account of
inter-branch behavior in emergency situations. According to this account,
Presidents tend to adopt an expansive view of executive power during perceived
emergencies, and the legislative and judicial branches tend to defer to executive
judgments about how best to handle the situation. Under the weak version,
Presidential action that contravenes the federal constitution or statutes is illegal,
and the existence of an emergency does not make it legal.247 However, as a
practical matter, executive officers are unlikely to be subjected to civil or criminal
sanctions for violating the law if: 1) they were acting within the scope of a
Presidential order; 2) the legislative and judicial branches agree there was a
genuine emergency; and 3) the relevant Presidential order did not constitute a
gross abuse of executive power.
The weak version of the emergency power thesis, understood as a
descriptive theory of inter-branch collaboration in times of crisis, has much to
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See supra text at note 245 (quoting President Nixon). See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Brief for the
Respondents (submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court), at 25 (stating that “[a] commander’s wartime
determination that an individual is an enemy combatant is a quintessentially military judgment, representing a
core exercise of the Commander-in-Chief authority”), and at 41 (stating that “the Fifth Amendment does not
restrict the Commander in Chief’s constitutional authority to detain captured enemy combatants during
ongoing hostilities.”)
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See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934) (stating that an
“[e]mergency does not create power . . . or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted”).
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recommend it. However, courts have generally rejected the strong version
because it would concentrate too much power in the executive branch. For
example, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,248 the Supreme Court entertained a habeas
petition brought on behalf of Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen captured in
Afghanistan during armed conflict between the United States and the Taliban.
The Bush Administration claimed the authority to detain him indefinitely,
“without formal charges or proceedings – unless and until it [the executive
branch] makes the determination that access to counsel or further process is
warranted.”249 The Supreme Court decisively rejected this claim of executive
prerogative: “We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.
Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive . . . in
times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when
individual liberties are at stake.”250
The Hamdi Court’s insistence that the judiciary plays a vital role in
restraining executive power, even in wartime, is generally consistent with the
original understanding of separation of powers. For example, Madison stated:
“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”251 To guard
against the excessive accumulation of power in a single branch, the Framers
designed a system “in which the powers of government should be so divided and
balanced among several bodies of magistracy as that no one could transcend their
legal limits without being effectually checked and restrained by the others.”252 If
the President could simply disregard the law in times of crisis, the Framers’
careful effort to incorporate checks and balances into the constitutional design
would be defeated.
One could argue that it makes no sense to interpret the Constitution in a
manner that requires the President to obey the law in a situation where rigid
adherence to law endangers national security. This objection misses its mark. As
248

542 U.S. __ (2004).
Id., slip op at 2-3.
250
Id. at 29 (O’Connor, J.) (plurality opinion). There was no majority opinion in Hamdi. Justice
O’Connor, writing for a plurality of four Justices, held that the President had statutory authorization to detain
Hamdi, but only as long as “active combat operations” are ongoing in Afghanistan. Id. at 13-14. Moreover,
to justify his continued detention, the government must prove that Hamdi is an “enemy combatant,” and he is
entitled to present his own evidence to rebut the government’s allegations. Id. at 17-32. Justice Souter,
writing for himself and Justice Ginsburg, argued that Hamdi’s continued detention violates the federal NonDetention Act, 18 U.S.C. §4001(a). Justice Scalia, writing for himself and Justice Stevens, argued that
Hamdi’s continued detention is unconstitutional. Justice Thomas was the only Justice who supported the
Bush Administration’s claim that it had the legal authority to detain Hamdi indefinitely.
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 303 (Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed. 1987).
252
Id. at 311 (Madison).
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a matter of constitutional fact, there are undoubtedly times when the President can
and will violate the law to defend the nation. In terms of constitutional law,
though, the critical question is whether the legislative and judicial branches have
the constitutional authority to second-guess the President’s judgment. We suggest
that the Constitution is best interpreted to grant the other branches the requisite
authority to review Presidential decisions after the fact. If the legislature agrees,
after an opportunity for considered reflection, that the President acted wisely in
responding to the perceived emergency, then the legislature can enact laws to
immunize executive officials from any civil or criminal liability that might
otherwise ensue from the legal infractions they committed.253 On the other hand,
if the legislature decides not to immunize executive officials, then those officials
should be accountable for their conduct in a court of law.254
The case of Ex parte Merryman provides a useful illustration of these
principles.255 John Merryman, a citizen of Maryland, was a leading secessionist
agitator during the Civil War. After he was arrested and detained by the military
at Fort McHenry, he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.256 Chief Justice
Taney personally issued the writ, ordering General Cadwalader to bring
Merryman before him, despite the fact that President Lincoln had suspended
habeas corpus. The general “politely but flatly refused to produce the prisoner,
citing as authority the President’s order” suspending the writ.257 Taney published
an opinion declaring that the President’s order suspending the writ and the
subsequent detention of Merryman was illegal.258 As a matter of constitutional
law, Taney’s analysis was unassailable. However, “Lincoln went right on
exercising the power that the Chief Justice had branded palpably
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See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 366-67 (1824) (“It may be fit and proper for the government,
in the exercise of the high discretion confided to the executive, for great public purposes, to act on a sudden
emergency, or to prevent an irreparable mischief, by summary measures, which are not found in the text of
the laws. Such measures are properly matters of state, and if the responsibility is taken, under justifiable
circumstances, the Legislature will doubtless apply a proper indemnity.”)
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As a practical matter, an executive officer who violates federal law in the course of implementing a
Presidential order is unlikely to face criminal charges during the tenure of the President who issued the order,
because the President would not want to authorize criminal prosecution of a subordinate who obeyed him.
However, the executive officer might face criminal prosecution after a change of administration. Moreover,
the officer could potentially be exposed to civil liability. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170,
179 (1804) (holding a Navy Captain liable for damages for unlawful seizure of a ship, despite the fact that the
President had authorized the seizure, because the seizure violated a federal statute).
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17 Fed. Cas. 144 (1861).
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See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 18-25 (2d ed. 1976).
257
Id. at 22.
258
See 17 Fed. Cas. at 148-49.
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unconstitutional.”259 And Taney was forced to concede that he had no power to
force the President to comply with the law.260
Three points emerge from this analysis. First, as a matter of constitutional
fact, the President undoubtedly has some power to violate the law to protect
national security. Second, as a matter of constitutional law, a Presidential
decision that a particular action is essential for national security does not render
an illegal action lawful. Third, “[s]o long as public opinion sustains the President,
as a sufficient amount of it sustained Lincoln in his shadowy tilt with Taney and
throughout the rest of the war, he has nothing to fear from the displeasure of the
courts.”261
Some will object to a concept of “legality” that makes it unlawful for the
President to do what is expedient to protect national security. Under this view,
the law should be interpreted so that any Presidential action that promotes
national security is, by definition, legal. The central problem with this concept of
legality, though, is that it fails to account for the inevitable tension between
national security and individual liberty. A Presidential action that is fully justified
on national security grounds may nevertheless impose significant constraints on
individual liberty. Thus, the critical constitutional question is whether the
President’s judgment about the proper tradeoff between liberty and security is
subject to legislative and judicial oversight. The Supreme Court, quite rightly,
has answered this question affirmatively. In the words of Justice Souter: “For
reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the Government asked to
counter a serious threat is not the branch on which to rest the Nation’s entire
reliance in striking the balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on
the way to victory . . . . A reasonable balance is more likely to be reached on the
judgment of a different branch.”262
B. The President’s Duty to Execute Treaties
Given that the President has a constitutional duty to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed,”263 the question arises whether that duty also applies
to treaties. Professor Henkin contends that the President has a general authority to
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ROSSITER, supra note 256, at 23-24.
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violate treaties.264 However, this section contends that the Constitution is best
interpreted to require the President to obtain congressional approval, in the form
of legislation, if he wants to violate a treaty provision that is Law of the Land.
1.
Treaty Termination and Treaty Violation: Before discussing the
President’s duty to execute treaties, it is important to highlight the distinction
between treaty termination and treaty violation. Under generally accepted
principles of international law, there are a variety of legitimate reasons for
terminating or withdrawing from a treaty.265 The parties to a treaty may jointly
terminate a treaty by consent of all the parties,266 or by concluding a later
treaty.267 A state may unilaterally terminate or suspend the operation of a treaty
in response to a material breach by another party.268 A state may also invoke “the
impossibility of performing a treaty,”269 or “[a] fundamental change of
circumstances”270 as a ground for terminating, withdrawing from, or suspending
the operation of a treaty. In addition, a single party may unilaterally withdraw
from a treaty in accordance with the withdrawal clause contained in the treaty.271
Most modern international treaties contain a withdrawal clause;272 the Geneva
Conventions are no exception.273

264
See HENKIN, supra note 178, at 214 (“The President can terminate a treaty or may decide to breach
it.”). Interestingly, this is one area where the Restatement does not adopt the views of its chief reporter. The
Restatement says that “the President has the power, when acting within his constitutional authority, to
disregard . . . an agreement of the United States.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 115 n.3 (emphasis
added). The Restatement does not purport to define the constitutional limits on the President’s authority to
“disregard” treaties.
265
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 216, arts. 54-64.
266
Id., art. 54(b).
267
Id., art. 59.
268
Id., art. 60. The rules for bilateral and multilateral treaties are different. For bilateral treaties, a
material breach by one party is grounds for termination by the other. Id., art. 60, para. 1. For multilateral
treaties, a material breach by one party may be grounds for another party to unilaterally suspend the operation
of the treaty, but a single party cannot unilaterally terminate the treaty. Id., art. 60, para. 2. These rules “do
not apply to provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian
character.” Id., art. 60, para. 5.
269
Id., art. 61.
270
Id., art. 62. Under the Vienna Convention, the changed circumstance justification is quite narrow.
A party may not invoke changed circumstances “as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty
unless: (a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to
be bound by the treaty; and (b) The effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still
to be performed under the treaty.” Id., art. 62, para. 1.
271
Id., art. 54(a).
272
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 332, cmt. a (“Modern agreements generally specify either
a term for the agreement, or procedures whreby a party may withdraw; therefore, there will rarely be
occasion to decide whether a right of withdrawal is implied . . . .”).
273
See Geneva Convention I, supra note 10, art. 63; Geneva Convention II, supra note 10, art. 62;
POW Convention, supra note 10, art. 142; Civilians Convention, supra note 10, art. 158.
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The Restatement asserts that the President has the constitutional authority
“to suspend or terminate [a treaty] in accordance with” a termination clause in the
treaty.274 This position makes sense from both a formal and functional standpoint.
As a formal matter, the President’s power to execute the law275 clearly includes
the power to execute a treaty termination or withdrawal clause that is the Law of
the Land. From a functional standpoint, there are often prudential factors that
favor a Presidential choice to work with Congress in executing a termination or
withdrawal clause.276 However, when President Carter terminated a mutual
defense treaty with Taiwan in accordance with the treaty’s termination clause,277 a
majority of the Supreme Court agreed that there is no judicially enforceable
constitutional constraint that precludes the President from exercising a treaty
termination clause unilaterally (i.e., without a congressional vote) on the basis of
his Article II powers.278 The Court correctly refrained from drawing a
constitutional line that would impose unnecessary constraints upon the President’s
exercise of his foreign policy powers. The Court’s decision reflects a tacit
judgment that Congress, by political means, exercises sufficient control over the
President’s treaty termination power that additional constitutional restraints are
unwarranted.279
The Restatement also asserts that the President has the constitutional
authority, even in the absence of a treaty termination clause, “to make the
determination that would justify the United States in terminating or suspending [a
treaty] because of its violation by another party or because of supervening
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 339(a).
U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
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Congress has sometimes played an active role in treaty termination. See HENKIN, supra note 178,
pg. 490-91, n.143.
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The termination clause permitted termination by either party on one year’s notice. See Goldwater
v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
278
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). In Goldwater, nine Senators and sixteen members of the
House of Representatives sued to block the President’s unilateral termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty
with Taiwan. See 617 F.2d at 709 (Wright, C.J., concurring). The Supreme Court vacated the D.C. Circuit
opinion and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. 444 U.S. at 996. The Court produced four
widely divergent opinions. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality of four Justices, thought that the case
presented a non-justiciable political question. Id. at 1002-1006. Justice Powell, writing only for himself,
thought that the case was not ripe, because neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives had taken a
formal vote on the issue. Id. at 997-98. Justice Brennan, writing for himself, would have affirmed the
President’s unilateral authority to terminate a treaty. Id. at 1006-1007. Justices Blackmun and White would
have set the case for oral argument to give the matter plenary consideration. Id. at 1006. Justice Marshall
concurred in the result without expressing any view on the issues.
279
See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 708-09 (“Treaty termination is a political act, but political acts are not
customarily taken without political support. Even if formal advice and consent is not constitutionally
required as a prerequisite to termination, it might be sought. If the Congress is completely ignored, it has its
arsenal of weapons, as previous Chief Executives have on occasion been sharply reminded.”).
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events.”280 Clearly, the question whether the United States should terminate or
suspend a treaty in response to a violation by another party, or in response to
changed circumstances, is not an appropriate question for judicial
determination.281 As between the President and Congress, both formal and
functional considerations support a finding of executive power. As a formal
matter, a decision that actions by a treaty partner constitute “material breach” of a
treaty is of an executive, not a legislative nature. The same applies with respect to
a decision that recent developments render continued performance by the United
States impossible. From a functional standpoint, the President is better able than
Congress to make these types of determinations.282 For these reasons, the
Supreme Court has held explicitly that the President has the constitutional
authority to decide to implement a treaty despite an apparent violation by the
other party.283 The constitutional power to choose not to terminate a treaty in
response to a breach by the other party presumably also includes the power to
terminate if the breach is sufficiently serious.
The preceding discussion deals only with the President’s constitutional
authority to suspend, terminate, or withdraw from a treaty in compliance with
international law. As long as a Presidential decision to suspend, terminate, or
withdraw from a treaty complies with international law, the President’s action is
consistent with his constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”284 The question of the President’s authority to breach a treaty, in
violation of international law,285 raises very different constitutional issues because
a Presidential breach of a treaty that is Law of the Land is also potentially a
violation of the President’s constitutional duty under the Take Care Clause.
280

RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 339(b).
See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 602 (1889) (“[W]hether a treaty with a
foreign sovereign had been violated by him, whether the consideration of a particular stipulation of a treaty
had been voluntarily withdrawn by one party so as to no longer be obligatory upon the other, and whether the
views and acts of a foreign sovereign, manifested through his representative, had given just occasion to the
political departments of our government to withhold the execution of a promise contained in a treaty . . . were
not judicial questions”).
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Under the Vienna Convention, a breach is “material” only if it violates “a provision essential to the
accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.” Vienna Convention, supra note 216, art. 60, para.
3(b). Impossibility is a legitimate ground for termination or withdrawal only “if the impossibility results
from the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty.”
Id., art. 61, para. 1. Application of these standards in concrete fact situations requires the expertise of the
executive branch.
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See Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 469-76 (1913) (affirming executive branch decision to
extradite U.S. national to Italy under bilateral extradition treaty, despite Italy’s refusal to extradite Italian
nationals to U.S.).
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U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. Courts have held that the President’s duty under the Take Care Clause
includes a duty to execute international obligations of the United States. See infra note 302.
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Whereas international law sometimes authorizes suspension, withdrawal or termination of a treaty,
international law never authorizes a treaty violation. See Vienna Convention, supra note 216, art. 26 (“Every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”).
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2. Treaty Violation and the Take Care Clause: Under the Constitution,
treaties are declared to be “the supreme Law of the Land,”286 and the President is
obligated to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”287 As a textual
matter, there are two possible interpretations of the word “Laws” in the Take Care
Clause. The first interpretation holds that the word “Laws” includes treaties. The
fact that the Supremacy Clause declares treaties to be “the supreme Law of the
Land” lends support to this interpretation. Under this interpretation, it would
seem that the President does not have the constitutional power to violate treaties,
because his duty to execute the Laws includes a duty faithfully to execute treaties.
The second interpretation holds that the word “Laws” in the Take Care
Clause excludes treaties. The fact that the Supremacy Clause distinguishes
between “Laws of the United States” on the one hand, and “Treaties” on the other
hand,288 lends support to this interpretation. Under this interpretation, the
President arguably does have the constitutional power to violate treaties, because
he does not have a constitutional duty to “take Care” that treaties are “faithfully
executed.” Although this textual argument initially appears plausible, it is
ultimately untenable: under this interpretation, the President would also have the
power to violate the Constitution, because the Constitution, like treaties, is
mentioned separately from “Laws” in the Supremacy Clause, but not in the Take
Care Clause.289
Historical materials support the view that the President’s duty under the
Take Care Clause includes a duty to execute treaties that are Law of the Land.
Some early drafts of the Take Care Clause would have limited the Clause so that
it applied only to federal statutes.290 A later draft would have obligated the
President to “take care that the laws of the United States be duly and faithfully
executed.”291 At the end of the Convention, though, the Committee of Style
deleted the words “of the United States.”292 According to one commentator,
286

U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
288
See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that “the Laws of the United States . . . and all Treaties made .
. . under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land”).
289
Compare U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”)
with U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . and all Treaties made
. . . under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land”).
290
See 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1966), at 244 (New Jersey
Plan) (granting the Executive authority “to execute the federal acts”); and at 292 (Hamilton Plan) (granting
the Executive authority “to have a negative on all laws about to be passed, and the execution of all laws
passed”).
291
2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1966), at 185 (draft
Constitution submitted by Committee of Detail).
292
See id., at 600 (report of Committee of Style).
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“[t]he deletion of this qualifying language . . . was probably intended to make
clear that the Take Care Clause encompassed not only federal legislation, but also
the other two forms of supreme federal law – the Constitution and treaties.”293
One of the earliest foreign relations controversies in the United States
involved President George Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality,294 which
declared the neutrality of the United States in a war between France and other
European powers. Opponents of the Proclamation argued, among other things,
that the President’s declared policy of neutrality was inconsistent with U.S.
obligations under Article XI of the Treaty of Alliance with France.295 Alexander
Hamilton, writing in defense of the Proclamation, did not claim that the President
had a constitutional power to violate the treaty. In fact, he claimed that the
President’s power to issue the Proclamation derived in part from his constitutional
duty to execute “the Laws, of which Treaties form a part.”296 James Madison
disagreed with Hamilton’s conclusion that the Proclamation was valid,297 but he
agreed with Hamilton’s claim that the President’s duty to execute “the Laws”
included a duty to execute treaties.298 Thus, it was common ground on both sides
of the debate that the President had a duty under the Take Care Clause to execute
faithfully the treaty with France.
A few years later, another foreign relations controversy arose when
President John Adams sought to extradite Jonathan Robbins to Great Britain, in
accordance with the Jay Treaty.299 Members of Congress challenged the
President’s authority to extradite Robbins on the grounds that there was no statute
to authorize extradition. John Marshall, the illustrious Chief Justice, who was
then a member of the House of Representatives, defended the President’s
authority on the grounds that the President had a duty to take care that the Jay
Treaty was faithfully executed. Marshall said:
293
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The treaty, which is a law, enjoins the performance of a particular
object. The person who is to perform this object is marked out by
the Constitution, since the person is named who conducts the
foreign intercourse, and is to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. The means by which it is to be performed, the force of
the nation, are in the hands of this person. Ought not this person to
perform the object, although the particular mode of using the
means has not been prescribed? Congress unquestionably may
prescribe the mode, and Congress may devolve on others the
whole execution of the contract; but, till this be done, it seems the
duty of the Executive department to execute the contract [i.e., the
treaty] by any means it possesses.300
Nineteenth century commentators generally agreed that the President’s
duty under the Take Care Clause includes a duty to execute treaties.301 There is
very little case law that addresses the relationship between treaties and the Take
Care Clause. However, Supreme Court opinions that address the topic are
unanimous in support of the view that the President’s duty faithfully to execute
“the Laws” includes a duty to execute treaties.302
3. Structural and Policy Considerations: Suppose that the President did
have a general power to violate treaties. If that were true, then either: 1) treaties
are not law; or 2) the President has the power to violate the law. The latter
proposition is at odds with the principle that ours is “a government of laws, and
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10 Annals of Congress 596, 613-14 (1800).
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includes the rights and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all
the protection implied by the nature of the government under the Constitution.”); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (the power to exclude or expel aliens “is to be regulated by treaty or by act
of congress,” and such regulations are “to be executed by the executive authority,” regardless of whether the
rules are derived from treaties or statutes); Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1890) (President’s
duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed is not “limited to the enforcement of acts of congress or
of treaties of the United States according to their express terms.” It encompasses “the rights, duties, and
obligations growing out of the constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by
the nature of the government under the constitution”); The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 571 (1841) (argument of
Attorney General on behalf of the United States) (“The executive government was bound to take the proper
steps for having the treaty executed . . . A treaty is the supreme law; the executive duty is especially to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.”).
301
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not of men.”303 As to the former proposition, it is true that some treaty provisions
lack the status of law within our domestic legal system. But this article has
already demonstrated that most provisions of the Geneva Conventions are Law of
the Land.304 Therefore, a general Presidential power to violate the Geneva
Conventions would effectively mean that the President is above the law.
Advocates of a Presidential power to violate treaties might seek to avert
this consequence by distinguishing among different types of law. The federal
constitution and statutes are binding on the President. In contrast, a President is
free to disregard an executive order issued by his predecessor, even though such
an executive order has the status of “law.”305 Treaties, one could argue, are like
executive orders, because both derive from the President’s Article II powers.
Thus, the claim that Presidents have a general power to violate treaties does not
imply that the President is above the law. Rather, the President’s power to violate
the law applies only to laws that are promulgated on the basis of the President’s
Article II powers.
This argument is unpersuasive. Granted, treaties differ from statutes in
that the Treaty Power is an Article II power, whereas Congress’ legislative
powers are derived from Article I. However, treaties are like statutes in that they
require the joint action of the executive and legislative branches.306 In contrast,
an executive order can become “law” without any legislative participation.307
Thus, from a structural standpoint, the President should not be required to obtain
congressional approval to violate an executive order because the President does
not need such approval to adopt an executive order.308 In contrast, the President
must obtain legislative approval to violate a treaty provision that has the status of
law because treaties require Senate approval in order to become law.309
303

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
See supra Part II.
305
See supra note __.
306
See Helvidius Essay No. 1, supra note 297, at 70 (“The power of treaties is vested jointly in the
President and in the Senate, which is a branch of the legislature. . . . [T]here are sufficient indications that the
power of treaties is regarded by the constitution as materially different from mere executive power, and as
having more affinity to the legislative than to the executive character.”).
307
See supra notes 174-191 and accompanying text.
308
See Taylor v. Morton, 23 F.Cas. 784, 785-86 (D. Mass. 1855) (“Ordinarily, it is certainly true, that
the powers of enacting and repealing laws reside in the same persons.”)
309
The President might obtain legislative approval to violate a treaty by means of ordinary legislation
that supersedes an earlier treaty for purposes of domestic law. See infra Section IV.C.1. Or, the President
might obtain legislative approval to abrogate a treaty by negotiating a new treaty with a foreign country that
supersedes a prior treaty for purposes of international law. By granting its consent to ratify the new treaty,
the Senate would effectively authorize abrogation of the prior conflicting treaty. Either mechanism provides
a legislative check on the President’s power to violate a treaty without some form of legislative authorization.
The question arises: “Absent a new agreement with a foreign country, could a two-thirds Senate
vote grant the President legal authority to violate a treaty if he otherwise lacked such authority?” The
304
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Policy considerations support the preceding constitutional analysis. The
United States has a long-term interest in promoting the development of an
international system that is governed increasingly by agreed legal rules, and less
by sheer power politics.310 On the other hand, the United States, more than any
other nation in the world today, has the power to thwart the development of an
effective international legal order by shunning the agreed rules when it is
convenient to do so. Moreover, there are many situations where short-term
interests provide incentives for the United States to violate international law.
From a constitutional standpoint, the best way to promote our long-term interest
in fostering the development of the rule of law in the international sphere is to
have constitutional arrangements that make it harder, not easier, for the United
States to renege on its international commitments. A constitutional rule that
grants the President a general power to violate treaties would make it too easy for
the United States to breach its treaty obligations. In contrast, a constitutional rule
that requires the President to obtain legislative approval to violate a treaty makes
it harder for the United States to violate treaties, and helps promote our long-term
national interest in strengthening the rule of law internationally.
In addition, such a rule would increase the prospects of meaningful
international cooperation. Substantial empirical evidence suggests that
institutionalized legislative participation in the treaty process increases the
credibility of U.S. commitments—thereby improving the prospects of meaningful
international cooperation.311 Although this empirical work documents the
importance of ex ante legislative influence (at the bargaining and ratification
stages of international agreements), the advantages of legislative involvement
would be substantially diminished if ex post the President could unilaterally alter
question must be answered in the negative. The Constitution grants the President plus two-thirds of the
Senate the power to create domestic law by means of an agreement with a foreign country, but the President
plus two-thirds of the Senate do not have any power to make law in the absence of an international
agreement. Since they do not have the power to make law without an international agreement, it is untenable
to claim that they have the power to “un-make” (or violate) law without an international agreement. See, e.g.,
Taylor v. Morton, 23 F.Cas. 784, 786 (C.C. Mass. 1855) (If the power to modify a treaty was vested
exclusively in the President and Senate, then “the government of the United States could not act at all, to that
effect, without the consent of some foreign government; for no new treaty, affecting, in any manner, one
already in existence, can be made without the concurrence of two parties, one of whom must be a foreign
sovereign.”). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 379 (John Jay) (Isaac Kramnick ed. 1987) (“They who
make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal them; and it will not be disputed that they who make treaties
may alter or cancel them; but still let us not forget that treaties are made, not by only one of the contracting
parties, but by both, and consequently, that as the consent of both was essential to their formation at first, so
must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them.”)
310
This has been a central theme in the work of Harold Koh. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit
of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT’L L. J. 23, 23-24 (2002).
311
See, e.g., LISA MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS: LEGISLATURES AND INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION (2000); Kenneth A. Schultz, Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises, 92
AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 829 (1997).
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the domestic law status of treaties. Critics might point out that legislative
involvement at the bargaining and ratification stages conveys important
information to other states about U.S. preferences; and, therefore, some useful
signaling function is served by ex ante legislative involvement even if the
President may violate treaties without congressional authorization ex post. This
point, we concede, is important and almost certainly correct. Nevertheless, many
of the most important signaling benefits of legislative participation are sacrificed
if Presidents may violate treaties unilaterally.312 Indeed, the signaling effect
improves the prospects for international cooperation precisely because it suggests
an increased probability of implementation and compliance.313 Legislative
involvement in treaty negotiation and ratification constitutes an important
constraint on the exercise of executive power—suggesting that the legislature will
not hinder the implementation of the agreement and that the executive is a reliable
(because constrained) treaty partner.314
The main policy argument in favor of a Presidential power to violate
treaties relates to the President’s demand for flexibility in handling the
unpredictable contingencies of foreign affairs. Although we recognize the need
for flexibility, we contend that the President has ample flexibility even without a
general power to violate treaties. There are three factors that support this
conclusion. First, if the political branches decide that a treaty imposes
unacceptable limits on Presidential flexibility, they can choose not to ratify the
treaty,315 or to ratify with conditions that are specifically designed to preserve
flexibility.316 Second, if the President decides after ratification that a treaty
imposes unacceptable constraints, he can suspend or terminate the treaty in

312

MARTIN, supra note 311.
Id.
314
See, e.g., id. at 5 (“Unconstrained executive-branch actors can indeed bargain more flexibly. But
such apparently powerful negotiators can find it difficult to put into effect the agreements they reach with
such ease at the international table. Their lack of ex-ante domestic constraints also gives them the capacity to
act arbitrarily, making them unreliable partners in international cooperation in spite of their apparently
enviable freedom of maneuver.”).
315
Every treaty limits Presidential flexibility by imposing international legal constraints on the
exercise of national sovereignty. Even if one adopts the view that the President has a constitutional power to
violate treaties, a Presidential decision to violate a solemn treaty commitment of the United States will almost
invariably incur political costs; those political costs limit Presidential flexibility by providing a disincentive
to treaty violations in the first place. Therefore, the decision to ratify a treaty amounts to a decision that the
costs resulting from legal constraints on national sovereignty – which necessarily limit Presidential flexibility
– are outweighed by the benefits that the treaty offers.
316
For example, when the United States ratified the Geneva Conventions, it adopted a reservation to
preserve the right to impose the death penalty in circumstances that would otherwise be prohibited under
Article 68 of the Civilians Convention. See 84 Cong. Rec. 9972 (1955) (resolution of ratification for
Civilians Convention).
313
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accordance with its terms, or in accordance with generally recognized principles
of international law.317
Third, if the President decides after ratification that the treaty imposes
unacceptable constraints, he can ask Congress to enact legislation to authorize
executive action inconsistent with the treaty. In the nineteenth century, the
logistical difficulties involved in convening a special session of Congress made it
difficult for the President to obtain prompt congressional action to deal with
national emergencies.318 In contrast, in the twenty-first century, it is easier than
ever for the President to obtain prompt congressional action because
Congressmen can travel to Washington in a matter of hours, if necessary, to
respond to a national crisis. Additionally, Congress takes much shorter recesses
now than it did in the nineteenth century.319 It took only one week after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, for Congress to enact a joint resolution
authorizing the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force” to respond
to the attacks.320 Thus, a constitutional rule requiring the President to obtain
legislative approval to violate a treaty imposes fewer constraints on Presidential
flexibility today than it would have one hundred years ago.
In sum, textual, structural, historical and policy considerations all support
the conclusion that the President lacks an independent constitutional power to
violate treaty provisions that have the status of supreme federal law.
C.

The Commander-in-Chief Power and Law-of-War Treaties

Assuming that, as a general rule, the President must obtain legislative
approval to violate treaties, the question arises whether there should be an
exception to that rule for law-of-war treaties. The argument in favor of such an
exception can be summarized as follows. Certain provisions of law-of-war
317

See supra Section IV.B.1.
The difficulty of securing prompt legislative action was one of the main factors that led President
Lincoln to act unilaterally to suspend the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil War. See Message to
Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861, reprinted in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS
(Roy P. Basler, ed.) at 594, 601 (noting that constitutional provision for suspending habeas corpus “was
plainly made for a dangerous emergency,” and claiming: “[I]t cannot be believed the framers of the
instrument intended that in every case the danger should run its course until Congress could be called
together; the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the rebellion.”).
319
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the 56th Congress ended on March 3, 1901, and the 57th
Congress did not convene until December 2, 1901.
See http://clerk.house.gov/histHigh/
Congressional_History/Session_Dates. Thus, there was a continuous nine-month period when Congress was
not in session. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the 106th Congress ended on December 15, 2000,
and the 107th Congress began on January 3, 2001. See id. Granted, the House of Representatives took ten
different recesses in 2001, for a total of about 130 days in recess. Id. Even so, the House could easily have
convened on short notice to respond to an emergency.
320
See Pub. L. 107-40 (Sept. 18, 2001).
318
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treaties regulate conduct that is constitutionally committed to the Commander-inChief, and that is therefore beyond the scope of Congress’ legislative powers. If
the President was required to await congressional legislation to authorize
violations of such treaty provisions, the federal government as a whole would lack
the power to violate the treaty because Congress cannot enact legislation beyond
the scope of its Article I powers. Since the federal government must have the
power to violate treaties, including law-of-war treaties, the President must have
the independent authority to violate treaty provisions that regulate conduct within
the exclusive purview of the Commander-in-Chief.
This section presents a four-part analysis of the argument summarized
above. The first part defends the claim that the federal government as a whole has
the power to violate treaties, including law-of-war treaties. The second part
demonstrates that, in the absence of international legal rules, the President as
Commander-in-Chief would have the exclusive power to control battlefield
operations in wartime, and Congress would lack the power to interfere with the
President’s conduct of battlefield operations. The third part contends that
Congress has the power under Article I to regulate the treatment of detainees, and
congressional legislation in that area does not interfere impermissibly with the
President’s exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power.
Therefore, a
constitutional rule requiring the President to obtain legislative approval to violate
treaties, such as the Geneva Conventions, governing the treatment of detainees,
would not deprive the federal government of the power to violate such treaty
provisions.
Part four shows that the creation of new international legal rules regulating
battlefield operations alters the constitutional balance between Congress and the
President. In particular, we argue that the creation of international rules
governing the conduct of warfare activates Congress’ power under the Define and
Punish Clause321 to regulate battlefield operations in ways that it could not in the
absence of such international rules. Finally, we argue that U.S. ratification of
law-of-war treaties activates Congress’ power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause322 to regulate treaty-related conduct that, in the absence of such treaties,
would be beyond the scope of Congress’ legislative powers. Therefore, the claim
that the President has the independent authority to violate law-of-war treaty
provisions beyond the scope of Congress’ legislative powers ultimately fails,
321
U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress the power “[t]o define and punish . . . Offences
against the Law of Nations”).
322
U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”).
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because Congress has the power to enact legislation to supersede domestically
any law-of-war treaty provision.
1. The Federal Power to Violate Law-of-War Treaties: The argument in
favor of a Presidential power to violate law-of-war treaties rests on two premises:
1) the federal government must have the power to violate such treaties; and 2)
Congress lacks the power to do so, in some cases, because certain provisions of
law-of-war treaties address matters within the exclusive purview of the
Commander-in-Chief. This section defends the first premise. The following
sections demonstrate that the second premise is incorrect.
There are distinct two lines of authority supporting the claim that the
federal government has the power to violate law-of-war treaties. The first relates
to the war powers of the federal government. The Supreme Court has affirmed
that “the war power of the federal government . . . is a power to wage war
successfully, and thus it permits the harnessing of the entire energies of the people
in a supreme co-operative effort to preserve the nation.”323 Additionally, the
Court has said: “Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress
the exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of warfare, it
has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of judgment and discretion
in determining the nature and extent of the threatened injury or danger and in the
selection of means for resisting it.”324
In light of these and similar precedents, Professor Henkin has remarked
that “[t]he Supreme Court has never declared any limit to the war powers of
Congress . . . or even intimated where such limits might lie.”325 Similarly,
another commentator suggests that “the only limitation of the war power is
necessity itself. It is as extensive in scope as circumstances require. It is
complete, total and adequate when both Congress and the President act in
cooperation.”326 These authorities support the proposition that the federal
government as a whole has the constitutional authority to violate law-of-war
treaties in situations where such treaties would inhibit the power to wage war
successfully.327
323

Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934). See also Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943) (“The war power of the national government is the power to wage war
successfully.”).
324
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93.
325
HENKIN, supra note 178, at 67.
326
Hollander, supra note 27, at 55.
327
We are not claiming, as a factual matter, that law-of-war treaties do inhibit the federal
government’s power to wage war successfully. Rather, we are claiming, as a constitutional matter, that the
federal political branches, when acting in unison, have the constitutional authority to violate specific
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The second line of authority supporting the claim that the federal
government has the power to violate law-of-war treaties relates to the later-intime rule, which holds that a later-in-time statute that conflicts with a previously
ratified treaty trumps the earlier treaty for purposes of domestic law.328 Taylor v.
Morton329 is the earliest reported judicial decision that provides a coherent
justification for the later-in-time rule. Justice Curtis wrote the opinion in his
capacity as a circuit justice. In his view, the case turned on the issue of whether
Congress had the power “to refuse to execute” (i.e., to violate) a treaty.330 He
concluded that Congress must have the power to violate a treaty, because that
power is an essential attribute of national sovereignty.
To refuse to execute a treaty, for reasons which approve themselves to the
conscientious judgment of the nation, is a matter of the utmost gravity and
delicacy; but the power to do so, is prerogative, of which no nation can be
deprived, without deeply affecting its independence. That the people of
the United States have deprived their government of this power in any
case, I do not believe. That it must reside somewhere, and be applicable
to all cases, I am convinced. I feel no doubt that it belongs to congress.
That, insasmuch as treaties must continue to operate as part of our
municipal law, . . . and inasmuch as the power of repealing these
municipal laws must reside somewhere, and no body other than congress
possesses it, then legislative power is applicable to such laws whenever
they relate to subjects, which the constitution has placed under that
legislative power.331
Justice Curtis wrote his opinion in Taylor v. Morton in 1855. The
Supreme Court first endorsed the later-in-time rule in 1871 in The Cherokee
Tobacco.332 Over the next two decades, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the laterin-time rule in at least three different cases. All three cases effectively restated
the rationale for the later-in-time rule that Justice Curtis first articulated in
provisions of law-of-war treaties if they decide that such violations are necessary for successful prosecution
of the war effort.
328
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 115(1)(a) (“An act of Congress supersedes an earlier .
. . [treaty provision] as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier . . . provision
is clear or if the act and the earlier . . . provision cannot be fairly reconciled.”). Under the later-in-time rule, a
subsequent treaty also supersedes a prior inconsistent statute. See id., § 115(2).
329
23 F.Cas. 784 (C.C. Mass. 1855).
330
Id. at 786.
331
Id. at 786 (emphasis added).
332
78 U.S. 616, 621 (1871). In that case, the Court did not provide any rationale for the later-in-time
rule. It merely stated that “an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty,” id. at 621, citing Taylor v.
Morton as authority for the proposition.
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Taylor.333 Indeed, all three cases cited Taylor and endorsed Justice Curtis’
opinion.334 Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, the later-in-time rule was
firmly entrenched in Supreme Court jurisprudence on the strength of Justice
Curtis’ analysis in Taylor. And his entire analysis was based on the assumption
that the power to violate treaties is an essential attribute of national sovereignty.
Thus, the rationale underlying the later-in-time rule supports the proposition that
the federal government has the constitutional authority to violate law-of-war
treaties.335
As noted above, there is an important distinction between treaty
termination and treaty violation, and there are several ways in which a treaty can
legitimately be terminated in accordance with international law.336 Moreover, the
President has the constitutional authority to terminate treaties in accordance with
international law.337 The Geneva Conventions, in particular, permit parties to
denounce the treaties for any reason, or for no reason, subject to a one-year prior
notification requirement.338 Therefore, one could argue, the power to violate
treaties is not an essential attribute of national sovereignty because international
rules governing treaty termination adequately protect the sovereignty of all
nations.
The preceding argument has some persuasive force. However, a
constitutional rule denying the federal government the authority to violate a treaty
might actually undermine the development of international law because it could
333

See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600-602 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 193-95 (1888); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 597-99 (1884).
334
See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 602 (1889) (stating that the issue of conflicts
between treaties and statutes “was fully considered by Mr. Justice Curtis, while sitting at the circuit, in Taylor
v. Morton”); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888) (stating that the “subject was very
elaborately considered at the circuit by Mr. Justice Curtis); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 597-98 (1884)
(stating that Justice Curtis “in a very learned opinion exhausted the sources of argument on the subject” of
conflicts between statutes and treaties).
335
This conclusion is entirely consistent with the thesis, advanced by Professor Golove, that “in
exercising his war powers as commander in chief, the President is constitutionally bound, at a minimum, to
comply with international law, [including] . . . the laws of war.” David Golove, Military Tribunals,
International Law, and the Constitution: A Franckian-Madisonian Approach, 35 N.Y.U. J. INTL’ L L. & POL.
363, 364 (2003). While defending the claim that the laws of war constrain the President’s authority as
Commander in Chief, Professor Golove concedes that “the view that Congress is so limited raises large
theoretical questions and is in tension with the so-called ‘last in time’ rule.” Id. at 387.
336
See supra Section IV.B.1.
337
See supra notes 274-285 and accompanying text.
338
See Geneva Convention I, supra note 10, art. 63; Geneva Convention II, supra note 10, art. 62;
POW Convention, supra note 10, art. 142; Civilians Convention, supra note 10, art. 158. Insofar as the
Geneva Conventions codify customary international law, the United States would have an international legal
obligation to comply with those customary norms, even if it denounced the Conventions. However, it is
debatable whether the President would have a domestic constitutional duty to comply with those customary
norms. See supra note 22.

67

Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?
Draft – July 17, 2004

inhibit the United States from entering into treaties that would otherwise be
acceptable. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that a modern U.S. court would
embrace a constitutional rule denying the federal government the constitutional
authority to violate a treaty provision if the political branches decided that
provision inhibited the nation’s ability successfully to wage war. A court can
justify a constitutional rule requiring the President to obtain legislative approval
to violate a treaty on the grounds that courts have historically played an important
role in policing the constitutional division of powers between the President and
Congress.339
But there is virtually no judicial precedent supporting a
constitutional rule that invokes international law as a limit on the constitutional
power of the federal government,340 thereby denying to the national government
as a whole the constitutional power to violate international law. There may come
a time when the world is politically integrated to such a degree that an
“international supremacy clause” becomes a viable option, but that time has not
yet arrived.
2. The Commander-in-Chief Power as a Limitation on Congress’ War
Powers: The preceding section demonstrated that the federal government, as a
whole, has the power to violate law-of-war treaties. The remaining question is:
“How is that power divided between the President and Congress?” We contend
that international laws of war shape the constitutional division of war powers
between the legislative and executive branches. Subsequent sections address the
impact of international laws of war on the allocation of war powers between the
branches. This section addresses the constitutional division of war powers in the
absence of international legal rules. Specifically, this section demonstrates that,
in the absence of international legal rules, the President as Commander-in-Chief
would have the exclusive power to control battlefield operations in wartime.
Insofar as the President’s power is exclusive, Congress lacks the power to
interfere with the President’s conduct of military operations.341

The Constitution grants Congress a wide array of war powers. Under
Article I, Congress has the authority to “provide for the common Defence;”342
339
See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding that Line Item Veto Act is
unconstitutional); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that one-House veto is unconstitutional);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding that President lacked constitutional
authority to seize steel mills).
340
But see Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 315-16 (1870) (Field, J., dissenting)
(contending that Congress lacks the constitutional authority to violate the laws of war).
341
We distinguish here between “concurrent” and “exclusive” powers. In areas where the President
and Congress share “concurrent” powers, the President has independent freedom of action in the absence of
congressional legislation, but he must conform his conduct to the requirements of any legislation that
Congress enacts. In areas where the President has “exclusive” power, congressional attempts to legislate are
invalid insofar as they interfere with the President’s exercise of his exclusive powers.
342
U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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“raise and support Armies” and “provide and maintain a Navy;”343 “make rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces”;344 “define and
punish . . . offenses against the law of nations”;345 and “declare war, grant Letters
of Marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and
water.”346 In addition, Congress is empowered to “make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution” any power vested in the federal
government.347
Despite this impressive array of congressional war powers, the President’s
Commander-in-Chief Power constitutes an important constraint on the scope of
congressional power. The Commander-in-Chief Power grants the President “the
supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces.”348 The reason
for vesting this power in the President is obvious: “Of all the cares or concerns of
government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which
distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.”349
Recognizing the need for the Commander-in-Chief to exercise unified
control over the armed forces, the Supreme Court has affirmed the principle that
there are constitutional limits on Congress’ authority to interfere with the
President’s operational control of the military in wartime. For example, Chief
Justice Chase stated that Congress’ war “power necessarily extends to all
legislation essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and success, except such
as interferes with the command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns. That
power and duty belong to the President as commander-in-chief. ”350 He continued:
“[N]either can the President, in war more than in peace, intrude upon the proper
authority of Congress, nor Congress upon the proper authority of the
President.”351
Congress has rarely attempted to interfere with the President’s operational
control of the military in wartime. There was a notable exception during the Civil
War, when President Lincoln was “subjected to unrelenting scrutiny by the
343

Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 12, 13.
Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
345
Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
346
Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
347
Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
348
THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 398 (Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed. 1987).
349
Id., No. 74, at 422 (Hamilton).
350
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added). See also
Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850) (“As commander-in-chief, [the President] is authorized to direct
the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the
manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy.”)
351
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 139 (Chase, C.J., concurring).
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powerful Joint Committee on the Conduct of War, which . . . insisted even on a
say in the choice of field commanders and battle strategy.”352 Not surprisingly,
congressional meddling in the details of military operations frustrated the
President’s war effort. Indeed, “Robert E. Lee once remarked that the committee
was worth two divisions to him.”353 Apart from this single episode of
congressional overreaching, Congress has generally contented itself with issuing
non-binding resolutions that do not intrude upon the Commander-in-Chief’s
authority to exercise control over battlefield operations in wartime.354
Commentators generally agree that the President has exclusive authority
over battlefield operations, and that Congress’ war powers are constrained by the
need to avoid interference with the President’s Commander-in-Chief power in
wartime.355 As one leading commentator has stated: “Congress declares war and
provides the means for carrying it on, but the President decides how the war is to
be conducted and directs the campaigns. . . . [I]n the field of military operations
there are no limitations prescribed by the Constitution and the President’s power
is therefore exclusive.356 The President’s exclusive power includes “control of the
movements of the army and navy” in time of war,357 as well as the power to
decide “how the forces shall be used, for what purposes, the manner and extent of
352

DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 258 (1992); see also GEOFFREY PERRET, LINCOLN’S WAR: THE
UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S GREATEST COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF (2004); BRUCE TAP, OVER LINCOLN’S
SHOULDER: THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR (1998).
353
MCCULLOUGH, supra note 352, AT 258. It should be noted, however, that Lee references only the
strategic value of the information made public in the Committee’s hearings. See PERRET, supra note 352. The
contemporary Congress, now broadly experienced in “closed hearings” and other forms of confidential
oversight of the executive, would arguably do much better.
354
Even in situations where individual Members of Congress objected to Presidential policy, Congress
has been reluctant to enact binding legislation that would restrict the President’s operational control over the
military in wartime. See, e.g., CLARENCE A. BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED
STATES 123-25 (1920) (discussing congressional opposition to the deployment of U.S. troops in Siberia after
World War I, which resulted in legislation that “was merely a request for information as to the general policy
respecting Siberia and the maintenance of troops there”). See also ROSSITER, supra note 256, at xvii (Preface
to 2nd edition written by Richard P. Longaker) (discussing congressional opposition to the deployment of
U.S. troops to Europe in 1951, resulting in a resolution in which “Congress seemed to accept the President’s
power to dispatch troops independently”).
355
See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 178, at 103-04 (“It would be unthinkable for Congress to attempt
detailed, tactical decision, or supervision, and as to these the President’s authority is effectively supreme.”);
MICHAEL GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 84 (1990) (concluding that the President has exclusive
authority over “operational battlefield decisions concerning the means to be employed to achieve ends chosen
by Congress”); Hollander, supra note 27, at 64 (“Once the nation is at war . . . the whole power of conducting
it, as to manner, method, and means is for Presidential determination. He is the sole judge of the nature and
extent of the exigencies, necessities, and duties demanded by the occasion.”).
356
BERDAHL, supra note 354, at 118. Professor Berdahl continues: “Neither the power of Congress to
raise and support armies, nor the power to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces, nor the power to declare war, gives [Congress] the command of the army. Here the constitutional
power of the President as commander-in-chief is exclusive.” Id. (quoting Lieber, Remarks on Army
Regulations, 18).
357
Id., at 121.
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their participation in campaigns, and the time of their withdrawal.”358 Any
congressional effort to regulate these types of operational and tactical decisions in
wartime would constitute impermissible interference with the President’s exercise
of his Commander-in-Chief power.
Although Congress lacks the power -- in the absence of international legal
rules -- to regulate the President’s conduct of battlefield operations in wartime,
the United States is a party to certain law-of-war treaties that do regulate the
means and methods of warfare.359 In light of the conclusion of the previous
section (that the federal government has the power to violate law-of-war treaties),
and the conclusion of this section (that Congress lacks the power to regulate
battlefield operations in wartime), one might assert that the federal power to
violate law-of-war treaties is vested in the President as Commander-in-Chief, at
least insofar as law-of-war treaties regulate conduct that is beyond the scope of
Congress’ Article I powers. We address this claim in sections 4 and 5 below.
First, though, we consider whether Congress has the power, in the absence of
international legal rules, to regulate the treatment of wartime detainees.
3. Congress’ Concurrent Authority to Regulate Treatment of Detainees:
The previous section demonstrated that, in the absence of international legal rules,
the Constitution would grant the President exclusive power over battlefield
operations in wartime, and Congress would lack the power to regulate such
matters. However, there are also substantial areas where the President and
Congress exercise concurrent authority. In this section, we contend that the
power to regulate the treatment of wartime detainees is shared between the
legislative and executive branches. Therefore, a constitutional rule requiring the
President to obtain legislative approval to violate treaties would not deprive the
federal government of the power to violate treaty provisions concerning wartime

358

Id., at 122. Professor Berdahl wrote these words in 1920. For the past eighty years, no scholar has
undertaken an in-depth analysis of the proper line of demarcation between the Commander-in-Chief’s
exclusive power over battlefield operations and the areas where Congress and the President share concurrent
authority. Given the tremendous changes in the technology of modern warfare, as well as the evolution of the
international laws of war, some refinement of Professor Berdahl’s formulation may be appropriate. It is
beyond the scope of this article to address this issue in a comprehensive fashion. Below, we suggest that: 1)
rules government the treatment of detainees fall on the concurrent side of the line, see infra Section IV.C.3;
and 2) the development of the international laws of war expands the scope of Congress’ concurrent powers,
while diminishing the scope of the President’s exclusive powers. See infra Section IV.C.4.
359
See infra Section IV.C.4 (discussing treaties that regulate means and methods of warfare). The
United States has the power to enter into treaties that regulate matters beyond the scope of Congress’ Article I
powers because limits on Article I do not necessarily apply in the same way to the treaty power. Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).

71

Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?
Draft – July 17, 2004

detainees because the Government and Regulation Clause360 grants Congress the
power to prescribe rules governing the treatment of wartime detainees.
Congress has the power under Article I “[t]o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”361 On its face, this
provision is clearly broad enough to empower Congress to prescribe rules for the
treatment of persons detained by the military. Moreover, the Government and
Regulation Clause must be construed in light of the principle articulated by Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution; and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”362 This principle supports a broad
interpretation of Congress’ powers under the Government and Regulation Clause.
Courts have often adopted narrower interpretations of enumerated Article I
powers in order to protect individual rights, or to protect state sovereignty. But
the Supreme Court has rarely, if ever, adopted a narrow construction of an
enumerated Article I power in order to protect the President’s prerogatives as
Commander-in-Chief.
The practice of the political branches is consistent with the view that
Congress has the power to regulate the treatment of wartime detainees. Indeed,
long before the drafting of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Congress prescribed
rules for the government of the armed forces that directly regulated the treatment
of wartime detainees.363 These statutory schemes established detailed rules
governing many aspects of military government, including the treatment of
captured enemy combatants.364 Moreover, many Supreme Court cases assume,
expressly or implicitly, that Congress has the power to make rules for the
treatment of the enemy in time of war.365
In a recently declassified memorandum drafted by the Bush
Administration Justice Department, the Assistant Attorney General asserted:
360
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (granting Congress the power “[t]o make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”).
361
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
362
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
363
See WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 45, 931 (2d ed. 1920) (documenting
long history of congressional regulation of the conduct of war through various iterations of the “Articles of
War”); American Articles of War of 1775, 2 J. Cont. Cong. 111-23 (1775), reprinted in WINTHROP, supra, at
953; American Articles of War of 1786, 30 J. Cont. Cong. 316 (1786), reprinted in WINTHROP, supra, at 972.
364
See, e.g., Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (holding that the Articles of War authorized the
President to try by military commission captured enemy combatants in a manner consistent with the law of
war).
365
See, e.g., Quirin, 317 U.S. 1; In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
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“Congress may no more regulate the President’s ability to detain and interrogate
enemy combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct troop movements on
the battlefield.”366 Not surprisingly, the Justice Department failed to cite any
authority for this unprecedented claim of executive prerogative. Moreover, in its
most recent decision on the detention of enemy combatants, the Supreme Court
rejected the Bush Administration’s claim. The Court distinguished between the
procedures governing “initial captures on the battlefield” and the procedures that
apply “when the determination is made to continue to hold those who have been
seized.”367 The Court tacitly conceded that the rules governing initial captures
may not be subject to judicial review. But the Court insisted on the need for
judicial review of the policies and procedures governing the continued detention
of captured enemy combatants. “While we accord the greatest respect and
consideration to the judgments of military authorities in matters relating to the
actual prosecution of a war . . . it does not infringe on the core role of the military
for the courts to exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated
roles of reviewing and resolving” claims involving the continued detention of
those who have been seized.368 Clearly, if the courts can review the claims of
detainees without infringing on the core role of the military, then Congress can
regulate the treatment of detainees without infringing on the core role of the
military.
As a practical matter, it is eminently sensible to vest the President with
responsibility for the “actual prosecution of a war,” while entrusting the
legislature with shared responsibility for prescribing rules governing continued
detention of enemy combatants. Alexander Hamilton defended the unitary
executive on the grounds that “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will
generally characterize the proceedings of one man.”369 He contended that these
are the qualities needed to ensure an energetic executive and, one might add, to
ensure successful prosecution of a war. In contrast, he argued, a numerous
legislature is “best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to
conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and
interests.”370 Whereas “activity, secrecy and dispatch” are needed to ensure
successful prosecution of a war, “deliberation and wisdom” are needed to regulate
the treatment of wartime detainees held in long-term captivity. Therefore, it
366
Bybee Memo, supra note 5 at 35. See also id., at 39 (“Any effort by Congress to regulate the
interrogation of battlefield combatants would violate the Constitution’s sole vesting of the Commander-inChief authority in the President. . . . Congress can no more interfere with the President’s conduct of the
interrogation of enemy combatants than it can dictate strategic or tactical decisions on the battlefield.”).
367
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. __ (2004) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (slip op. at 27-28.
368
Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
369
THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 403 (Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed. 1987).
370
Id.
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makes sense to construe the Government and Regulation Clause to grant Congress
the power to prescribe rules for the treatment of wartime detainees, but not to
interfere with the President’s control over battlefield operations.
Recall that the Geneva Conventions prescribe rules that govern the
treatment of persons captured (and detained) by enemy forces.371 The Civilians
Convention, for example, protects “those who, at any given moment and in any
manner whatsoever, find themselves . . . in the hands of a Party . . . of which they
are not nationals.”372 In addition, the POW Convention (as its name implies)
governs only those circumstances in which combatants are captured and detained
by the enemy—that is, the treaty governs the treatment of prisoners in time of
war. The upshot is that the Conventions, for the most part, purport to govern only
the treatment of persons no longer taking active part in the hostilities.373 Thus, the
vast majority of the provisions embodied in the Geneva Conventions address
matters that are well within the scope of Congress’ Government and Regulation
Power.374
In sum, the argument in favor of a Presidential power to violate law-ofwar treaties boils down to this: the President must have the power to violate lawof-war treaties because the federal government has the power to violate treaties,
and law-of-war treaties regulate conduct that is beyond the scope of Congress’
Article I powers. This section has demonstrated: 1) the majority of the provisions
embodied in the Geneva Conventions concern the treatment of wartime detainees;
and 2) even in the absence of international rules, the Government and Regulation
Clause empowers Congress to regulate the treatment of wartime detainees.
Therefore, even if the President did have the constitutional authority to violate
371

See supra Part I.A.
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 10 art. 4 (emphasis added).
373
For example, the POW Convention has a total of 143 articles, including 92 articles that address
“Captivity,” and an additional 13 articles that address “Termination of Captivity.” Moreover, the Convention
specifically obligates parties to evacuate POWs “as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in
an area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger.” Geneva Convention III, supra note
10 art. 19. Thus, the Convention’s primary focus concerns the treatment of individuals who have been
removed from active combat zones.
374
Some protections established by the Geneva Conventions regulate operational choices more
directly, and thereby arguably impinge on the Commander-in-Chief power. Indeed, it is well understood that
the law of war governs not only the treatment of captives but also the very “means and methods” of warfare.
These rules are, for the most part, codified in the Hague Convention, supra note 34, and the Additional
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 33 (The United States has not ratified the Additional
Protocols.) However, some provisions of the Geneva Conventions govern war tactics. For example, the
Civilians Convention prohibits attacking civilian hospitals. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 10 arts. 1819. It also requires belligerents to allow free passage of medical supplies, objects necessary for religious
worship, and foodstuffs so long as the belligerent is satisfied that these consignments are for civilian use. Id.,
art. 23. Below, we consider whether the President has the constitutional authority to violate treaty provisions
that regulate the conduct of battlefield operations. See infra Section IV.C.4
372
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treaties beyond the scope of Congress’ Article I powers, the President would still
be bound by most portions of the Geneva Conventions, because the Conventions
primarily address matters within the scope of Congress’ legislative powers.
4. International Laws of War and the Separation of Powers: Up to this point, we
have established only that, in the absence of international law rules: (1) the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, possess some quantum of exclusive authority
to conduct military operations; and (2) Congress possesses some quantum of
concurrent authority to regulate the treatment of enemy forces no longer directly
participating in the hostilities. Two important questions remain unanswered by the
analysis so far: (1) is the President bound by those aspects of the Geneva
Conventions that govern (or might govern, in some circumstances) the conduct of
hostilities proper; and (2) is the President bound by Hague Law which expressly
purports to regulate the conduct of battlefield operations. In this Section, we argue
that the creation of new international legal rules regulating battlefield operations
alters the constitutional balance between Congress and the President. We reject
the claim that the President has the independent authority to violate law-of-war
treaty provisions beyond the scope of Congress’ legislative powers because
Congress has the power to enact legislation to supersede, as a matter of domestic
law, any law-of-war treaty provision. The main idea here is this. Assume that—
in the absence of controlling international legal rules—any congressional attempt
to regulate “the general direction of military and naval operations” would be an
unconstitutional infringement of the President’s Commander-in-Chief power.
Even so, once the U.S. ratifies a treaty that constrains the President’s operational
discretion, that treaty ratification has the effect of empowering Congress to
regulate in areas where it could not otherwise regulate.
Two claims support this conclusion. First, we argue that the creation of
international rules governing the conduct of warfare activates Congress’ power
under the Define and Punish Clause to regulate battlefield operations in ways that
it could not in the absence of such international rules. Finally, we argue that U.S.
ratification of law-of-war treaties activates Congress’ power under the Necessary
and Proper Clause to regulate treaty-related conduct that, in the absence of such
treaties, would be beyond the scope of Congress’ legislative powers.
In defending these two claims, we will make reference to a specific
example of the kind of rule we have in mind: the prohibition on the bombing of
“undefended towns” embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907.375 This is, we
suggest, the kind of rule that presents the greatest difficulty for our broad claim
375

Hague Convention IV, supra note 34, art. 25 (“The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited.”).
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that the President has no unilateral authority to violate treaties. The rule purports
to restrict the strategic options of states in time of war. In the absence of
international rules, Congress arguably would not have the power to promulgate
such a rule because it infringes on the President’s exclusive Commander-in-Chief
powers. Again, the question is whether the emergence of an international rule
reallocates law-making (and thus, law-breaking) authority as between the political
branches.
a. The Define and Punish Clause and the Division of War Powers: First
consider that the existence of international rules activates Congress’ authority to
“define and punish . . . offenses against the law of nations.”376 The Define and
Punish Clause expressly empowers Congress to incorporate the law of nations—
including treaties—into domestic law. If there were no international legal rule
prohibiting, for example, the bombing of undefended towns, then Congress could
not create such a rule – it would be beyond the scope of Art. I. But once the
United States ratifies a treaty that prohibits the bombing of undefended towns,
Congress has the power under the Define and Punish Clause to enact legislation
establishing civil and/or criminal liability for a violation.377
Moreover, Congress’ power to punish individuals who violate
international norms necessarily includes the power to immunize individuals who
violate those same norms in cases where Congress decides that the infraction was
justified. 378 Thus, if the President orders the air force to bomb an undefended
town in violation of the Hague Convention, and Congress agrees that the
President made a wise choice, Congress could enact a law on the basis of its
Define and Punish power to immunize the military officers who executed the
Presidential order from any civil or criminal liability that might otherwise ensue.
This point, however, provides only modest support for our broad claim in
this Section. The problem is this: Congress’ Define and Punish power provides
only limited authority to enact legislation that would, in effect, authorize
violations of the Conventions. There is an important difference between
legislation “authorizing” certain conduct (e.g., the bombing of undefended towns)
and legislation creating immunity for those who engage in unauthorized conduct.
376

U.S. CONST. Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 10.
Indeed, this is exactly what Congress has done. Article 25 of the Hague Regulations Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land is now part of the U.S. criminal code. See War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §
2441. The House Report on the War Crimes Act specifically cites the Define and Punish clause as the source
of congressional authority to pass the bill. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-698, at 7 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2166, 2172.
378
See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 178, at 68-70. This power also authorizes Congress to establish (or
modify or qualify) civil remedies for the violation of the law of nations. See id. at 69-70.
377
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Even if Congress accorded U.S. officials an unqualified immunity for the
bombardment of undefended towns, this military tactic would be illegal (because
it violates a treaty, which has the status of law). Any such enactment arguably
would not supersede law-of-war treaties (including the Geneva Conventions) as a
matter of domestic law. The question is whether Article I accords Congress such
authority.
b. The Necessary and Proper Clause: The question then is whether
Congress has the authority, given the existence of international rules, to enact
legislation superseding any such rules. We submit that it does, pursuant to the
Necessary and Proper Clause. The idea is this: if the Geneva Conventions impose
operational constraints that unacceptably compromise the ability of the
Commander-in-Chief to wage war successfully, Congress has the authority to
enact legislation superseding these problematic constraints because such
legislation is “necessary and proper” for the execution of the President’s power.379
As Chief Justice Marshall noted in McCulloch v. Maryland:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution; and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.380
The upshot is that Congress has the power, pursuant to the Necessary and
Proper Clause, to enact any legislation that expands the discretion of the
Commander-in-Chief in the conduct of war. In other words, this power authorizes
Congress to make rules the effect of which is to empower the President to
prosecute the war successfully. In this sense, the Necessary and Proper rationale
provides independent support for the broader claim of this Section—that Congress
has the constitutional authority to enact legislation that supersedes the Geneva
Conventions.
The claim advanced here is obviously analogous to the Supreme Court’s
holding in Missouri v. Holland.381 In that case, the Court assumed that Congress
lacked the power to regulate migratory birds in the absence of a treaty, but held
that a treaty on migratory birds effectively gave Congress the power, under the
379

See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 300-305 (2nd ed. 1988) (describing the
contours of Congress’ power under the “necessary and proper” clause); see also id. at 301 (“The exercise by
Congress of power ancillary to an enumerated source of national authority is constitutionally valid, as long as
the ancillary power does not conflict with external limitations such as those of the Bill of Rights and
federalism).
380
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
381
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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Necessary and Proper Clause, to regulate in areas where it could not regulate in
the absence of a treaty.382
Critics might suggest that the Missouri v. Holland analogy fails for the
following reason. The Necessary and Proper Clause refers to laws “for carrying
into Execution” the powers vested in the federal government. In Missouri, the
law at issue was designed to “carry into Execution” a treaty. Here, the issue is
whether Congress has the authority to prevent or inhibit the execution of a treaty.
Such laws, critics might argue, are not necessary or proper for carrying into
execution the treaty power. Our claim, however, is that legislation superseding the
Conventions is necessary and proper for carrying into execution the Commanderin-Chief power, not the Treaty power. Nevertheless, the logic of Missouri applies
to any legislation essential to the effective exercise of any power enumerated in
the Constitution—including the Commander-in-Chief power. The analytical
structure of our argument tracks closely the Court’s reasoning in Missouri. We
start with the premise that – in the absence of international rules – Congress could
not regulate the means and methods of warfare. For example, the President has
exclusive authority—again, in the absence of international rules—to decide
whether to bomb “undefended towns.” We then posit formal international rules
prohibiting specific means and methods of warfare—including the bombing of
“undefended towns.” We then conclude: Since the international rule is binding on
the President, legislation to remove the constraint is “Necessary and Proper” to
execute the Commander-in-Chief power.383
Indeed, we can take the analogy a step further. Because the treaty power
is a federal power, when the U.S. ratifies a treaty, the act of ratification
“nationalizes” the issue (per Missouri) and shifts the locus of decision-making
from the state governments to the federal government. Similarly, because treaties
have the status of law, the act of ratification “legalizes” the issue (as in the
bombing of undefended towns) and thereby shifts the locus of decision-making
from the President to Congress. Absent a treaty, the question whether to bomb
undefended towns is a question of policy for the President to decide. But when
the U.S. ratifies the treaty, that creates a legal rule, and the President must comply
with the legal rule unless Congress changes the law.
*****

382

Id.
As previously discussed, the international rule is binding on the President as a matter of
constitutional law because the rule is embodied in a treaty that has the status of law, and the President has a
duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. See supra Section IV.B.
383
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In short, our argument is this. Absent international laws of war, the
President as Commander in Chief would have exclusive control over “battlefield
operations,” and Congress would lack the power under Article I to interfere with
the President’s control over “battlefield operations.” However, by ratifying law of
war treaties, the U.S. shifts the constitutional balance between Congress and the
President. The act of ratification empowers Congress to regulate—under the
Define and Punish and Necessary and Proper Clauses—matters governed by the
treaty, even if those matters would otherwise be subject to the President’s
exclusive power.
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V.
The President, The Courts, and The Geneva Conventions
Part Four concluded that the President is bound by the Geneva
Conventions. That conclusion provides little comfort to the foreign nationals
detained at Guantanamo Bay, or to the Iraqis who were tortured at Abu Ghraib, if
– as the Bush Administration maintains – U.S. courts cannot provide remedies for
treaty violations committed by U.S. military officers. Indeed, if U.S. courts are
powerless to enjoin ongoing treaty violations by the U.S. military, or to
compensate victims for injuries sustained as a result of actions that violated the
Conventions, then even if the President is bound in a formal sense, he is not
bound in any practical way because executive officials may continue to violate the
Conventions, secure in the knowledge that no one will stop them.
Part Five addresses the role of the courts in ensuring that U.S. military
officers and contractors comply with the Geneva Conventions. There is no
question that the federal courts would adjudicate criminal prosecutions initiated
by the federal government against individuals who allegedly breached the
Conventions.384 However, in cases where private plaintiffs initiate suits against
the federal government, government employees, or military contractors, the role
of the courts may vary substantially depending upon the identity of the plaintiffs,
the identity of the defendants, the nature of the relief sought, and/or the nature of
the substantive claim. For example, Guantanamo detainees may have greater
access to U.S. courts than prisoners held in Iraq or Afghanistan.385 Plaintiffs
might evade the bar of sovereign immunity by suing military contractors, rather
than government employees.386 There are many possible permutations and
combinations of plaintiffs, defendants, substantive claims, and remedial
mechanisms. It is beyond the scope of this article to explore all of them. Even so,
some discussion of the role of courts is essential to counter the view that the
President is bound only in a formal sense, not in a practical sense.

384
The War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441, makes it a federal criminal offense to commit a grave
breach of the Geneva Conventions, or to commit a violation of Common Article 3.
385
In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. ___ (2004), the Court relied heavily on the fact that the United States
exercises “complete jurisdiction and control” over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base to justify its holding that
the federal district court had jurisdiction over a habeas petition presented by Guantanamo detainees. See
Stevens slip op. at 12-15. It is unclear whether the Court would have reached the same result if the
petitioners had been detained in Iraq or Afghanistan.
386
In a recent case, plaintiffs sued private contractors and their employees for abuses committed at
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., Amended Complaint, available at www.ccrny.org/v2/reports/.
Notably, the complaint does not name any government entities or employees as
defendants. This may be because claims for money damages against government employees would likely
fail. See infra note 423.
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The approach adopted here is to consider in detail one particular type of
claim that plaintiffs are likely to raise: a claim by Guantanamo detainees against
U.S. government officers to enjoin the future use of interrogation techniques that
violate the Geneva Conventions. Part Five considers a variety of objections that
government defendants might raise to prevent or circumscribe judicial review of
such a claim. Potential objections include: a) courts lack jurisdiction to entertain
plaintiffs’ claim; b) the political question doctrine bars plaintiffs’ claim; c)
sovereign immunity bars plaintiffs’ claim; d) the Geneva Conventions do not
create privately enforceable rights; e) separation-of-powers principles mandate
judicial deference to the executive branch’s authoritative interpretation of the
Geneva Conventions. Defendants are likely to raise some variant of most of these
five objections in almost any lawsuit in which plaintiffs raise Geneva Convention
claims against federal employees and/or contractors. By addressing these five
objections in the context of a suit to enjoin the future use of certain interrogation
techniques, Part Five will demonstrate that the President is bound by the Geneva
Conventions, in a practical sense, because the courts do have a significant role to
play in adjudicating some types of potential claims under the Conventions.
A. Jurisdiction
In Rasul v. Bush, aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay sought to challenge
the legality of their detention by means of habeas corpus petitions.387 In addition,
they raised nonhabeas statutory claims challenging the conditions of confinement
at Guantanamo.388 The government’s brief asserted that Johnson v. Eisentrager389
barred federal district court jurisdiction both over petitioners’ habeas claims and
over their nonhabeas statutory claims.390 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of
petitioners on both counts.
First, the Supreme Court held explicitly that the federal habeas statute
“confers on the District Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ habeas corpus
challenges to the legality of their detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base.”391 Second, although the Supreme Court did not decide whether the District
Court had jurisdiction over the nonhabeas claims, it did state that “nothing in
Eisentrager or in any of our other cases categorically excludes aliens detained in
military custody outside the United States from the ‘privilege of litigation’ in U.S.
courts.”392 The Court identified two potential grounds for federal jurisdiction
387
388
389
390
391
392

542 U.S. ___ (2004).
Id. at 16-17 (slip. op.).
339 U.S. 763 (1950).
See Rasul v. Bush, Brief for the Respondents, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs.
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. ___ (2004) (slip. op. at 15-16).
Id. at 16.
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over petitioners’ nonhabeas claims: the federal question statute393 and the Alien
Tort Statute.394
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul, and its decision the next
day in Alvarez-Machain,395 it is uncertain whether the Alien Tort Statute grants
the federal district courts jurisdiction to entertain a claim by Guantanamo
detainees against U.S. government officers to enjoin the future use of
interrogation techniques that violate the Geneva Conventions.396 However, one
thing is clear in light of Rasul: if there is a federal statute that creates a private
cause of action authorizing suit by the Guantanamo detainees to challenge the
interrogation techniques being employed, then the federal question statute grants
federal district courts jurisdiction to entertain such a claim.397 Below, we suggest
that the Administrative Procedure Act creates a private right of action, thereby
giving rise to federal question jurisdiction.398
B. The Political Question Doctrine
Professor Yoo contends that the political question doctrine generally
precludes judicial enforcement of treaties.399 Although there is a grain of truth to
Yoo’s argument, he takes the argument too far. There are some treaty
interpretation issues that raise nonjusticiable political questions. For example,
Article 51 of Additional Protocol I prohibits any “attack which may be expected
to cause incidental loss of civilian life . . . which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”400 If the United States
eventually ratifies Protocol I,401 some individual or group might file a lawsuit
alleging a U.S. violation of Article 51. Such a claim would clearly raise a
nonjusticiable political question. The application of Article 51 in any particular
case requires a decision maker to weigh the potential loss of human life against
the anticipated military advantage. That type of cost-benefit analysis is a political
question because there is “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
393

28 U.S.C. § 1331.
28 U.S.C. § 1350.
395
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. ___ (2004).
396
Add a long footnote to highlight the issues that a court would have to address in resolving a claim
under the Alien Tort Statute.
397
The federal question statute confers jurisdiction on federal district courts to hear cases “arising
under” federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This means, inter alia, that federal courts have jurisdiction to
entertain any claim in which a federal statute creates a private right of action that entitles a private plaintiff to
assert his or her claim. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 279-80 (3rd ed. 1999).
398
See infra Section V.D.
399
See John Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1305,
1325-28 (2002) [hereinafter Yoo, False Sirens].
400
AP I, supra note 33, art. 51, para. 5(b).
401
The United States signed Protocol I on December 12, 1977, but has never ratified it.
394
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the issue to a coordinate political department,”402 and “a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”403
However, the fact that some treaty interpretation issues raise nonjusticiable
political questions does not mean that all treaty interpretation issues raise
nonjusticiable political questions. For example, on April 16, 2003, Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld approved a set of twenty-four “counter-resistance techniques”
to be used for “interrogations of unlawful combatants held at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.”404 Suppose that a group of Guantanamo detainees filed suit to enjoin the
future use of some of these techniques on the grounds that specific techniques
violate Article 31 of the Civilian Convention. Article 31 states: “No physical or
moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain
information from them or from third parties.”405 Application of the six factors
identified in Baker v. Carr406 demonstrates that such a claim is justiciable:
•

There is no “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department.”407 Indeed, a determination as
to whether a particular interrogation technique involves physical or moral
coercion involves a straightforward application of law to fact, something
that U.S. courts do on a daily basis in a wide variety of circumstances.

402
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Specific targeting decisions, which require someone to
weigh the expected military benefit against the potential loss of civilian life, are arguably constitutionally
committed to the President as the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl.
1. See supra Section IV.C.2.
403
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217. A different situation would be presented if the government decided
to prosecute a military officer who directed an attack that caused excessive loss of civilian life. 18 U.S.C. §
2441 makes it a federal criminal offense to commit a war crime. The term “war crime” includes, inter alia,
conduct prohibited by Article 23 of “the Annex to the Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, signed 18 October 1907.” 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(2). Under Article 23, it is
forbidden “[t]o employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.” Annex to
Hague Convention, supra, art. 23(e).
In a civil suit brought by a private individual, the allegation that a military officer employed arms
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, or that an attack caused incidental loss of civilian life excessive in
relation to the military benefit, would raise a nonjusticiable political question. Courts are not competent to
second-guess the official judgment of the U.S. military that suffering was necessary (as in a civil suit against
the military). In a federal criminal prosecution, though, there is nothing to prevent a court from deciding that
an attack was “calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.” In cases where the military decides that suffering
was unnecessary (as in a war crimes prosecution), courts are competent to decide whether the officer’s action
was “calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.”
404
Memorandum for the Commander, US Southern Command (Apr. 16, 2003), available at
www.washingtonpost.com: “Bush Administration Documents on Interrogation.”
405
Civilian Convention, supra note 10, art. 31. See also POW Convention, supra note 10, art. 17 (“No
physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure
from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened,
insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.”)
406
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
407
Id., at 217.
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•

•

•

•

408
409

There is not “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving” the question.408 To the contrary, the Geneva Conventions
specify in detail precisely who are “protected persons.”409 Moreover
courts, no less than executive officials, are capable of determining what
constitutes “physical or moral coercion.”
These questions can be decided “without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”410 The political branches
already made the initial policy determination to refrain from using
physical or moral coercion against protected persons when they decided to
ratify the Geneva Conventions.
A court could resolve these questions “without expressing lack of respect
due coordinate branches of government.”411 Although courts frequently
defer to the executive branch’s interpretation of a treaty, there are many
cases in which courts have adopted interpretations that conflict directly
with views espoused by the executive branch.412 In such cases, courts are
not manifesting a lack of respect for the executive. Rather, they are
exercising their constitutional power to decide cases in accordance with
the “Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . .
under their Authority.”413
The Bush Administration may well claim that the war on terrorism creates
“an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made,”414 and that there is a “potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”415
But the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay has already generated
substantial embarrassment by subjecting the United States to widespread
criticism for its alleged failure to comply with international humanitarian
and human rights law.416 A judicial decision on the issue could potentially
help ameliorate this problem, either by providing a reasoned opinion
substantiating U.S. compliance with international law, or by remedying
any previous non-compliance.
Id.
See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 479-494 and accompanying

text.
410

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
Id.
412
See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 953,
962 (1994) (citing cases).
413
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
414
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
415
Id. at 217.
416
See JENNIFER ELSEA, TREATMENT OF BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 1–5
(2003) (documenting the storm of controversy surrounding the POW issue); Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in
our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the International Legal Order, 81
N.C. L. REV. 1, 10 n.24 (2002) (same).
411

84

Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?
Draft – July 17, 2004

In sum, the Geneva Conventions present some treaty interpretation issues
that raise nonjusticiable political questions, which are constitutionally committed
to the executive branch. But the Geneva Conventions also present some treaty
interpretation questions that are well within the scope of judicial competence.
Specific cases will inevitably involve difficult line-drawing problems that will
require a judgment about whether a particular treaty interpretation issue is within
the scope of judicial competence. In such cases, the critical question is: who
decides? Does the judiciary have the constitutional power to decide which treaty
interpretation issues are justiciable? Or, is the judiciary required to defer to the
President’s determination that a particular treaty interpretation issue is
nonjusticiable (in which case the President would not be bound by the Geneva
Conventions)?
In several court cases, the executive branch has espoused the view that the
President, not the judicial branch, gets the final say as to whether a particular
treaty interpretation issue is nonjusticiable.417 To the best of our knowledge, no
court has ever conceded this point. Nor could any court concede this point
without doing serious damage to the separation of powers principles that are
embedded in our constitutional structure. The Framers drafted a constitution that
divides power in order to promote certain policy objectives, one of which is to
maintain a balance among the branches.418 Judicial recognition of an executive
power to decide, by Presidential fiat, that certain treaty interpretation issues are
nonjusticiable would destroy the balance between the executive and judicial
branches to the detriment of the People in whose name the President governs.
The Constitution grants the judicial branch the power to determine which issues
are justiciable, and which issues are nonjusticiable, so that the judiciary can
perform its constitutional function of protecting individuals from executive
overreaching. Therefore, the President is bound by the Geneva Conventions
because his interpretation of at least some treaty provisions is subject to judicial
review, and the power to determine which treaty provisions are justiciable belongs
to the judicial branch, not the President.
C. Sovereign Immunity
417
See David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1439, 1483 (1999) (summarizing U.S. amicus brief submitted to the Fourth Circuit as follows:
“The United States’s argument appeared to reduce to the proposition that any case implicating a treaty right
is, upon the election of the executive branch, capable of being characterized as a political question and thus
rendered nonjusticiable.”).
418
See Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 200, at 1729-30 (1996) (“The Founders
embraced separation of powers to further several widely agreed-upon goals . . . including balance among the
branches, responsibility or accountability to the electorate, and energetic, efficient government.”)

85

Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?
Draft – July 17, 2004

In his concurring opinion in Al Odah v. United States, Judge Randolph
asserted that the Guantanamo “detainees’ treaty and international law claims are
barred by sovereign immunity.”419 Like the political question doctrine, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity undoubtedly bars some claims against federal
officers and/or agencies under the Geneva Conventions. However, sovereign
immunity does not bar all possible claims and defenses under the treaties.
For example, there are some cases in which criminal defendants have
invoked the Conventions as the basis for a defense to a federal criminal
prosecution.420 In such cases, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is inapplicable
because the doctrine applies only to offensive claims against the federal
government and/or its agents. Similarly, the federal habeas statute entitles an
individual to a remedy if “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States.”421 Sovereign immunity has never barred
habeas corpus actions against federal officers.422 Thus, habeas petitioners who
satisfy the jurisdictional and other requirements of the habeas statute, and who
prove a violation of the Geneva Conventions, are entitled to relief under the
statute without regard to sovereign immunity.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides a waiver of sovereign
immunity for plaintiffs who seek relief other than money damages against federal
officers.423 The waiver applies, with some exceptions, to any “person suffering
419

Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1149-50 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., concurring).
See, e.g., United States v. Lindh, 212 F.Supp.2d 541, 552-58 (E.D. Va. 2002) (U.S. citizen charged
with violations of federal anti-terrorism statutes invoked defense based on POW Convention); United States
v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1506, 1525-28 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (Commander-in-Chief of Panamanian Defense
Forces charged with various narcotics offenses raised defense based on POW Convention).
421
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1994) (emphasis added).
422
Petitions for writs addressed to individual officers do not implicate sovereign immunity. See, e.g.,
LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS (2nd ed. 2003) (“Actions for common law writs are prototypical officer
suits, neatly avoiding the government’s sovereign immunity.”).
423
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (“An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money
damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an
official capacity . . . shall not be dismissed . . . on the ground that it is against the United States.”). See also
H. Rep. No. 94-1656 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.S.C.A.N. 6121, 6121 (stating that the purpose of the
proposed amendment to the APA was “to remove the defense of sovereign immunity as a bar to judicial
review of Federal administrative action otherwise subject to judicial review.”).
Whereas the APA provides a waiver of sovereign immunity for at least some plaintiffs who seek
declaratory and/or injunctive relief for violations of the Geneva Conventions, sovereign immunity poses a
larger hurdle for plaintiffs who seek money damages. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does provide a
waiver of sovereign immunity in some cases where plaintiffs seek money damages from the United States for
torts committed by federal employees. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (providing that the United States shall be liable
“in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances”). However,
substantive liability is determined “in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred,” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), and the remedy provided by the FTCA “is exclusive of any other civil
420
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legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action.”424 A violation of individual rights protected by a treaty is a “legal
wrong” within the meaning of the APA.425 Therefore, an individual who seeks
declaratory and/or injunctive relief against a federal officer for an alleged
violation of his or her rights under the Geneva Conventions could potentially
bring a claim under the APA. Of course, the APA includes various limitations on
its waiver of sovereign immunity.426 Accordingly, some claims for declaratory
and/or injunctive relief for alleged violations of the Conventions may be barred by
sovereign immunity. However, there is no a priori reason to think that the
various limitations on the APA will bar all possible claims under the Geneva
Conventions. To the contrary, case-by-case decisions will be necessary to
determine the applicability of the APA in particular circumstances.
Recall the previous hypothetical: a group of Guantanamo detainees filed suit
to enjoin the future use of certain interrogation techniques approved by Secretary
Rumsfeld on the grounds that specific techniques violate Article 31 of the Civilian
Convention. This is similar to one of the claims raised by the plaintiffs in Al
Odah v. United States. 427 In his concurring opinion in Al Odah, Judge Randolph
presented two distinct arguments against judicial review under the APA. First, he
argued that APA review is barred because the APA excludes judicial review of
acts by “military authority exercised in the field in time of war.”428 This argument
is unpersuasive. Assuming that the Guantanamo detainees are subject to “military
authority exercised . . . in time of war,” they are clearly not “in the field,” because
action or proceeding for money damages by reason of the same subject matter.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1).
Thus, the statutory scheme appears to preclude a damages remedy for a violation of the Geneva Conventions,
unless that violation would give rise to a state tort law claim. Even assuming that the violation constitutes a
tort under state law, the waiver does not apply to “any claim arising in a foreign country,” 28 U.S.C. §
2680(k), or to “any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces . . . during
time of war.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j).
424
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
425
See Sloss, supra note 135, at 1135 (citing cases).
426
For example, judicial review of agency action is not permitted under the APA if “statutes preclude
judicial review,” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1994), or if certain decisions are “committed to agency discretion by
law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1994). We address both limitations below. See infra notes 431-436 and
accompanying text (in V.C, discussing the “agency discretion” provision) and notes 451-462 and
accompanying text (in V.D, addressing the argument that “statutes preclude judicial review”).
427
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (affirming Rasul v. Bush, 215 F.Supp.2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002)). In
Rasul, the district court decided two separate cases, brought on behalf of two different groups of Guantanamo
detainees, that were consolidated at the district court level. In the Rasul case, the petitioners explicitly sought
release from custody, and labeled their claim as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 57. In contrast,
the Al Odah plaintiffs stated explicitly that they did not seek release from custody; rather, they sought
injunctive relief related to the conditions of confinement, id. at 58, and they invoked the APA as a basis for
judicial review. See 321 F.3d, at 1149-50 (Randolph, J., concurring). Thus, the hypothetical case here is
similar to the Al Odah complaint.
428
Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1149 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1)(G), 701(b)(1)(G)) (Randolph, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
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they are detained in a military prison thousands of miles away from the battlefield
where they were captured.429 Judge Randolph’s interpretation of the statute is
flawed because it deprives the phrase “in the field” of any meaning whatsoever.430
Second, Judge Randolph argued that APA review is unavailable because the
military decisions being challenged are “committed to agency discretion by
law.”431 There may well be some claims related to the Geneva Conventions that
are committed to agency discretion.432 However, the executive branch does not
have unfettered discretion to decide whether prisoners held at Guantanamo are
protected by the Geneva Conventions because the Conventions themselves
specify who is protected, the Conventions have the status of supreme federal law,
and the executive branch must apply the law.433 Moreover, decisions about the
methods of interrogation used at Guantanamo Bay are not committed to agency
discretion because the Geneva Conventions limit the range of permissible
429

As Justice Kennedy noted in his concurring opinion in Rasul, “Guantanamo Bay is in every
practical respect a United States territory.” Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. ___ (2004) (Kennedy slip op. at 3).
Thus, even under a very broad interpretation of the statutory phrase “in the field,” Guantanamo Bay does not
qualify.
430
Judge Randolph cites two cases in support of his claim that the Guantanamo detainees are “in the
field” within the meaning of the APA. First, he cites Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234
(1960). That case is simply irrelevant because it had nothing to do with the APA. Second, he cites Doe v.
Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1991). That case actually undermines Judge Randolph’s claim. Sullivan
involved a challenge to an FDA regulation that authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) to administer
investigational drugs to U.S. military personnel without obtaining informed consent. The regulation
permitted DOD to waive the informed consent requirement only in the context of “a specific military
operation involving combat or the immediate threat of combat.” Id. at 1374. The government argued that the
FDA regulation was not subject to judicial review under the APA; it invoked the statutory exception for
“military authority exercised in the field in time of war.” Id. at 1380. Despite the fact that the challenged
regulation applied only in combat situations, the court concluded that the regulation was subject to judicial
review under the APA because the plaintiff challenged “the scope of authority Congress has entrusted to the
FDA.” Id. at 1380. Thus, Sullivan supports the conclusion that a claim by Guantanamo detainees
challenging DOD’s authority to adopt rules inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions would also be subject
to judicial review under the APA.
Judge Randolph’s opinion relies heavily on the following sentence from Sullivan: “Doe currently
does not ask us to review military commands made in combat zones or in preparation for, or in the aftermath
of, battle.” See Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1150 (Randolph, J., concurring) (quoting Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1380).
Judge Randolph claims that Al Odah is distinguishable from Sullivan because decisions regarding the
Guantanamo detainees involve “military commands made . . . in the aftermath of battle,” which are exempt
from APA review. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1150. In fact, though, the complaint in Sullivan was much more
closely connected to battlefield activities than the complaint in Al Odah. The plaintiff in Sullivan filed his
complaint in the midst of Operation Desert Shield in an effort to prevent non-consensual administration of
drugs to U.S. military personnel engaged in combat activities. See Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1374. Given that
Sullivan was subject to APA review – despite the statutory exception for “military authority exercised in the
field in time of war” – it is untenable to claim that Al Odah is exempt from APA review under the “military
authority” exception.
431
Al Odah, 321 F.3d, at 1150 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1994)).
432
See supra Section V.B.
433
The executive branch has some leeway in interpreting the Conventions, provided that its
interpretation is reasonable. However, the Bush Administration’s claim that the Guantanamo detainees are
not protected by the Conventions fails to satisfy even a deferential “reasonableness” standard. See infra
Section V.E.
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interrogation methods,434 and the President must obtain legislative approval if he
wants to utilize methods prohibited by the Conventions.435 Finally, the military’s
own regulations specify that military officers do not have discretion to violate the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions that govern the treatment of detainees.436
There is one other potential objection to APA review that merits
consideration. The APA authorizes judicial review of “final agency action,” but
“[a] preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling” is generally
not reviewable.437 Defendants in our hypothetical case might argue that APA
review is not available because Secretary Rumsfeld’s April 2003 order approving
the use of specific interrogation techniques was not “final agency action” within
the meaning of the APA. In practice, there is tremendous overlap between the
“final agency action” requirement and the requirement for plaintiffs to exhaust
administrative remedies.438 If a plaintiff has failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies, then agency action is not considered final.439
Conversely, if an agency does not provide any administrative remedies, agency
action that might otherwise be considered “preliminary” or “intermediate” will
often be deemed final.440 This approach is consistent with the principle that there
is a “strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative
action.”441 The “final agency action” requirement is not designed to preclude
judicial review altogether; it is merely intended to defer judicial review until after
agency action is final.
Based on publicly available information, it appears that the administrative
mechanisms available for Guantanamo detainees permit periodic review of the

434

See Civilian Convention, supra note 10, art. 31 (“No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised
against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties.”). See also
POW Convention, supra note 10, art. 17 (“No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion,
may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war
who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous
treatment of any kind.”)
435
See supra Part IV.
436
See Army Regulation 190-8, § 1.1(b) (“In the event of conflicts or discrepancies between this
regulation and the Geneva Conventions, the provisions of the Geneva Conventions take precedence.”).
437
5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
438
See KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.11 (3rd
ed. 1994).
439
Id., at 356 (“If a petitioner has not exhausted available administrative remedies, the agency has
usually not yet taken a final action.”).
440
Id. (stating that Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), was “a case in which the Court waived
the final agency action requirement based on application of one or more exceptions to [the exhaustion]
requirement. There is no apparent reason why the two doctrines should differ in scope or be subject to
differing exceptions.”).
441
Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986).
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fact of detention.442 However, there does not appear to be any administrative
mechanism that allows detainees to challenge the conditions of detention. In
particular, there is no evidence that the Bush Administration has established any
type of administrative review procedure that would enable detainees to challenge
the methods of interrogation being used. Given the absence of any viable
administrative remedy, courts should hold that Secretary Rumsfeld’s April 2003
order constitutes “final agency action” within the meaning of the APA.443
In sum, the defense of sovereign immunity should not bar a suit by
Guantanamo detainees to enjoin the future use of interrogation techniques that
violate the Geneva Conventions because the APA provides a waiver of sovereign
immunity.
D. Privately Enforceable Rights
The government brief in Rasul v. Bush asserts that “[t]he Geneva
Convention does not create privately enforceable rights.”444 This assertion
conflates three distinct issues: 1) do the Geneva Conventions create primary
individual rights under international law?; 2) if so, do the Conventions create
primary individual rights under domestic law?; and 3) if so, do the Conventions
create remedial rights for individuals under domestic law?
To answer the first question, it is necessary to consider specific provisions
of the Geneva Conventions. For example, article 137 of the POW Convention
states: “The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible and the
ratifications shall be deposited at Berne.”445 Clearly, this provision does not
create primary individual rights. In contrast, to return to our previous example,
article 31 of the Civilian Convention states: “No physical or moral coercion shall
be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from
them or from third parties.”446 This provision creates primary rights for
individuals under international law. It imposes a specific, mandatory duty (not to
exercise coercion) upon a particular class of persons (agents of the Detaining
Power) for the benefit of an identifiable group of individuals (“protected
persons”). Nothing more is required to establish a primary individual right under
international law.447
442

See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 65, at A1.
[Add long footnote explaining the “final agency action” requirement]
444
See Rasul v. Bush, Brief for the Respondents, at 39, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs.
445
POW Convention, supra note 10, art. 137.
446
Civilian Convention, supra note 10, art. 31.
447
In the LaGrand Case, Germany argued that article 36, paragraph 1(b), of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations created individual rights. See LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America),
443
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The next question is whether article 31 creates primary rights for
individuals under domestic law. This question must be answered affirmatively.
As noted above, the vast majority of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions,
including article 31, are Law of the Land under the Supremacy Clause.448 The
treaties’ status as Law of the Land means that the treaties create primary domestic
rights and primary domestic duties that correspond to the legal rights and duties
that the treaties create under international law. Since article 31 creates primary
rights for individuals under international law, and since article 31 has the status of
supreme federal law under the Supremacy Clause, it follows that article 31 creates
primary rights for individuals under domestic law.
The government’s assertion that the Geneva Conventions do not create
“privately enforceable rights” appears to be consistent with the preceding
analysis. Although the government’s position is not entirely clear, it seems to be
making the following claim: even assuming that the Geneva Conventions create
primary rights for individuals under domestic law, individuals cannot obtain
domestic judicial remedies for violations of those primary rights because the
Conventions themselves do not create domestic remedial rights for individuals.449
This claim makes sense only if one assumes that domestic courts should not
provide remedies for individuals who are harmed by violations of their treatyprotected primary rights unless the treaty itself creates a private right of action (a
domestic remedial right) in addition to the primary individual right.450

I.C.J. 2001, ¶ 75, available at www.icj-cij.org. The United States disagreed, contending “that rights of
consular notification and access under the Vienna Convention are rights of States, and not of individuals,
even though these rights may benefit individuals . . . .” Id., ¶ 76. The Court rejected the U.S. argument,
concluding “that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights.” Id., ¶ 77. The Court relied principally on
the plain meaning of the treaty’s text to support its conclusion that article 36 creates primary rights for
individuals under international law. The Court’s analytical methodology in LaGrand strongly supports the
conclusion here that article 31 of the Civilian Convention creates primary individual rights under
international law.
448
See supra Section II.A.
449
On the distinction between primary and remedial rights, see generally HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 122-25
(1994).
450
The government’s position manifests a “remedies first” approach: the idea is that courts should
decide first whether the law provides a remedial right. If the answer to that question is “no,” then courts need
not address the issue of primary rights. Hart and Sacks contend: “Lots of people have tried to think
backwards in this way. It is the essence of clear analysis to see that it is backwards, and instead to think
frontwards.” Id. at 136. See also Sloss, supra note 113, at 11 (“To think ‘frontwards’ in treaty cases, courts
should first ask whether a treaty provision has the status of primary domestic law and then, if the first
question is answered affirmatively, consider the availability of judicial remedies for a violation of that treaty
provision.”).
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Whatever merit this assumption might have in other contexts, it has no
merit whatsoever in the context of a suit for injunctive relief against federal
officers. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides a private right of
action for injunctive relief against federal officers for all claims within the scope
of the APA waiver of sovereign immunity.451 In Norton v. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance,452 plaintiffs sued the Secretary of Interior for declaratory and
injunctive relief to enforce the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA). Plaintiffs asserted a private right of action under the APA,453
apparently because the FLPMA does not itself create a private cause of action.
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, reaffirmed that “[t]he APA
authorizes suit” for federal statutory violations “[w]here no other statute provides
a private right of action” if the challenged agency action is “final agency
action.”454 Given that the APA grants plaintiffs a private right of action to sue for
violations of federal statutes that do not themselves create a private right of
action, there is no reason to bar APA claims for injunctive relief against federal
officers who violate a treaty that does not create a private right of action455 – at
least in cases where the treaty provision at issue, like article 31 of the Civilian
Convention, creates primary rights for individuals under both international and
domestic law.
A different conclusion might be warranted if the treaty makers had
manifested an intention to preclude domestic judicial remedies for violations of
individual rights protected by the Geneva Conventions. Judicial review of agency
action is not permitted under the APA if “statutes preclude judicial review.”456
Accordingly, a court might be justified in declining APA review of claims
invoking a particular treaty if the treaty itself manifested an intention to preclude
judicial review. For example, when the United States ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the treaty makers adopted a
declaration specifying that the ICCPR is “not self-executing.”457 That non-selfexecuting declaration provides at least some evidence of a political intent to
preclude APA review of claims invoking the ICCPR.458
451

See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986) (stating that
APA creates private right of action). The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, may also
create a private right of action for declaratory relief against federal officers who are engaged in ongoing
treaty violations. Detailed analysis of issues raised by potential claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act
is beyond the scope of this article.
452
542 U.S. ___ (2004).
453
Id. (slip op. at 4).
454
Id. (slip op. at 5) (emphasis added).
455
Add a note about the Alien Tort Statute and implied rights of action for treaty violations.
456
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1994).
457
See 138 Cong. Rec. S4783-84 (1992).
458
One of the co-authors of this article has argued elsewhere that the non-self-executing declaration
attached to the ICCPR was not intended to bar injunctive relief against federal officers for violations of the
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In contrast, there is no evidence that the treaty makers, at the time of
ratifying the Geneva Conventions, intended to preclude judicial review of claims
based on the treaties. One U.S. court has suggested that provisions in the
Conventions providing for diplomatic remedies manifest the drafters’ intent to
preclude domestic judicial remedies.459 The court’s logic is flawed. One could
just as easily argue that provisions in the Conventions providing for domestic
criminal prosecutions460 manifest the drafter’s intent to ensure that domestic
courts play a role in enforcing the Conventions. The fact is that the treaty text is
silent with respect to domestic judicial remedies in civil cases. That silence
supports judicial review under the APA because there is a “strong presumption
that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action.”461 Moreover,
under international law, there is a presumption in favor of domestic judicial
remedies for violations of treaty provisions that create primary individual
rights.462 Therefore, courts should not dismiss APA claims for treaty violations
without compelling evidence that the treaty makers intended to preclude judicial
review of such claims. The text of the Geneva Conventions themselves, their
negotiating history, and the ratification history in the U.S. Senate are devoid of
any such evidence.
E. Deference to the Executive Branch’s Interpretation of Treaties
In a brief submitted to the district court in Al Odah v. United States, the
Justice Department stated that the government’s position “does not mean that
aliens detained by the military abroad are without rights, but rather that the scope
of those rights are to be determined by the Executive and the military, not by the
courts.”463 In short, the Bush Administration has suggested that the President has
unfettered discretion to interpret the Geneva Conventions as he sees fit. This
section rebuts that claim.
It is firmly established that the courts owe deference to executive branch
interpretations of treaties. The question is: “how much deference?” The first subICCPR. See Sloss, supra note 135, at 1136-37. Even so, we concede that there is at least a plausible
argument in support of the view that the declaration was intended to bar APA claims for ICCPR violations.
459
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003).
460
See supra Section II.A.1.
461
Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986).
462
See LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), I.C.J. 2001, available at www.icjcij.org (holding -- despite the fact that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is silent with respect to
domestic remedies -- that the treaty implicitly obligates the United States to provide individual remedies for
violations of the primary individual rights protected by the treaty).
463
Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Al Odah v. United States, Civil Action No.
02-CV-828 (CKK) (D.D.C. 2002) (on file with author).
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section below contends that absolute deference is unwarranted because the
judiciary has an independent role in treaty interpretation.464 The next sub-section
assumes that something like Chevron deference is appropriate.465 Applying
Chevron deference to the hypothetical case in which Guantanamo detainees assert
that interrogation techniques violate article 31, we show that: a) despite the Bush
Administration’s claim to the contrary, at least some of the detainees at
Guantanamo are protected under the Civilian Convention, if not the POW
Convention; and b) at least some of the interrogation techniques approved by
Secretary Rumsfeld violate article 31 of the Civilian Convention.
1. Absolute Deference: Professor Yoo contends that the Constitution
grants the President exclusive control over treaty interpretation.466 He claims that
“the treaty power as a whole . . . ought to be regarded as an exclusively executive
power.”467 He correctly notes that Article II expressly grants the President the
power to make treaties, subject to Senate consent.468 Moreover, he adds, “Article
II’s Vesting Clause establishes a rule of construction that any unenumerated
executive power . . . must be given to the President.”469 Given that the power to
interpret treaties is “an unenumerated executive power,” he concludes that Article
II grants the President the power to interpret treaties.
Yoo is clearly right to suggest that the President has a limited power over
treaty interpretation. However, Yoo’s argument is flawed because it assumes that
the power to interpret treaties, in its entirety, is an “unenumerated executive
power.” In fact, the power to interpret treaties, like other constitutional powers, is
divided among the various branches. The Constitution states expressly that “all
Treaties made . . . under the Authority of the United States” have the status of
law.470 The power to interpret the law is granted primarily (but not exclusively)
to the judiciary. In particular, Article III grants federal courts the power to
464

This statement is not meant to imply that absolute deference is never appropriate. Indeed, there are
some treaty interpretation issues where absolute deference may be warranted. See, e.g., Mingtai Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Service, 177 F.3d 1142, ___ (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that the question
whether Taiwan is bound by China’s adherence to the Warsaw Convention “is a question for the political
branches, rather than the judiciary”). However, it is untenable to claim that the judiciary owes absolute
deference to the political branches in every case involving treaty interpretation.
465
Under the Chevron doctrine, courts will defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of a
statute if the agency is charged with administering the statute and its interpretation is reasonable. See
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
466
See Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 114; Yoo, False Sirens, supra note 399. For a partial
response to Professor Yoo, see Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 CALIF.
L. REV. 1263 (2002).
467
Yoo, False Sirens, supra note 399, at 1309.
468
See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
469
Yoo, False Sirens, supra note 399, at 1309.
470
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
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adjudicate cases arising under treaties,471 and Article VI gives state courts the
duty to enforce treaties.472 If, as Yoo claims, the Constitution granted the
President exclusive control over treaty interpretation, then the references to
treaties in Articles III and VI of the Constitution would be superfluous.
In some of its earliest reported decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed the
principle that treaty interpretation is, at least in part, a judicial function.473
Modern Supreme Court decisions have reaffirmed the principle that, although
courts owe deference to executive branch views on treaty interpretation, “courts
interpret treaties for themselves.”474 Indeed, there are numerous cases in which
U.S. courts have adopted interpretations of treaties that were at odds with the
construction espoused by the executive branch.475 Thus, despite Professor Yoo’s
contrary assertion, constitutional text and judicial precedent show that treaty
interpretation is not an exclusively executive power.
2. Chevron Deference: According to the Restatement: “Courts in the
United States have final authority to interpret an international agreement . . . but
will give great weight to an interpretation made by the Executive Branch.”476
Professor Bradley has suggested that this “treaty interpretation deference” is best
understood as a form of Chevron deference.477 Under the Chevron doctrine,
although courts are deferential to the executive branch, they “do not defer if they
find that the plain language of the treaty clearly resolves the issue, or if the
executive branch’s interpretation is unreasonable.”478 In this section, we contend
that courts applying a Chevron approach to a claim under article 31 of the Civilian
Convention would likely hold that: a) at least some of the Guantanamo detainees
are protected under the Civilian Convention, if not the POW Convention; and b)
at least some of the interrogation techniques approved by Secretary Rumsfeld
violate article 31.
471

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“the Judges in every State shall be bound” by treaties).
473
See, e.g., United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109-110 (1801) (stating that
treaty implementation is usually “superintended by, the executive of each nation,” but if a treaty “affects the
rights of parties litigating in court, that treaty as much binds those rights, and is as much to be regarded by the
court, as an act of congress”); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 239 (1796) (“In all these cases, it seems
to me, that the courts, in which the cases arose, were the only proper authority to decide, whether the case
was within the article of the treaty, and the operation and effect of it”).
474
Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961).
475
See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 953,
962 (1994) (citing cases).
476
Restatement (Third), supra note 22, § 326(2).
477
Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 702 (2000).
478
Id., at 703. Here, we do not attempt to defend a Chevron approach to treaty interpretation as a
normative matter. As a descriptive matter, though, the Chevron doctrine does a reasonably good job of
describing the courts’ approach to treaty interpretation. Accordingly, we assume that courts would adopt this
approach in cases where plaintiffs raise claims under the Geneva Conventions.
472
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First, the Administration’s claim that none of the detainees are protected
by the Civilian Convention constitutes an unreasonable interpretation of that
treaty. The government’s official position is that the Geneva Conventions “apply
to the Taliban detainees, but not to the al Qaeda international terrorists.”479 The
government’s rationale is that al Qaeda members are not covered by the
Conventions because al Qaeda “is an international terrorist group and cannot be
considered a state party to the Geneva Convention.”480 Thus, from the
government’s standpoint, the al Qaeda detainees are not legally entitled to
protection under the POW Convention or the Civilian Convention.481 This
position is flatly inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions—indeed, it verges on
the absurd. The Civilian Convention provides explicitly that it applies to all
persons “who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves,
in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.”482 There are only three
exceptions to this broad coverage. First, persons protected by one of the other
three Conventions are not protected by the Civilians Convention. Second,
“[n]ationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by
it.”483 Third, “[n]ationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the territory of
a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded as
protected persons while the State of which they are nationals has normal
diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are.”484
The Administration cannot rely on the first exception, because it claims
that the al Qaeda detainees are not protected by any of the Geneva Conventions.
The second exception has very little practical application because almost every
479

White House Press Statement, supra note 12.
Id.
481
As discussed in Part I, the Bush Administration concluded that Common Article 3 does not apply to
the conflict because it is international in character. See supra note 72. And as demonstrated above, this
position is flatly inconsistent with the text, structure, and history of the Conventions. See supra note 72. On
the other hand, it is unclear whether the Bush Administration thinks that the Taliban detainees qualify as
protected persons under the Civilians Convention. On the one hand, the government has said that the
Conventions “apply to the Taliban detainees.” Id; Fact Sheet, supra note 13. This seems to imply that they
are legally entitled to some protection under the Conventions. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld stated that the U.S. would, as a matter of policy, treat the detainees humanely, but he
suggested that the U.S. was under no legal obligation to do so. See U.S. Dep’t of Defense News Transcript,
Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability en Route to Camp X-Ray (Jan. 27, 2002), available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002. Moreover, there is no question that the Taliban detainees are being
denied some of the protections to which they would be legally entitled as protected persons under the
Civilians Convention. See infra notes 479-494 and accompanying text. This suggests that the Bush
Administration does not believe that they are legally entitled to such protections.
482
Civilian Convention, supra note 10, art. 4.
483
Id.
484
Id.
480
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state in the world is bound by the Convention.485 Some of the al Qaeda detainees
might legitimately be denied protection under the third exception, depending upon
their nationality.486 But the Administration claims that the Conventions do not
apply to the Al Qaeda detainees, regardless of their nationality. That claim is
contradicted by the plain meaning of the Civilians Convention.
The Administration also argues that the Civilians Convention protects
only “non-combatant” civilians; and, as such, it does not apply to “unlawful”
combatants.487 This position is also difficult to square with the plain meaning of
the Civilians Convention. As just discussed, Article 4 of the Convention defines
the category of persons protected by the Convention broadly.488 The provision
does not expressly limit the application of the Convention to persons taking no
part in the hostilities.489 Indeed, the Convention prescribes, in some detail, rules
governing the treatment of civilians “suspected of or engaged in activities hostile
to the State.”490 It is also important to note that the definitions of “protected
persons” in the other Geneva Conventions are, without exception, quite
detailed.491 When read in light of the other Conventions, the Civilians Convention
should not be interpreted as implicitly excluding from its protection a broad
category of individuals otherwise satisfying its definition of “protected persons.”
Moreover, the Administration’s position is expressly rejected by a consensus of
commentators,492 contemporary international war crimes jurisprudence,493 and
national military manuals.494
485

As of this writing, there are 191 states parties to the Geneva Conventions. See supra note 50.
To invoke the third exception as a basis for denying treaty rights to the Guantanamo detainees, the
Administration would either have to show that they are “nationals of a co-belligerent state,” or that they are
“in the territory of a belligerent State.” Civilians Convention, supra note 10, art. 4. Although it is not
entirely clear which states qualify as “co-belligerents” in these circumstances, there may be a few detainees
from such states. However, the Administration has consistently maintained that Guantanamo is not U.S.
territory. The Bush Administration cannot have it both ways. If Guantanamo is not U.S. territory, then any
detainees who are not POWs are protected as civilian internees, unless they are nationals of a co-belligerent
state. If Guantanamo is U.S. territory, then the detainees are entitled to federal constitutional and statutory
protections that might legitimately be denied to aliens outside U.S. territory.
487
See White House Fact Sheet, supra note 13.
488
Civilian Convention, supra note 10, art. 4.
489
Id.
490
Id., art. 5.
491
See Geneva Convention I, supra note 10, art. 4; Geneva Convention II, supra note 10, art. 4; POW
Convention, supra note 10, art. 4
492
See, e.g., HILLARE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE LIMITATION OF WARFARE, 137 (2nd ed. 1998); MICHAEL BOTHE, ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
OF 1949, 261-63 (1982); Jinks, supra note 48; George Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the
Determination of Illegal Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 893 (2002); G.I.A.D. Draper, The Status of
Combatants and the Question of Guerrilla Warfare, BRITISH Y.B. INT’L L. 197 (1971); Frits Kalshoven, The
Position of Guerrilla Fighters under the Law of War, 11 REVUE DE DROIT PÉNAL MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE
LA GUERRE 55, 71 (1972); Esbjorn Rosenblad, Guerrilla Warfare and International Law, 12 REVUE DE DROIT
486
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Second, no reasonable construction of Article 31 of the Civilian
Convention would permit the interrogation techniques authorized by the
Administration. Recall that Article 31 states: “No physical or moral coercion shall
be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from
them or from third parties.”495 By design, the interrogation techniques authorized
for use in Guantanamo involve the systematic application of physical and moral
coercion. And although the President’s Order depriving the detainees of all
protection under the Geneva Conventions also directed the military to treat all
detainees “humanely,” several techniques authorized (and no doubt utilized) by
the Department of Defense violate many of the most fundamental precepts of the
Conventions, including Article 31 of the Civilian Convention. Indeed, the
Administration acknowledges—in the very order issued in April 2003 by
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in which the Administration’s “mature”
interrogation policy is established496—that several of the techniques are
PÉNAL MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 91, 98 (1973); Knut Dormann, The Legal Situation of
“Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants”, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 849 (2003).
493
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., ICTY (Judgment), IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998, para. 271
(“If an individual is not entitled to the protections of the Third Convention as a prisoner of war (or of the First
or Second Conventions) he or she necessarily falls within the ambit of Convention IV, provided that its
article 4 requirements are satisfied.”).
494
See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL: THE LAW OF
LAND WARFARE 31 (1956) (United States) (“If a person is determined by a competent tribunal, acting in
conformity with Article 5 [GC III] not to fall within any of the categories listed in Article 4 [GC III], he is not
entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war. He is, however, a “protected person” within the meaning of Article
4 [GC IV].”); BRITISH MILITARY MANUAL, PART III: LAW OF LAND WARFARE 96 (1958) (United Kingdom).
495
Civilian Convention, supra note 10, art. 31. See also POW Convention, supra note 10, art. 17 (“No
physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure
from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened,
insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.”)
496
See Dep’t of Defense, Counter-Resistence Techniques in the War on Terrorism, Memorandum for
the Commander, US Southern Command from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, April 16, 2003,
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/62204index.html [hereinafter Rumsfeld April 2003
Memo]. This Memo, signed by Secretary Rumsfeld, details the Administration’s considered view on which
interrogation techniques—beyond those authorized in then existing military law and policy—are preauthorized in Guantanamo. See DEP’T OF ARMY, FM 34-52, INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION (1987)
(summarizing U.S. policy regarding interrogation of war detainees). The Memo is the endpoint in the
Administration’s evolving interrogation policy for Guantanamo. In January 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld issued
a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff reporting that the Department had determined that the detainees
were not entitled to POW status; and directing combatant commanders to treat the detainees humanely and
“to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.” Dep’t of Defense, Status of Taliban and Al Qaida, Memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, January 19, 2002, available online at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/62204index.html. Of course, the White House adopted this policy as
a formal matter in February 2002—formally established in President Bush’s February 7 Directive and
publicly announced in the White House Fact Sheet. See Bush Directive on Treatment of Detainees, supra
note 13. By the summer of 2002, combatant commanders had concluded that (1) many of the detainees had
been trained in counter-interrogation techniques; and (2) some of the detainees had information that could
prove quite useful in the War on Terrorism. See White House, Press Briefing by White House Counsel Judge
Alberto Gonzalez, et al., June 22, 2004 (opening statement of Daniel J. Dell’Orto, Principle Deputy General
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inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions (if indeed the Conventions apply)
including: the “Incentive/Removal of Incentive” techniques that involves the
withdrawal of privileges accorded to detainees as a matter of right by the
Conventions;497 the “Pride and Ego Down” technique involving attacks or insults
against the ego of the detainee;498 the “Mutt and Jeff” technique involving harsh
intimidation tactics;499 and the “Isolation” technique involving the solitary
confinement of detainees for thirty days or more.500 In addition, several other
techniques expressly pre-authorized may well violate the Conventions depending
on the manner in which they are utilized including several strategies relying on
the implied threat of gross mistreatment.501
It is also important to note that the legal memoranda ostensibly justifing
the use of these techniques only offer sustained analysis of whether the techniques

Counsel
of
the
Department
of
Defense),
available
at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/print/20040622-14.html.
These
conclusions
ultimately
generated a formal request to utilize so called “counter-resistence” interrogation techniques on detainees in
Guantanamo. The request makes its way up to the Commander of the Southern Command and then on to the
Pentagon. See id. On December 2, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld pre-authorizes combatant commanders to
utilize several harsh counter-resistance techniques in Guantanamo including 20-hour interrogations, hooding,
removal of clothing, forced shaving, use of stress-induced phobias like fear of dogs, and telling detainee that
he or his family are in imminent danger of death. See Dep’t of Defense, Counter Resistance Techniques,
Action Memorandum for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld from General Counsel William J. Haynes,
II, November 27, 2002 (approved by Secretary Rumsfeld on December 2, 2002) [hereinafter Rumsfeld
December 2002 Order]; Dep’t of Defense, Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies,
Memorandum for Commander, Joint Task Force 170 from LTC Jerald Phifer, Director, J2, October 11, 2002
(cataloguing the techniques referenced in Rumsfeld’s December 2002 Order), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/62204index.html. Secretary Rumsfeld, in turn, rescinded this preauthorization on January 15, 2003 pending a study to be undertaken by a special Working Group led by the
DoD’s General Counsel. See Dep‘t of Defense, Counter-Resistance Techniques, Memorandum to
Commander, Southern Command from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, January 15, 2003, available
at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/print/20040622-14.html. This Order did not preclude the use
of the controversial techniques, rather it simply directed the Commander of the Southern Command to
request in writing the use of these techniques if the Commander determines that the use of any such technique
us warranted in an individual case. See id. Following the final report of the Working Group, Secretary
Rumsfeld issued the April 2003 Order. See Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogation, supra note 7.
497
Rumsfeld April 2003 Memo, supra note 496 at Tab A, Interrogation Technique B.
498
Id. at Tab A, Interrogation Technique I.
499
Id. at Tab A, Interrogation Technique O.
500
Id. at Tab A, Interrogation Technique X.
501
These include: the “Dietary Manipulation” technique that may involve the use of hunger or thirst as
an inducement to cooperate, Rumsfeld April 2003 Memo, supra note 496 at Tab A, Interrogation Technique
T; the “Environmental Manipulation” technique that may involve adjustment of the temperature or the
introduction of unpleasant smells, id. at Tab A, Interrogation Technique U; the “Sleep Adjustment”
technique, id. at Tab A, Interrogation Technique V; and the “False Flag” technique whereby the interrogator
sets out to convince the detainee that the interrogator is a national of a country known for the harsh treatment
of detainees, id. at Tab A, Interrogation Technique W. Each of these strategies utilize implied threats of abuse
(via the further deterioration of living conditions or the harsh treatment of a “false flag” interrogator) if the
detainee fails to cooperate. As such, each is arguably inconsistent with the Conventions.
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constitute “torture” within the meaning of U.S. criminal law.502 The important
point here is that these techniques are plainly inconsistent with the Civilian
Convention (as well as the POW Convention and arguably Common Article 3)
irrespective of whether they constitute “torture” within the meaning of either
international or U.S. law.
*****
This analysis of potential treaty-based APA claims is, of course,
provisional and we offer it here to illustrate a more fundamental point: the courts
have a meaningful role to play in enforcing the Geneva Conventions. As a
consequence, the President is bound by the Conventions not simply as a formal
matter, but also as a practical matter.
CONCLUSION
The central issue presented in this Article is the question whether the
President is bound by the Geneva Conventions. The preceding analysis suggests
several reasons why the President is bound. First, the Geneva Conventions are
the Law of the Land under the Supremacy Clause. Second, Congress has not
authorized the President to violate the Geneva Conventions, or to promulgate
rules inconsistent with the Conventions. Third, any conflict between a
Presidential order and a treaty that is Law of the Land must be resolved in favor
of the treaty, unless Congress has authorized executive action inconsistent with
the treaty, or the President is acting within the scope of his exclusive
constitutional authority. Fourth, the rules embodied in the Geneva Conventions
address matters within the scope of Congress’ Article I powers, and the President
lacks the constitutional power (absent congressional authorization) to violate
treaty provisions within the scope of Article I. Finally, U.S. courts have both the
power and the duty, at least in some circumstances, to restrain federal executive
action that violates the Conventions.
When a crisis presents itself, there is a strong tendency to concentrate
power in the executive branch. The events following September 11, 2001
exemplify this trend. In response to that crisis, the Bush Administration has
adopted a variety of measures to augment executive power. It is not surprising
that executive branch officials responsible for conducting the war on terrorism
advocate an approach to constitutional interpretation that maximizes Presidential
power, and minimizes treaty-based constraints on the exercise of that power.
502

See, e.g., Bybee Memo, supra note 5; Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogation, supra

note 7.
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However, in the final analysis, it is both dangerous and counterproductive to
permit the President to utilize the war on terror as an opportunity to augment the
powers of the executive branch at the expense of the other two branches.
The U.S. Constitution was designed, in part, to limit executive power.
The Founding generation was acutely aware of the dangers inherent in a system
that concentrated power in the hands of a supreme monarch. To avert those
dangers, they created a governmental structure in which there is no supreme ruler,
because the law itself is supreme. Specifically, the Constitution accords
supremacy to three types of law: the Constitution, statutes, and treaties.503 To
ensure that the President is not above the law, the Constitution gives the President
a duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”504 That duty applies
not only to constitutional and statutory law, but also to treaty law. Therefore, the
President is bound by the Geneva Conventions because the Geneva Conventions
have the status of supreme federal law, and the President has a constitutional duty
faithfully to execute the treaties.
Some government officials responsible for national security policy may
well scoff at this conclusion. Constitutional analysis, they might say, must be
faithful not only to the text and structure of the Constitution, but also to the
practical realities of life in an age of global terrorism. Terrorists armed with the
destructive capacity of modern technology pose a unique threat to the United
States. Moreover, the President has a duty to “preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States,”505 which necessarily implies a duty to protect
and defend the people of the United States. If faithful execution of the law would
endanger the security of U.S. citizens, then the President’s duty to protect and
defend the people must take precedence over rigid adherence to the letter of the
law. The U.S. Supreme Court, the guardian of the rule of law within our domestic
constitutional system, has stated: “the Constitution is not a suicide pact.”506
In our view, the alleged dilemma that forces the President to choose
between protecting national security and upholding the rule of law is a false
dichotomy, at least insofar as the Geneva Conventions are concerned. United
States compliance with the Geneva Conventions does not endanger national
security. To the contrary, failure to comply with the Conventions endangers the
welfare of U.S. troops overseas, because other nations are unlikely to accord
captured U.S. soldiers better treatment than the United States provides to the
503
504
505
506
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enemy troops it captures.507 In addition, substantial evidence suggests that
mistreatment of the enemy directly undermines the war effort—by discouraging
surrender by the enemy, encouraging reprisals, decreasing morale of home forces,
and decreasing political support for the war effort.508 Moreover, U.S. failure to
adhere strictly to the Conventions undermines respect for the rule of law among
the international community.509 That, in turn, weakens our security, because U.S.
national security depends in part upon the willingness of other nations and subnational actors to conform their conduct to the requirements of international
law.510 Thus, it is a sad irony that Presidential policies that derogate from the
Geneva Conventions for the sake of protecting national security may ultimately
thwart accomplishment of that very objective.

507
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